Welcome to DU! The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards. Join the community: Create a free account Support DU (and get rid of ads!): Become a Star Member All Forums Issue Forums Culture Forums Alliance Forums Region Forums Support Forums Help & Search

eridani

(51,907 posts)
Sat Dec 27, 2014, 01:25 AM Dec 2014

Why foreign military forces trained by the US military generally fail

http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/26839-focus-the-training-game

The American military adventure in Vietnam produced an even more calamitous result. The decision by the Nixon administration in 1968 to withdraw US combat forces from South Vietnam led to a policy of "Vietnamization," where the US poured in billions of dollars to build and equip a robust South Vietnamese military capable of standing on its own against the combined forces of North Vietnam and the indigenous Viet Cong. A test of this policy came in the spring of 1972, when the South Vietnamese military, backed by US military advisors on the ground and massive US air power, beat back a concerted offensive by North Vietnam. This "success" led to Congressional action in the form of the Cooper-Church amendment in August 1973, facilitated by the testimony of US military officials as to the robust capabilities of the South Vietnamese armed forces, which effectively barred future US military operations in Vietnam. When North Vietnam resumed its offensive in March of 1975, the South Vietnamese military, operating on its own, collapsed, and Saigon fell to North Vietnamese on April 30.

The failure of the US military to adequately train and equip the armies of foreign allies does not rest on the issue of professional competence of those doing the training. Clearly, those called upon to conduct military training were qualified to do so, and the heroic performance of their trainees at the small-unit level underscored this fact. But it was the corrupting influence of politics that compels otherwise honorable men to put self-interest before the national interest. Men who would be willing to give their lives in combat wilt under the pressure of careerism for the simple fact that both intrepidness under fire and facilitating the whims of superiors, while seemingly contradictory behaviors, are traits that help one move up the steep pyramid of military command. Cowardice in the face of the enemy and speaking truth to power, likewise considered polar opposite behaviors, result in career termination.

The senior military officials who oversaw the training of South Korea's military in 1949-1950 knew that Syngman Rhee was a problematic leader of a problematic nation. The same can be said of South Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu, and Iraq's Nouri al-Maliki. If war is an extension of politics, so too are armies an appendage of the bodies they serve. There is an old proverb that states "a fish stinks from the head." This holds true of nations as well, and if a government fails to command the respect and loyalty of the people it governs, then an army drawn from the ranks of those very same people cannot be expected to fight and die in its name. This is the fundamental problem facing the US military as it prepares to train yet another fighting force in both Iraq and Syria. Nouri al-Maliki might be gone, but the government that replaced him continues to implement his policies. There is no political leadership of the "Free Syrian Army" worthy of the name.

Two new American generals have been summoned to oversee the training effort in Iraq. Lieutenant General James Terry will lead the effort, supported by Major General Paul Funk II. Each will, in due course, be called upon to testify before Congress as to the progress they are making in their mission. Neither will earn an additional star if they report back that their charges are militarily incapable of achieving the optimistic objectives set forth by the Obama administration. Congress can anticipate that each of these men, and any others they call upon to testify, will provide them with the sort of pat answers one has come to expect from such hearings. That is how the training game is played in Washington, DC. There is a tongue-in-cheek definition of insanity that attributes the affliction to anyone who does the same thing over and over again, yet expects a different result. The fact of the matter is, void of meaningful political change in both Iraq and within the political leadership of the "Free Syrian Army," there will be no cause in either of those countries worthy of the sacrifice of the men America plans to train to fight in the spring offensive of 2015. We've been down this path before, outside Seoul in June 1950, Xuan Loc in April 1975, and Mosul in June 2013. The outcome is tragically predictable, no matter how hard our politicians try to convince us otherwise.


3 replies = new reply since forum marked as read
Highlight: NoneDon't highlight anything 5 newestHighlight 5 most recent replies
Why foreign military forces trained by the US military generally fail (Original Post) eridani Dec 2014 OP
S Unable to Counter ISIS Despite Billions Spent on Weapons eridani Dec 2014 #1
'The outcome is tragically predictable, no matter how hard our politicians try KG Dec 2014 #2
That simple - the PR BS does not work malaise Dec 2014 #3

eridani

(51,907 posts)
1. S Unable to Counter ISIS Despite Billions Spent on Weapons
Tue Dec 30, 2014, 03:27 AM
Dec 2014
http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/27766-us-unable-to-counter-isis-despite-billions-spent-on-weapons

Iraq this year has seen a more grotesque and wide-ranging failure than the inability to cope with IEDs. The Iraqi Army was created and trained by the US at great expense, but this summer it was defeated by a far smaller and less well-armed force of insurgents led by Isis. It was one of the most shameful routs in history, as Iraqi Army commanders abandoned their men, jumped into helicopters and fled. The new Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, admits that 50,000 “ghost soldiers” in the Iraqi Army had never existed and their salaries fraudulently diverted into their officers’ pockets.

The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service, some 350,000 soldiers and 650,000 police, had been built by the US at a cost of $26bn since 2003, according to the recent report of the US Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction. It is a fascinating document that demands answers to many questions, such as how did $9.4bn get spent on training, staffing and supplying the Iraqi police, though this force is notorious for its corruption and incompetence. Another $3.4bn went on supplying the Iraqi Army with tanks, aircraft, boats, armoured personnel carriers and other equipment, much of which was later captured by Isis. Curiously, Isis was immediately able to find crews for the tanks and artillerymen for the guns without any lengthy and expensive training programmes.

The 3,000 American soldiers President Obama has sent back into Iraq are to start training the remaining 26 brigades of the Iraqi Army all over again, without anybody asking what went wrong between 2003 and 2014. Why is it that Isis recruits can fight effectively after two weeks’ military training and two weeks’ religious instruction, but the Iraqi Army cannot? Maybe the very fact of being foreign-trained delegitimises them in their own eyes and that of their people.

KG

(28,749 posts)
2. 'The outcome is tragically predictable, no matter how hard our politicians try
Tue Dec 30, 2014, 07:37 AM
Dec 2014

to convince us otherwise'

malaise

(267,816 posts)
3. That simple - the PR BS does not work
Tue Dec 30, 2014, 07:39 AM
Dec 2014

on the ground. Despots are despots whether they are Western backed or not

Latest Discussions»General Discussion»Why foreign military forc...