It's far from "scathing." It's actually quite good, and makes more than a single point. Here's a link:
http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/2010_AAN_Golden_Surrender.pdfExecutive summary and postscript for the focus-challenged:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Reintegration is more complex and difficult to accomplish than is commonly appreciated. There are significant obstacles, including lack of trust, insurgent cohesion, and revenge attacks on participants. There is also a dissonance between the economic incentives offered by reintegration and some of the powerful social, political, ideological, and personal factors that cause people to fight.
A well‐executed reintegration scheme could have positive social, economic, and stabilisation benefits – and thus reduce the force of the insurgency – but if mishandled, it could do the reverse. Without intelligent design, effective delivery, and political resolve it has the potential to exacerbate local security conditions, undermine high‐level talks, and even increase insurgent recruitment. It could also distract policy‐makers from action to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Reintegration addresses the symptoms of the disease, and not the disease itself.
POSTSCRIPT
As indicated above, this paper does not seek to reach firm conclusions about a policy that has not yet been clearly defined or implemented. It has sought to warn against assumptions about reintegration. A well-executed reintegration programme, linked to wider political outreach and reform of government, could have major social, economic, and stabilisation benefits, but there are considerable obstacles to its success and a range of possible unintended adverse implications. It is essential that any reintegration policy takes account of such risks, in both design and implementation, and effectively manages and mitigates them.
It is also essential that reintegration is seen in perspective. As with the Chieu Hoi programme in South Vietnam, it might well achieve ‘tactical’ successes, but do little to avert strategic failure. Perhaps the greatest risk is that the programme distracts policy‐makers from addressing the root causes of the conflict, especially predatory, exclusionary politics, and the abuse of power. This would be treating the symptoms while ignoring the cancer.
Into what kind of society are we asking insurgents to integrate? ‘Golden surrender’ holds little appeal for those who are not fighting for gold. Indeed, there would seem to be as much need for the social and political reintegration of government officials and other power‐holders into society, as there is for insurgents. If this happens – through fairer politics, better government, and stronger development – it may well be that reintegration starts to happen quietly of its own accord.