"The Iraq War" NYTimes review (J. Maslin)

here is an empty space on the textbook shelf for a definitive account of the destruction of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime. Despite the efforts of the eminent military historian John Keegan to fill that gap with "The Iraq War," the space will remain empty for a while longer.

Mr. Keegan has paid rapt attention to the scope and minutiae of warfare in "The Face of Battle," "The First World War" and other major efforts. He has made the Battle of Agincourt sound more timely than the ones he describes here. "The Iraq War" is a prim, already dated book with omissions and gaffes that will grow only larger as events march on. It refers to Abu Ghraib twice, once as a point on a map and once as an expressway. These references do not even share identical spelling.

Based partly on his interviews with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Mr. Keegan's book presents background history and battlefield details. Unless it comes to loving detail about jargon and equipment (no name or specification of a tank goes unmentioned), his tone is as arid as the terrain he describes. Here is his version of an event that attracted global scrutiny on account of pictures that speak far louder than these words:

"Iraqi opponents of the regime had already attempted to pull the statue down by throwing a loop around its neck and using muscle power. A marine armoured engineer vehicle now amplified their efforts. Its cable loop broke the statue's supports and Saddam's image collapsed face-forward revealing a shoddy framework of metal struts that had held it upright."

The use of words like shoddy hint at this book's pervasive snobbery, and its nose-holding inability to delve deeply into the Arab perspective on the events being described. Mr. Hussein is, among other things, "a completely uncollegial figure." Mr. Keegan has more valid points to make about Mr. Hussein's Stalinism than his social graces. And Mr. Hussein's "so-called" palaces were "large, vulgar, recently built villas." The war demonstrates "that classical military theory applies only to the countries in which it was made, those of the advanced Western world." Thus are the Iraqis made to sound positively unsporting for not playing by established rules.

"The Iraq War" immortalizes a "brief and brilliant" campaign led by American and British troops, who receive equal attention here; this is not a book to neglect the role of the Queen's Royal Lancers. Unfortunately, as Mr. Keegan acknowledges in a coda titled "The War's Aftermath," there have been some unanticipated problems since the campaign's happy ending. But by and large his emphasis is on successful strategy, and he hovers in a strange limbo between immediacy and hindsight. "At the culmination of the campaign," he writes, "it was believed that Osama bin Laden, the terrorist mastermind, had been cornered and killed. Later evidence, supplied by video and broadcast tape, dashed such hopes."

With its timeliness in question, "The Iraq War" is most useful for its overview of the history preceding the crisis. This short, concise book stretches back to when Iraq was Mesopotamia, and later when it was part of the Ottoman empire, to establish the requisite background. Mr. Keegan traces deep-seated historical antagonism between Shiite and Sunni Muslim contingents in the region. He tackles the daunting job of explaining the many and shifting internecine conflicts within the Arab world. And he explores the increasing difficulties experienced by traditional Arab leaders facing "fiercely anti-Western, anti-Zionist, anti-capitalist beliefs" among their own people.



http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/24/books/24MASL.html?8bu