How Superpowers Become Impotent
In Lebanon and Iraq, guerrilla tactics turn clean, mean fighting machines into wimps
by Richard K. Betts
BEING A superpower is handy. No government in the world dares stand up to the United States on a regular battlefield. Having more than a quarter of the world's GDP and a half-trillion-dollar defense budget gets us that much — and it's a lot.
Israel is a superpower in its neighborhood too. And yet these two militarily muscular powers find themselves strategically impotent in the face of age-old guerrilla tactics married to high-tech capabilities.
The U.S. and Israel are perfectly equipped to knock out Iraqis, the Taliban or Hezbollah — as long as they act like good enemies and come at us in tanks, planes and ships.
But as anyone watching the news knows, these enemies are not stupid, so they do not cooperate by fighting in the way we are suited to beat. Instead, in Afghanistan, the resurgent Taliban pins down NATO forces in hit-and-run attacks. In Iraq, opponents stymie U.S. control with roadside bombs, sniping and raids. From Lebanon, Hezbollah fires missiles into Israel's heartland. And on the Internet, Al Qaeda boasts that it will use radiological weapons.
Along with suicide terrorism and a willingness to incur massive civilian casualties on their own side, these guerrilla tactics threaten to transform nationalist insurgents and Islamist terrorists from manageable irritants, who cause suffering but never severely damage a great power, into formidable threats to the basic security of the U.S. and its allies
These frightening developments are a wake-up call for U.S. policy. We need to focus not just on polishing our military strategy but on which fights are winnable at an acceptable cost. We need to choose our battles more carefully. The ones we choose should be fought with overwhelming force, as Colin Powell wisely counseled, but also with overwhelming help to conquered populations who must be won over if peace is to take hold.
The complete article is at:
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0814-20.htm