IRAQ The War Within (The Progress Report)

The War Within
September 8, 2008
by Faiz Shakir, Amanda Terkel, Satyam Khanna, Matt Corley, Benjamin Armbruster

In his "fourth insider account from the Bush White House," The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008, veteran journalist Bob Woodward "tracks the growing alarm in the White House in 2006, as U.S. casualties mounted during Iraq's plunge toward civil war." Based on "more than 150 interviews," including conversations with the President and classified documents, Woodward's book "reveals that the administration's efforts to develop a new Iraq strategy were crippled by dissension among the president's advisers, delayed by political calculations and undermined by a widening and sometimes bitter rift in civilian-military relations."

Woodward portrays Bush as an out-of-touch commander in chief who was slow to recognize the threat posed by the growing Iraqi insurgency during the summer of 2006. Woodward reveals that, despite the Bush's public assertions that "he relies on his generals to tell him what to do," the surge strategy "came from the White House" and was strongly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General George W. Casey, the Commanding General in Iraq from 2004 to 2007. The surge itself, Woodward notes, was not solely responsible for the lessening of violence in Iraq. "At least three other factors were as important as, or even more important than, the surge," Woodward writes.

DETACHED PRESIDENT: As violence escalated in Iraq throughout 2006, Bush seemed detached from the reality on the ground. In a recent interview with CBS's 60 Minutes, Woodward reported that Bush could not understand why the Iraqis were seemingly unappreciative of "what we've done to them." "His beacon is liberation. He thinks we've done this magnificent thing for them. I think he still holds to that position," Woodward said. In 2006, Casey "concluded that one big problem with the war was the president himself" who viewed the war in conventional terms, repeatedly asking how many of the various enemies had been captured or killed."

Casey "confided to a colleague that he had the impression that Bush reflected the 'radical wing of the Republican Party that kept saying, 'Kill the Bastards! Kill the bastards! And you'll succeeded.'" Similarly, deputy national security adviser Megan O'Sullivan and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley tried "in the summer of 2006 to get an Iraq strategy review underway" but "they encountered resistance," and "it was almost a month before the president would be fully engaged" in the process. With the 2006 midterm elections looming, the administration, Woodward writes, did not want to acknowledge that "Iraq had gotten so bad that they were considering a new approach. That would play into the hands of critics and antiwar Democrats." Finally, "in mid-October, after months of inaction, Hadley told the president, 'I want to start an informal internal review'...'Do it,' Bush said."

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