Religion
Related: About this forumThe Moral Landscape Challenge
The Winning Essay
May 31, 2014
Last August, I issued the following challenge:
It has been nearly three years since The Moral Landscape was first published in English, and in that time it has been attacked by readers and nonreaders alike. Many seem to have judged from the resulting cacophony that the books central thesis was easily refuted. However, I have yet to encounter a substantial criticism that I feel was not adequately answered in the book itself (and in subsequent talks).
So I would like to issue a public challenge. Anyone who believes that my case for a scientific understanding of morality is mistaken is invited to prove it in under 1,000 words. (You must address the central argument of the booknot peripheral issues.) The best response will be published on this website, and its author will receive $2,000. If any essay actually persuades me, however, its author will receive $20,000, and I will publicly recant my view.
Several hundred of you entered this contestwhich was an extremely gratifying turnout. The philosopher Russell Blackford judged the essays and picked a winner. Here begins my exchange with its author, Ryan Born.SH
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-moral-landscape-challenge
The winning essay by Ryan Born is at the link.
Harris responded to it today.
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/clarifying-the-landscape
Jim__
(14,075 posts)Predictable response from Harris.
struggle4progress
(118,278 posts)not simply presuppose, the correct theory of moral reality ...
Yes, well, that is exactly what one expects of a good scientific theory: it should enable us to predict clearly by some calculus what we expect to observe. But in the world, as we know it, moral thinking often has a large aspirational component, which doesn't always coincide clearly with actual human behavior, so "morality" (whatever species of it we might consider) is not directly observable but can only be discussed in ideal terms -- at which point, one encounters not only the problem that different people give different ideals different weights but also the underlying problem that individuals personally have ideals conflicting other of their own ideals: for example, many people will recognize both a moral duty to obey the laws of the land, whether or not one agrees with the laws, but recognize as well as a duty to disobey grossly unjust laws. If Harris believes he can solve such problems, he is welcome to lay out his axioms and his calculus and then to show how his calculus actually wisely resolves some nontrivial issues in practical morality; failing that, he has no satisfactory theory but merely an ideological stance
Jim__
(14,075 posts)This essay by Dwayne Holmes is a response to Sam Harris' response to Ryan Born's winning essay. This response is stated in low-key term, but is a devastating critique of Harris' position, especially in terms of changes that Holmes sees between the original book, The Moral Landscape, and Harris' clarifications in response to Born.
Unfortunately, I can't link directly to the essay but only to Scientia's home page. Clarifying Sam Harris' Clarifications is the 2nd essay linked to on that page.
A brief excerpt:
Harriss expanded definition of science relies on a loosening of criteria that can become problematic for those in traditional scientific fields such as physics and biology. His most questionable claim is that the existence of answers in principle provides sufficient grounds for defining something as scientific. If that were true, Intelligent Design (ID) theory would become classified as a legitimate science, as there are answers in principle to the questions they ask. The difference between ID theories and traditional scientific theories is that the methodology underlying ID cannot generate answers in practice. For many that is a critical distinction (and Harris admits his approach may not meet that criterion).
If we decide to accept a broad definition of science (just to let Harriss moral theory in), future court cases regarding science education may then hinge on being able to explain the difference between science (for people in lab coats) versus science (for everyone else) such that they shouldnt be taught together in a science class. Why make the difficult job of protecting legitimate science education any harder than it already is?
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By using the most generic conceptions of consequence and good, it is possible to force deontology and virtue ethics to fit into the category of consequentialist theory. But that would not change the fact that traditional consequentialist theories (like utilitarianism or TML theory) are characterized by vastly different ideas regarding what consequences are desired (including for whom) and how to compare choices when making a moral judgment. In fact, outside the extreme end of avoiding absolute misery for everyone, Harris has not made a case that alternative systems compare practical consequences at all while rendering moral judgments, much less in the same way as consequentialist theories do.
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That an abstract principle might be chosen (credibly) over practical consequences can be seen with a simple hypothetical. Imagine that scientific evidence emerges that a false belief in wholly benign star fairies (who help when all natural/scientific measures have been exhausted, and require no other false beliefs or actions against others) leads to greater happiness, health, and longevity. According to traditional consequentialist theories (including Harris) it would be right to maintain that false belief and promote it in others. More important, it would be wrong to promote doubt in others.
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