The search for an exit (Lebanon war)

The search for an exit

Leader
Friday August 11, 2006
The Guardian

The truth behind the diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting in Lebanon, a truth which also lies behind Israel's threat to expand the war if it is not satisfied with the outcome, is that everything now revolves around an attempt to save Israel's face. The Olmert government has to be given a chance to climb down without looking too much like a loser and allowing Israeli forces to stay in Lebanon for a while may, at least in Israel's estimation, meet that requirement. That is why the powers are working hard at the United Nations and elsewhere to persuade the Arab countries to soften their position on a continued Israeli presence. It is not so much that the Israeli Defence Forces want to stay so they can continue hammering Hizbullah, they are being told, but that the Israeli government wants them to stay on to give the Israeli public the feeling that "we showed them". Those are the words of the liberal writer Meron Benvenisti, one of numerous commentators in the Israeli press underlining the many faceted foolishness of the Lebanon operation.

The most fundamental fact is that Hizbullah was, it is pretty generally agreed, on the road toward demilitarisation well before this adventure. The logic of Lebanese politics pointed toward a slackening of the movement's ties with Syria and Iran and the progressive reduction of its military activities. In turn, Israel's logic should have been to put up with the occasional provocation and wait for Lebanon's internal evolution to bring changes. If it did not, there would have been time enough to change policy. There is a Greek proverb which says "you don't go to hell to light a cigarette". Even if the campaign in Lebanon should lead to a situation in which the demilitarisation of Hizbullah comes a little earlier, how can all the damage that has been done in the past month be justified by such a small improvement in Israel's security?

The loss of human lives, the destruction of houses, schools, workshops, roads, bridges and power lines in a small country that was still in the process of rebuilding itself, the huge burdens thrown on the international community, and, not least, the damage to Israel's reputation, far outweigh any gains. That icon of Israeli policy, the "deterrent image"of the Israeli Defence Forces, is badly dented, for Lebanon has shown not only a dismal combination of poor political judgment and inadequate intelligence on the civilian side, but a failure on the military side to achieve the decisive results promised. It should not be forgotten that, while attention has been focused on Lebanon, Israeli military actions in Gaza have killed almost 200 people, while a good proportion of the Palestine Authority's ministers and parliamentarians remain in detention. What little there was in the way of an Israeli plan for dealing with a Hamas leadership in Palestine lies in ruins.

The growing realisation that the Lebanon operation was a mistake and that it has ended in failure is putting the government under increasing strain. Wednesday's six-hour cabinet meeting was punctuated by angry arguments and personal abuse. The veteran Israeli radical Uri Avnery predicted a few days ago that "the politicians will blame each other. The generals will blame each other. And, most of all, the generals will blame the politicians".

http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,1842204,00.html