The US is now rediscovering the pitfalls of aspirational imperialism

Bush's desire to implant western-style democracy in Iraq is profoundly reminiscent of past British imperial practice

Linda Colley
Saturday December 17, 2005
The Guardian


The war in Iraq has had at least one redeeming feature. Along with events in Afghanistan, it has revived serious debate into some of the most important and long-standing issues in history and politics. Type the four words "Iraq", "Afghanistan", "America" and "empire" into Google, for instance, and you get around 3.5 million hits. There are the usual mad bloggers and propaganda rants but there is also a wealth of discussion on offer that expands every day. Is the US an empire? If so, what sort of empire? Is imperialism good or bad, or sometimes both? And, of course: why has it proved so hard for America, the most formidable military and economic power the world has seen, to effect its will? The passion behind this on-screen questioning is evident. So, very often, is a limited understanding of what imperial ventures have usually involved.


In part, this is understandable. Before 1939 most of the world was still ruled by empires of some kind, as had been the case for much of recorded history. Since the second world war and decolonisation, however, most people have drawn their impressions of empire as a mode of rule less from direct experience than from one of two powerful mythologies. Some still veer towards the old, conservative mythology of maps drenched in pink and brave pith-helmeted sahibs doing selfless, transforming work for "native" peoples. But this view has increasingly retreated before a rival, post-colonial mythology. According to this, empires (especially European ones) always rested overwhelmingly on force and invariably provoked desperate resistance that ultimately painfully triumphed. Clearly antagonistic, these two selective visions none the less have something in common. They both make empires out to have been more powerful than historically was often the case.

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The British colonials were not big on democracy for the colonized, either. When you start from a bonehead premise, the rest of your "reasoning" isn't going to be worth much either.

When I first started realizing that my Dear beloved country was in fact An Empire, I started looking into it. I was deeply disappointed. I found out that Empires are very costly to the Empire, in many different ways. They might start out as "lucrative looting adventures", but eventually they become losing propositions.

First of all, the Empire reaches out and grabs another country. They take it by force. If they're lucky, the country has lots of natural resources, maybe gem stones, goodies, oil, slaves to exploit. In an implicit agreement with the people back home, they offer up their young men as soldiers, and the citizens get to share in the loot or booty. That's exactly what's happened here in the U.S.

Now it gets worse. Over time, the colony gets disgusted. They want the overlords out. They rise up. It becomes armed warfare.

The Empire has no intention of giving up its prize. The citizens have gotten used to having Ming Vases and lovely sapphires from India. But it becomes more difficult to hang on to it. More soldiers are sucked in, the death rate goes up. The Empire tries to placate the locals, or tries bribing certain leaders to keep the population under control.

Every method is tried, and they all largely fail. The price to keep it becomes astronomical. At some point, the Empire must give up its prize. But there can be a happy ending. Look at England. They gave up all of their colonies, and they are doing better than ever.

George, are you reading this?

Years ago, an economist I worked with, who was also a fervent student of history, told me of a study another economist had done. The study examined the British Empire and tried to evaluate whether, in the long run, each individual possession had been a profit or a loss to Britain.

He determined that only India had been profitable overall. All the others had been a net loss for Britain.

(Actually, that surprises me. I'd have thought that the American colonies would have been profitable in the long run because of the value of the Atlantic trade, still continuing. But perhaps he cut off his calculations when a given possession achieved independence. It might have been to complicated otherwise.)