Survey: People want receipt showing how they voted

No kidding!!! And this survey was conducted in Las Vegas where they had a combination of paper ballot voting, Sequoias with paper trails and Sequoias without paper trails!

"An Election Day poll in Las Vegas indicated that 81 percent of voters surveyed want to take home a private "ATM style" receipt to verify for themselves their vote was counted correctly, a consulting group said Wednesday."

snip...

"Nevada Secretary of State Dean Heller, the man responsible for overseeing elections throughout the state, opposes giving voters a printed receipt, however. He said that while it may sound like a good idea, it could lead to many problems."

(And Heller is the LIAR who told the nation that Nevada was 100% paper trail for this election!! Why lie? What does he have to hide?)

...more....

http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/lv-gov/2004/nov/12/517815076.html

I asked my poll worker for a paper recipt of my vote when I used an ES&S machine, and she looked at me as though she were in a daze.

Transparency, damn it all!

If you don't trust the machine to count your vote as you cast it, why would you beleive the reciept? If someone can figure out how to get an evoting machine to miscount votes as required while still keeping the audit votes intact, how hard do you think it would be to have the receipt reflect your votes perfectly, but just record different results in the database?

Sorry, but I never got the point of receipts...

The machine records your vote in it's database and simultaneously prints it on a roll of paper. You see this through a plastic window and can confirm that at least the paper version reflects the proper vote. Thats verification

The roll of paper is retained. The electronic votes can be used if there is proof that they're right. So you pick one machine out of each 100 at random and you hand-count the votes on the paper roll and compare it to the electronic tally. They should all match and if not then you compare one-by-one the electronic ballots to the paper trail and find out exactly which electronic votes don't match or you track down the counting error. This is audit trail and auditing.

Now you can prove that the machines are counting right. If people see the wrong vote on the paper then they yell and get it voided out and vote again. If the machine's memory fills up or if it breaks down halfway through the day then there is a paper record that can be counted instead of that machine's votes dissapearing. If you audit 1% of the votes by hand at random then you can add up all the hand-count results and compare that tally to the overall tally. The results should be very close to entire_count/100. If they are not then there are errors in aggregating the vote and you hunt the errors down.

None of this requires that people take home a copy with them.

...but don't they already do this through manufacturing and all the way through election day?

Audit votes are cast reguraly to do exactly what you state. Instead of "after the fact" detection, they can actually detect as the election progresses so if there's a "problem" (whatever that may be), it will be detected right away instead of afterwards. As far as I know, no audit vote has ever been founbd to be in error, so I'm not sure what other good the receipt does for you.

As far as taking it with you, bad idea. As someone suggested, that would be a proof of purchase.

Through manufacturing - perhaps for some hardware.
But the vote tabulations are run on normal PC's and they're often PC's that have lots of other software on them.

The machines themselves are certified regarding QA, power conditions, temperature conditions, static conditions etc. But there have been many instances where they fail in practice under conditions well within the testing specs.

The software is supposed to be certified. But it's often not (see California governor recall election). The certification lab gets paid by the vendor and when asked why they never complained about known problems they reply that the vendors "don't like to see
negatives in the reports". The certification does not test security.

The vote tabulation software does not have to be certified and often has no security. The Diebold GEMS system stores it's data in a Microsoft Access database where it can be easily changed without any security or trace. Rather like writing a check out in pencil, very
enticing for a partisan with access to the count machine to quickly tweak some numbers. Also easy to write a background program to be planted in advance to do this covertly on machines which might be chosen to be the count machine.

The vote tabulation weakness can apply to optical scan and punchcard machines as well as DRE machines. But those have an audit trail while most DRE machines have none.

Most states don't do the type of audit I described. But I'm curious about the 'audit votes' mechanism you mention. How widely used is the practice and where can I find out more about it?

Thanks

is that you can review them and then place them into a box that acts as an independent audit after the election, should fraud be suspected. So that in cases like the one we have today, where there are evoting machines that can be changed with no trace, someone can go open a box and count. It is an obvious solution to an obvious problem. If things really get out of control we could even set up a copying system that produced copies for any number of independent vote verification systems.

have it print out a double one one that would be dropped off in a box one that you can take home so you have the vote on the BB
the verification in a ballot box and your own slice of verification in your hands, that would be quite nice.

If I get a receipt with my vote then my vote can be bought or blackmailed. The receipt stays with the machine so that it can be counted independently.

...was because it was early voting, and my wife and I worked as poll greeters on Election Day. Dallas used optical scanners only on 11/2 - early voters had to use touchscreens.

