The Washington Post's Walter Pincus and Peter Baker detail the "withering" criticism of the presidential commission that investigated pre-Iraq war intelligence, which, concerned that the same failures could plague estimates of Iran and North Korea's weapons capabilities, offered 74 recommendations to change the intelligence community from "an . . . apparatus plagued by turf battles, wedded to old assumptions and mired in unimaginative thinking." White House homeland security adviser Frances Townsend said changes would begin to be apparent in two weeks
Data on Iraqi Arms Flawed, Panel Says
Intelligence Commission Outlines 74 Fixes for Bureaucracy
By Walter Pincus and Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, April 1, 2005; Page A01
U.S. intelligence agencies were "dead wrong" in their prewar assessments of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and today know "disturbingly little" about the capabilities and intentions of other potential adversaries such as Iran and North Korea, a presidential commission reported yesterday.
While praising intelligence successes in Libya and Pakistan, the commission's report offered a withering critique of the government's collection of information leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, calling its data "either worthless or misleading" and its analysis "riddled with errors." That resulted in one of the "most damaging intelligence failures in recent American history."
The 692-page report to President Bush determined that many of the problems that led to the Iraq breakdown have not been fixed, and warned that they may be undercutting the quality of current U.S. evaluations of Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons development. To avoid a repeat performance, the commission produced a set of 74 recommendations intended to "transform" a sprawling intelligence bureaucracy that it described as "fragmented, loosely managed and poorly coordinated."
The report presents the most extensive examination to date of how the United States came to believe that Saddam Hussein was harboring secret weapons of mass destruction, leading to a war that toppled a dictator but turned up no such weapons. The report depicted an intelligence apparatus plagued by turf battles, wedded to old assumptions and mired in unimaginative thinking.
Yet while unstinting in its appraisal of intelligence agencies, the panel that Bush appointed under pressure in February 2004 said it was "not authorized" to explore the question of how the commander in chief used the faulty information to make perhaps the most critical decision of his presidency. As he accepted the report yesterday, Bush offered no thoughts about relying on flawed intelligence to launch a war and took no questions from reporters. <snip>
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A15184-2005Mar31.htmlhttp://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-curveball1apr01,0,959265.story?coll=la-home-headlineshttp://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-na-intel1apr01,0,1593904.story?coll=la-home-headlines