Reply #27: Haiti [View All]

Haiti and The Dangers of Responsibility to Protect
By Anthony Fenton *
Haitianalysis
January 3, 2009

As an emerging lobby advocates for the institutionalization of a controversial doctrine of "humanitarian imperialism,"1 and a new administration that is friendly to this doctrine gets set to occupy the White House, a reminder of the case of Haiti points to the potential dangers posed by an "operationalized" Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm.

Introduction

In 2004, Haiti's democratically-elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a small but well organized and funded opposition movement backed by the most powerful members of the "international community" - the U.S., Canada, and France.2

Doing what his father and Bill Clinton were unable to before him, President George W. Bush led the way in answering the question that had vexed consecutive administrations since Haiti's popular movement swept the Duvalier's totalitarian dynasty from power in 1986: "Who will rid me of this turbulent priest?"3

In December of 2005, Fabiola Cordova, the program officer who was overseeing the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) burgeoning program in Haiti described how, even after more than a decade of efforts to undermine, demonize, and isolate Aristide leading up to the 2004 coup, the U.S. based their political operations on the following calculation:

"Aristide really had 70% of the popular support and then the 120 other parties had the thirty per cent split in one hundred and twenty different ways, which is basically impossible to compete ..."

The goal, then, was to us "even the playing field' inside of Haiti under the auspices of 'promoting democracy." This translated to the establishment of policies operating in parallel fashion on several tracks. The political opposition, factions of which were linked to the 'rebel' paramilitary movement that would emerge, was bolstered in attempt to consolidate it as a united movement against Aristide. Meanwhile, Aristide's government was simultaneously isolated diplomatically, a de facto economic embargo was placed on his government, and aid money was circumvented around the government and given to NGO's, many of which helped form the opposition.

Combined with a variety of other factors, the strategy had the effect of creating an enabling environment for Aristide's extra-constitutional removal from power.

With UN Security Council authorization, the U.S., Canada, France, and Chile were the first countries to send their militaries in to "stabilize" the country. They quickly joined forces with the anti-Aristide political opposition and "rebel" insurgency. On the one hand, they set up a puppet regime that was swept clear of Aristide's Lavalas party, which was occupied by Western 'technical assistants' and Western-friendly 'technocrats.' On the other hand, the UN occupying forces joined the anti-Aristide insurgency and waged a counterinsurgency (COIN) war against Lavalas, whose members were included among those identified as anti-occupation 'insurgents.'4

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http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2009/0103haiti.htm