By Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus
Sunday, February 1, 2004; Page A01
The information was so startling that CIA Director George J. Tenet, accompanied by Vice President Cheney, trooped up to Capitol Hill to brief the four top Senate and House leaders the day after Labor Day 2002. The administration was gearing up to present its case against Iraq at the United Nations, and lawmakers were eager for any evidence that would prove Saddam Hussein was a grave threat.
In the briefing, Tenet and Cheney presented what one participant described as a "smoking gun": New intelligence showed Iraq had developed unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs) that could deliver chemical or biological agents. In addition, Iraq had sought software that would allow it to produce sophisticated mapping of the eastern U.S. cities. President Bush hinted at the evidence in a speech on Oct. 7, 2002.
And one year ago, when Secretary of State Colin L. Powell made a lengthy presentation before the U.N. Security Council, he echoed the concern: "Iraq could use these small UAVs, which have a wingspan of only a few meters, to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or if transported, to other countries, including the United States."
Since Powell's speech, however, investigations by U.S. weapons inspectors have determined that the UAVs, or drones, were not designed to spread deadly toxins but to fly unarmed reconnaissance missions.
The story of the UAVs -- just one part of the vast array of claims made by the Bush administration about Iraq's alleged weapons programs -- is emblematic of how U.S. intelligence on Iraq often was wrong, even when officials made efforts to cull the strongest material from a torrent of information.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1825-2004Jan31.html?nav=hptop_ts