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Edited on Fri Nov-07-03 10:57 PM by mike_c
on edit-- sorry, I hit the Post Message button by mistake-- I'm still working on this and will update in a few minutes.
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Sorry, the link in the original post didn't give any real information. Thanks to all who have posted links to additional info.
Italicized passages are from WC's speech:
"we must be honest with the American people. That's something that President Bush hasn't done. There is no silver bullet - no magic solution in Iraq. There is no easy way out.
Every American should understand: early exit means retreat or defeat. There can be neither. We need a success strategy -for it is only success that can honor the sacrifice of so many American men and women; it is only success that will allow Iraq to stand on its own; and it is only success that will allow our soldiers to come home.
What does success mean?
Success means that Iraq is strong enough to sustain itself without substantial outside forces, but not so strong as to threaten its neighbors.
Success means that representative government has taken root, so that it can be a model for the future in the Middle East."
OK, this does not sound like a plan for disengagement to me-- it sounds like a paraphrase of the Bush* administrations' attempts to define an exit strategy that ultimately only prolongs our involvement and gives them and their cronies more time to rape and pillage. The only aspect of that "plan" that I partially agree with is that "we broke it, so we're responsible for fixing it." However, I don't think we can do so while we still have troops on the ground or administrative toadies running the show in Iraq. We should pay for it, but not run the show.
Back to WC:
"From the beginning, the Administration has insisted on exclusive control of the reconstruction and occupation of Iraq. This has cost us the support of other nations and made America a bigger target for terrorists. We must end this American monopoly. "
This is the best statement that WC has made about Iraq to date, IMO. I agree wholeheartedly. However, it stops short of saying that we must end the American occupation. I find that a bit troubling.
"Instead we must create a new international structure - the Iraqi Reconstruction and Democracy Council -- similar to the one we created in Bosnia with representatives from Europe, the United States, Iraq's neighbors, and other countries that will support our effort.
...We would still have a leading role - but you can't be a leader if no one comes along - you're not a leader if you're all alone."
Again, this sounds more like a plan for gaining legitimacy for continued occupation than a plan for disengagement.
"We must also transform the military operation - turning it into a NATO enterprise."
I disagree with this strongly, primarily because the U.S. still remains largely in control of NATO. NATO control of the Iraq occupation is a smokescreen to hide U.S. involvement behind a facade of compliant "multilateralism."
"First off, we want to distribute our resources properly. This requires US forces to run an agile, intelligence-driven counter-insurgency campaign, while Iraqi forces and our allies perform other necessary tasks. When it comes to our force levels, it's possible that some may need to be added initially to create the right mix of capabilities. You cannot measure success by a reduction in forces, and you can't declare failure by an increase in forces. It's better to do the job right so we can succeed and then bring our troops home."
Code speak for escalation. I think WC will get us in deeper. Where else have you heard talk about the need for effective "counter-insurgency forces" during the last half of the twentieth century? Will we NEVER learn the lessons of Vietnam?
"One mistake in Vietnam was trying to use conventional forces to fight an unconventional war. The more conventional forces we have in Iraq, the more logistics we need. The more unarmored humvees and trucks we have, the greater our vulnerability to roadside bombs. Most of our losses are being taken in routine patrolling and transit - not in active counter-insurgency efforts. The right mix of forces -- more special forces and other lighter units -- will reduce our "footprint," logistics tail and vulnerability, while increasing our ability to strike hard."
Sorry, I don't want us to "increase our ability to strike hard" in Iraq or anywhere else for that matter. Using the military as the primary instrument of American foreign policy is wrong, IMO.
"Today Iraq is a magnet for every jihadist in the Middle East who wants to take a free shot at an American soldier. We have to stop outside infiltration or intervention. Closing the borders will require real cooperation from the countries bordering Iraq."
More parroting of the BFEE line.
"Unfortunately, this administration has made the region wary of working with us. We must convince them otherwise to show them that cooperation with us is in their interest and will help their region, not with more wars but with more progress.
In both Bosnia and Afghanistan, we recognized that you cannot put a country back together if its neighbors are committed to tearing it apart. In both those cases, we engaged all of the neighbors, no matter how objectionable we found their policies or regimes, in our effort to stabilize those societies. We have yet to initiate such a regional dialogue with Iraq's neighbors."
I agree with this. But will the U.S. be able to meaningfully engage Iraq's neighbors if it continues it's policy of complete and unquestioning support for Israel and strong-arm tactics eleswhere in the ME? I don't think so.
"The French are wrong: we cannot transfer full authority to Iraqis before they are ready. But the administration is also wrong: we can give the Iraqis a much bigger sense of ownership over their country and move more quickly towards a government that answers to its people. Until Iraqis believe that they can control their future, they will huddle in fear and watch others attack - rather than stand with pride, expose the guerrillas and stop the violence."
The first line of this is a BFEE canard, plain and simple. Until we invaded and overthrew their government, the Iraqi's were quite capable of governing themselves. They remain so. It is a singular mark of U.S. arrogance to suggest that Iraqis have suddenly become children unable to handle their own affairs. Again, it's a smoke screen to obscure the real reason-- WE want to handle their affairs for as long as it is profitable to do so.
The last bit is essentially correct, but in the end replays the BFEE line that only a small proportion of the Iraqi people oppose our military occupation of their country, and that most of them huddle in fear-- not of their occupiers, but of the "lawless element" and a few "guerrillas."
"We should help the Iraqis move immediately to establish their own government, a government to replace the existing council. Because that council was chosen by Americans, it is not seen as legitimate in the eyes of too many Iraqis. But right now, there are 50 city and regional councils in Iraq - elected by the Iraqi people. Just as the State Legislatures used to elect members to our Senate in our own country, these councils should select new members of an interim government drawing from the existing governing council."
YES. I agree. This is the correct position, but I'd go further and say that the U.S. should NOT be a partner in this process.
"Finally, we should open the West to Iraq with exchange programs in multiple fields so that Iraqis who have been isolated for years can see the rest of the world -- what we are doing with our economy, schooling, health care, local media, how we run our government and take community action. Then they can return to their country to help guide the growth of the new Iraq."
I think this is a good idea in principle, but it's hard to see it working in practice-- we can't even get other countries to send armed troops to Iraq, let alone the kind of free exchange of citizenry that this plan presumes. Still, I think it is far better diplomacy than gunboat diplomacy.
OK, I've updated this now. Thanks for being patient. I still don't see much of a plan for getting us OUT of Iraq. Clark supporters don't seem to be able to distinguish between a disengagement plan and a plan for "winning the war." I don't think we should win this one-- I believe we should admit our mistake and find another international agency-- which we don't control-- to pick up th pieces in exchange for major mea culpas.
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