The point of paper trails is so that you can look out a print out before it goes into a ballot box.

the Secretary of State keeps but they want their own copy so they can fight it later if challenged because it is blatantly obvious now that we can't trust most state elected officials who stand in a partisan context during elections and Heller openly campaigned for Bush in Nevada. Why would we want to trust him?

The cases in the article where it becomes possible to demand proof that you've voted or how you voted?

They talk mostly about coercion but it also makes vote buying more likely.

The take-home receipts are useless for recount purposes, but they could make an exit-poll type independent count easier.

Your points are part of it.

I don't want the state to have a record of my votes attached to my name. I don't want outside groups to have access to who/what I voted for. That information is for me to decide whether to share.

"The take-home receipts are useless for recount purposes,"

Agreed.

"but they could make an exit-poll type independent count easier"

Possibly, it could cut down on those who decide to participate fudging who they voted for. But I don't see how would that improve exit poll accuracy beyond a miniscule amount. After all how many people lie to exit pollsters?

There is no need to directly tie your name to your ballot.

The designer of the system could use a key field, somehow related to you, but not your name on another database that could be kept secret by encryption algorithms, or some other method. I am not a programmer, but I know it could be done simply and more accurately than what we have now.

Diebold, et al, also makes ATMs, right? 1) you always get a receipt (unless you tell it not to give one). 2) If you put money in and the machine doesn't record it to your account, you get PO'd. So these things are hovering above 99% accuracy (I imagine... I've never had a problem in 10+ years). 3) They are hacker proof. How come we can't get the same service for DEMOCRACY, for crying out loud?!!!

They would not try to hide the real vote unless they wanted to steal it.


The Fair election petition:
In the interests of fair elections we demand the following standards be instituted immediately for all electronic Ballot boxes and vote counting machines.

All programming instructions shall be written in open source code That code shall include no copy or include statements and all shall be hard coded. That code shall at all times be available for public inspection and pass independent third party certification for accuracy and reliability. After that certification the code and all hardware shall be secured no changes shall be allowed to the code or the hardware after certification.
The vote shall only be counted after a voter verified paper record of the vote has been created and retained.

All vote records and counts shall be transferred by verifiable physical means. Any CD DVD TAPE or other transfer medium shall be labeled with the counts and a date time stamp. All records and counts shall be reviewed and verified for validity and accuracy.

No modems internet connections or telephone connections will be allowed at any stage of the vote counting process.

That's it exactly.

That is why any election in which these machines are used is invalid.

The Fair election petition:
In the interests of fair elections we demand the following standards be instituted immediately for all electronic Ballot boxes and vote counting machines.

All programming instructions shall be written in open source code. That code shall at all times be available for public inspection and pass independent third party certification for accuracy and reliability. After that certification the code and all hardware shall be secured no changes shall be allowed to the code or the hardware after certification.
The vote shall only be counted after a voter verified paper record of the vote has been created and retained.

All vote records and counts shall be transferred by verifiable physical means. Any CD DVD TAPE or other transfer medium shall be labeled with the counts and a date time stamp. All records and counts shall be reviewed and verified for validity and accuracy.

No modems internet connections or telephone connections will be allowed at any stage of the vote counting process.

paper receipt or a paper trail. That legally there is a
big difference. The language for legality must be
"paper ballot".

Who was the young man who invented the e-voting machine after the 2000 election that produced a verifiable paper ballot that then was put in a sealed ballot box? I believe he died shortly after coming up with the machine in a mysterious car crash. I know I read something to that affect here on a DU post.

Help me find the post please. I tried searching for it a couple of times since then, but I guess I didn't search the correct forum or use the right key words.

hope this helps...

http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CRG411A.html
<snip>
Athan Gibbs devoted his life "to making sure voters in future elections would know their votes mattered". He died in a mysterious car crash on Interstate highway 65 in Tennessee in March 2004
<end>

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.ph...
<snip>
Gibbs’ death bears heightened scrutiny because of the way he lived his life after the 2000 Florida election debacle. I interviewed Athan Gibbs in January of this year. “I’ve been an accountant, an auditor, for more than thirty years. Electronic voting machines that don’t supply a paper trail go against every principle of accounting and auditing that’s being taught in American business schools,” he insisted.

