|
First off, they ruled out anybody who knew the relevant bit of history, and could therefore learn from it. That alters the sample a bit, but makes it a comparable pool of subjects, so it's sort of hard to quibble for any purpose other than quibbling. While I usually enjoy a good quibble, not now.
Second, though, is this line: "The civil rights and antiwar movements taught Americans to question authority." No, they did not. They taught some Americans to question authority; they did not teach each American to question authority. Moreover, and more importantly, they taught Americans not so much to question authority, but to question the authorities, or to question some authority. There is a difference.
The former point is a quantitative one. It might just be that not sufficient people in New Haven that have learned to question authority are also unaware of Millgram's experiment to show up in the good researchers' statistics. But I think the latter is more appropriate for discussion. "Question authority" is not to ask questions of authority, but to doubt authority. Most of those saying to question authority do so not because they want information, or want their doubts cleared up: Most have quite clear ideas about what *should* be being done on a topic, and while the current centers of authority on that topic hold, they cannot implement their new and improved ideas.
Take racism. I recently was in the awkward position of being at my parents and deciding after one conversation with my mother that it was time for me to get an earlier flight home. She dissed a wanna-be politican who I firmly believed is not only dissable, but diss-worthy; yea, dissing her is a public service. Nonetheless, saying that she'll get the position because "she sucks up to n****rs" is beyond the pale, even for my dem-voting feminist mother. In 1954 that would have been the morally acceptable thing to say in most of American society. In 2008 it would make my mother a social outcast in most, I think, of American society. In the strata I'm usually in, moral authority is torn between simply saying racism is evil and racial epithets are wrong and saying that positive efforts to instill good will between whites and blacks are required. Questioning--doubting--why racism was wrong led to a mixed state of tolerance for both racists and anti-racists, but that kind of situation isn't stable. Publicly, the anti-racists have moral authority behind them, and like the racists of old, doubting their moral authority gets a bad reaction. We've replaced one authority that must not be doubted with another authority that must not be doubted, and it took about 50 years. But there's still an authority that must not be doubted.
I'm not sure how it can be any other way, and still allow to to talk about a culture and society, to be honest. You just have to have the right definition of "morality", and define it not in strictly religious terms, but in social terms. Many laws have a basis in morality; the question always boils down to whose. Lots of choices are binary; were they trinary, it still wouldn't solve the problem.
So I'm not sure why anybody thought the results would change, just looking at it from a narrow, mainstream-American-centric POV. Unless they thought that the slight change in "parameter settings" from '64 to the present were substantive, when the parameters themselves have barely shifted. Most of us just swapped in one value or issue for another as times and trends demanded, substituted one source of authority for another.
A more interesting question is whether anybody's tried to replicate Millgram's study cross-culturally, a term that can be taken various ways. Are the responses even across various US cultures (because surely American black, Chicano, or Indian cultures are different here from W Africa, Mexico, or even the Zapotec)? Are they across European cultures? Across cultures around the world, whether Europe-derived or indigenous in Latin America, in Africa, across the various Arab cultures, etc., etc.? If the results are fairly uniform, then it certainly says something about humans. If there's a lot of variation and it seems random, that says something else. If the variation isn't random, then there's a different set of conclusions.
It would even have been at least as interesting to see how those who *knew* about Millgram's study would act. But showing stability between one or two generations in a fairly stable society? Eh.
|