http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101fareviewessay10229/ellen-laipson/while-america-slept-understanding-terrorism-and-counterterrorism.htmlBenjamin and Simon also decry the impact that political scandals had on the last two years of the Clinton presidency and passionately denounce the media's obsession with Clinton's fall from grace. In their view, the press lost sight of the national interest and distracted the American public and government from core security concerns. The uproar over Clinton's decision to bomb the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan after the East African embassy bombings was a case in point. Critics questioned whether the plant had a military purpose and accused Clinton of using foreign policy to distract attention from his domestic problems. For Benjamin and Simon, the target choice was completely defensible, even in hindsight. They make a strong case that Salah Idris, al Shifa's owner, had ties to al Qaeda and that his plant was involved in the production of suspicious chemicals. But they have trouble accepting that the president's credibility was not strong enough to withstand the intense press scrutiny that would naturally follow such a high-profile, high-risk operation. One can agree about the excesses of some parts of the media, but the "blame game" that the authors play is more than a bit lopsided.
A few other instances of myopia slip into this first-person account. For example, Benjamin and Simon recount with some drama the millennium weekend, describing multiple threat warnings and the immense stress of trying to monitor and prevent any terrorist attack against the United States at home or abroad. But many of their colleagues were holed up in special 24-hour command posts monitoring not terrorism but the year 2000 computer rollover. For these officials, the burning question was not whether radical Islamists would strike but whether the world's computer systems would crash and lead to global confusion. Although the authors are obviously right to emphasize the importance of terrorism, it is worth remembering that the U.S. government must contend with a whole range of national security concerns.
TAMING THE LEVIATHAN
Benjamin and Simon's description of American counterterrorism efforts during the 1990s raises important questions about preventing future attacks. Can the big bureaucratic machine of government, with its intentional diffusion of power and multiple interests, work as one unit in fighting terrorism? Will officials in intelligence, law enforcement, and policymaking figure out how to overcome the competitive instincts and security concerns that interfere with effective information sharing? Will they find ways to gather more information more quickly about terrorists, without compromising America's fundamental civil liberties and freedoms?
Benjamin and Simon cannot answer all these questions, but they shed some useful light on what it is like on the inside, how well-informed and well-intentioned people sometimes focused on the wrong things, and how small failures of leadership can allow the bureaucracy to muddle along in its inertia. Their account makes one very wary of the real impact of the new Department of Homeland Security in rectifying the problems of the past. For every bureaucratic logjam it fixes, it will likely create new ones.
The authors, moreover, would like to centralize authority in the White House, so that all departments and agencies are accountable to the president and his team. Yet decades of history suggest that the American system of governance always veers away from excessively accumulating power in any one institution. Should terrorism push the United States to revise its core belief in checks and balances? more...