Learning from Fallujah’s agony
Scilla Elworthy
7 - 11 - 2005
The second siege of Fallujah by United States forces in November 2004 inflicted huge damage and casualties on the Iraqi city. Scilla Elworthy asks what went wrong, and what strategy could have worked better for civilians and military alike.
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With no time to take the path of negotiation, the coalition forces planned a “final” assault in November 2004 – “Operation Phantom Fury” – with US troops in the lead and British troops moving from the south to give cover. The US decided to subdue the city by force, closing all roads and putting it under total siege, as insurgents carried out car bomb attacks, killing Iraqi army and police, US army and Iraqi civilians.
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It is easy to be wise after the event. But some further, overall lessons are worth learning for any military operation in the future:
It is foolhardy to engage on an invasion of this kind without the language skills and cultural understanding to collect and use intelligence in order to bring civic leaders “on side”; An invasion promoted as “liberation” needs to treat the liberated population with the same respect that would be shown to people in the home country; The ability to use overwhelming force is dangerous; soldiers at all levels need to be challenged to use the minimum necessary force at all times; All of the above have deep implications for the kind of people recruited into the military and the way they are trained.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/fallujah_2999.jsp