A Subtle Alchemy: US Finds it easier to Occupy Abroad than to Withdraw

http://www.juancole.com/2014/06/alchemy-abroad-withdraw.html

A Subtle Alchemy: US Finds it easier to Occupy Abroad than to Withdraw
By contributors | Jun. 28, 2014
By Alan McPherson

In 2003, former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld infamously foresaw victory in Afghanistan and Iraq as demanding a “long, hard slog” and listed a multitude of unanswered questions. Over a decade later, as President Obama (slowly) fulfills his promise to pull all US troops from Afghanistan, a different set of questions emerges. Which Afghans can coalition troops trust to replace them? Will withdrawal lead to even more corruption in the Hamid Karzai government or that of his successor? Has the return of sectarian violence in Iraq been inevitable?

One assumes that the difficulties associated with withdrawing an occupation force are less daunting than those accompanying invasion. Yet the history of US occupations in Latin America demonstrates just the opposite: invasion itself raises the standards of political behavior in invaded countries to stratospheric heights, thus guaranteeing failure and disillusion when the time comes for withdrawal.



A century ago, the Woodrow Wilson administration promised non-intervention in Latin America, but then, in response to World War I, lengthened the already existing US occupation on Nicaragua and started two new occupations, in 1915 in Haiti and in 1916 in the neighboring Dominican Republic.

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Much like George W. Bush and his administration did in the Middle East, privately Wilson and his aides shared a vision of a Caribbean area remade in their own image, one where violence as a political tool would be abandoned, political parties would offer programs rather than follow strongmen, and the military would be national and apolitical. Wilson wanted, he said, “orderly processes of just government based upon law.” “The Wilson doctrine is aimed at the professional revolutionists, the corrupting concessionaires, and the corrupt dictators in Latin America,” he added. “It is a bold doctrine and a radical doctrine.”

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banana_wars



United States Marines and a Haitian guide patrolling the jungle in 1915 during the Battle of Fort Dipitie



Cuba (1898–1922)

Cuban Campaign
Cuban Pacification
Negro Rebellion
Sugar Intervention

Puerto Rico (1898)

Puerto Rican Campaign

Honduras (1903–1925)

Nicaragua (1912–1933)

Granada
Coyotepe Hill
La Paz Centro
Ocotal
San Fernando
Telpaneca
1st Las Cruces
2nd Las Cruces
Quilali
La Flor
Achuapa
Agua Carta
El Sauce

Mexico (1914)

Veracruz

Haiti (1915–1934)

Fort Dipitie
Fort Rivière
1st Port au Prince
2nd Port au Prince

Dominican Republic (1916–1924)

Santo Domingo
Guayacanas
San Francisco de Macoris