“These machines are set up to provide paper trails. No business in America would buy a machine that didn’t provide a paper trail to audit and verify its transaction. Now, they want the people to purchase machines that you can’t audit? It’s absurd.”
<end>

http://www.technologycouncil.com/news.ez?viewStory=701
<snip>
Sterling offers his view of TruVote's advantage: "The TruVote system offers a voter-verifiable paper ballot that is printed under glass. The voter does not get to handle the paper ballot. The system allows the voter to verify the information on the paper ballot before the vote is actually cast. As such, we always have an independent paper audit trail for manual recounts. In addition, a second (optional) take-home receipt is printed that allows the voter to verify that their vote was indeed received, recorded and counted as intended. In addition, the TruVote system offers a state-of-the-art ADA interface allowing a voter to vote using voice recognition, numeric keypad or a touchscreen interface, all with an audio ballot. Setting up an election is extremely easy with the integrated ballot creation tools which come standard with the system."
<end>


:hi:

Maybe we can see that this machine is pushed to the surface of the much needed national discussion on election reform.

The 'Voter Confidence Acts' - H.R. 2239 & S. 1980 didn't have any impact upon the the priorities of issues which the electorate voted upon this year?

"Nevada Secretary of State Dean Heller, the man responsible for overseeing elections throughout the state, opposes giving voters a printed receipt, however. He said that while it may sound like a good idea, it could lead to many problems."

Do you think that any of the voters of Nevada might consider the possibility that the Republican Chairmen of the Republican controlled Senate and House could connect any dots for why either of these bills can't get on the floor???


HELLO! Do any of these people do their banking in such a manner? Does this mean that money is more important than "democracy"!!!



:kick:

I mean, really. How long has this been an issue now? And how many people did anything about it?

It's still possible to cheat the system and get away with it. :-(

Or your husband?

Or your father?

Or the man buying your vote?

The paper goes into a locked box, not to the voter.

Yet most think its absurd?

It's relatively astonishing how quickly people forget about oppressions and abuses. It seems we habitually get nostalgic for the 'unimproved' forgetting about the suffering and death that were inherent in the culture of such times. It's a kind of mental "historical revisionism" - even forgetting the very reasons and experiences that lead to today's practices.

The reciepts in the ballot box can then be used for recounts and to spot check the machines.

I vote for paper ballot to be the legal language.


P.s. do you have a receipt for that vote?;-)

this just proves that most people don't have a goddamn clue about voting and how it works.

So if there's a recount required, do they call up all the voters and ask them to bring their receipts with them? WHAT A JOKE.

Printed BALLOTS, not receipts. Jeeeeeeez.

for later recounting.
Private take home reciepts would be used for vote selling.

And you make it a mandatory-jail-time offense to ask anyone to show you their receipt, even a spouse or employee.

In cases of recounts or suspicions of fraud, voters may voluntarily produce their receipts to the candidate's legal team, or the legal team of the sponsors of the initiative being contested, for the purpose of independently verifying that the candidate or initiative got more votes than the official tally claims.

I don't know about anyone else, but that would make me happy.

And, since it's illegal to sell your vote, I just bet they won't be so quick to rat out the guy who paid them $100 bucks for their vote, either.

And do you REALLY want to go house to house trying to collect voting receipts for a recount? REALLY?

Receipts have NO STANDING in elections. They are futile. Your vote can just as easily be manipulated even if you get some sorry receipt.

There are no imitations on this. We have to have the real McCoy on this and that is a paper ballot. And, the machines need to GO********

we need a print out BALLOT that is verified and deposited in a ballot box...as a failsafe to "prove" the numbers.. That's all we need....The ballot print outs should be counted FIRST..recorded, and then the machine count.. It the number of voters and the number of votes match..everything's cool.. If NOT.. the paper wins.. It;s just THAT simple :)

Use your heads, peeps. Don't fall into the trap of "vote-buying" argument as a way to discredit paper ballots.

Which is more dangerous to democracy?

The fact that some limited operation could "buy" individual votes from individual people? Think of the mechanics involved in gathering thousands of "bought" votes and compare that to tens of thousands of votes can be skewed with just one phone call to a modem, or one skew in software, or one special card slipped into a ballot counting machine that makes the count run backwards.

The technology for a safe election exists. It's called three-part NCR paper. White copy to the ballot box. Pink copy to the voter. Yellow copy to an archive guarded in the event of a protested election and recount.

Emerging democracies have been using this "technology" in order to provide confidence in the outcome.

how do you know the pink copy matches the yellow and the white?

Are you allowed to go in at random and check?

Also, the receipt could be encrypted to protect privacy/vote selling...and you could take it in at will to check it against the archived yellow copy.

So, take heed Democrats!

how will the * dynasty continue in 2008?

Will be interesting to see them fight election reform in congress.

Feinstein: "We have four years to design a system where every vote can be verified."

Cheney: "Go f*ck youself, lady."

Hillary Clinton: "We have to be a beacon of democracy and show the world a true democracy is possible."

Frist: "This IS a democracy because WE said it is. Now pass me a cat."