Don’t Chase Putin Out of Syria — Let Him Fail On His Own
With each Russian escalatory step in Syria, the situation only seems to get worse. Critics pile on, citing it as an example of President Barack Obamas failed foreign policy, calling for Obama to do something confront Moscow, punish it for its reckless behavior, reassert leadership. But what would that something be?
Across the political spectrum, there are calls for a more muscular U.S. approach in Syria. Some are talking of proxy battles, while others are calling it a new Cold War and declaring a need to act tough to restore American credibility. But before the U.S. tumbles into something, its worth taking a step back and asking what Russian President Vladimir Putin aims to get out of this, and whether, if measured by his own goals, this brazen military intervention will work. I think the answer is no which should guide how the U.S. should respond.
Lets start with Putins stated objective for his intervention in Syria: fighting ISIS. This claim is preposterous. Few Russian strikes are taking place in Islamic State-controlled territory; the air campaign is focused on the opposition that is primarily fighting Assad. This is consistent with Putins inverted logic of the conflict, which as he stated at his UN General Assembly speech last week is as follows: Assad not only has a right to stay in power, but he in fact is the key to solving the ISIS problem. Unlike the United States and most of the rest of the world, who see the Syrian leader as a driver of the conflict, Putin asserts that Assad is the solution.
Russias motivation is simple: to protect Assad. Putin believes he is defending a basic principle against outside intervention that seeks to bring down an allied governmentas hes angrily watched happen over the last 15 years in Serbia, Iraq, Libya and Ukraine. And Russias military role in the Syrian conflict is hardly new. Theyve been there from the beginning as one of Assads only allies and chief weapons suppliers. Russian personnel have been on the ground throughout.
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/10/dont-chase-putin-out-syria/122686/?oref=d-dontmiss
cpompilo
(323 posts)let the U.S. take this opportunity to extricate itself from the folly that has been our military engagement in this enduring, unwinnable conflict. Further, let us use this opportunity to move swiftly via an Apollo program type effort to replace our reliance on a fossil fuel driven economy and convert to a mixed energy economy utilizing decentralized wind/solar, and hydrogen.
Igel
(35,197 posts)I think what'll happen is what's happening to a large extent in Ukraine. Carve out the loyal, pro-Russian territory "plus" and sequester it. No need for Syria to keep all of the territory it had if it can't be properly controlled.
That is one of the possible Afghanistan lessons. There were territories that could be controlled, those that could not be controlled, and if you separate them life gets easier. Esp. if you don't mind ethnic cleansing. You have defensible territory and a fairly well-defined border. Problem solved, no down-bogging required. In Afghanistan they were all into territorial integrity, so they had to also include Pakhtun areas that were harder to control and Turkmen areas that had their own aspirations. It was impossible to keep them all, hence the return of the zinky boys.
Another of the possible Afghanistan lessons--also a Soviet one--is that oppression counts. If you equally oppress all groups, except possibly one, then most fall into line as long as the conditions are harsh enough to justify it. The "Students", the Taliban, only succeeded because of Pakistani ISI support and the channels they provided for outside groups to funnel in arms and fighters. If Iraq and Syria both oppress the Salafist medievalites on their respective side of the border and cooperate, then they might be able to have sufficient levels of oppression if they can keep Turkey from letting fighters and munitions through and if they can keep the Sa'udis and adjacent countries from interfering. Assad knew this lesson once, but the real problem with the fall of Saddam was that the eastern border became porous. Saddam knew this lesson. So did Tito. Stalin. The Ottomans. And many others. (The West not only refuses to accept that this is a possible lesson, it first has to unlearn the lesson that unbridled numbers of cantankerous and rival ethnic competitor groups leads to anything but a multicultural nirvana. Point out 99 examples where this vision failed and they'll point to an example that is only marginally relevant, then claim that all the facts support their view. WYSIATI, even if you need blinders.)