Darfur's ugly resonance in the Arab world

By Rami G. Khouri

The relative silence of the Arab world has been one of the striking dimensions of the tragic events in the Darfur region of western Sudan in the past 18 months. Up to 50,000 people may have died and over a million have been made refugees there, as a result of attacks by Arab militias. The international consensus was reflected in the recent UN Security Council resolution giving the Sudanese government one month to disarm the militias and restore security. Human rights groups and governments in the West have described events in Darfur as "ethnic cleansing" and even "genocide," while the Sudanese government rejects these accusations and claims that no more than 5,000 people have died in the region.

Based on documentation by credible international human rights groups and the UN itself, the world finally moved to stop the human suffering in Darfur when the United States and the UN took the lead to act in June. Throughout the past 18 months, as the tragedy has unfolded in Darfur, the Arab world has been conspicuously absent from the debate. While a few voices in the region have spoken out for decisive diplomacy to restore security and calm in Darfur, many other voices in the media and among government officials have taken a much more relaxed stance, even accusing the US of meddling in the region to secure future oil interests.

The Arab silence on this issue probably is not specific to Darfur or Sudan, but rather reflects a wider malaise that has long plagued our region: Arab governments tend to stay out of each other's way when any one of them is accused of wrongdoing, and most Arab citizens have been numbed into helplessness in the face of public atrocities or criminal activity in their societies.

The modern history of the Arab world over the past 50 years has been defined by two broad trajectories that are intimately related: the concentration of economic and military power in the hands of small numbers of people who form the governing power elites, and that governing elite's steady provision of basic services and job opportunities to the citizenry.

Darfur's ugly resonance in the Arab world....

An interesting take from Abdullah Iskandar in today's Dar al Hayat

....the theory of Arabicizing, internationalizing, or Africanizing the Darfur conflict, politically and on the field, has been followed by the Sudanese government since the beginning of the crisis. It thought that this is the way to strike the rebels' credibility, and cover up the ongoing massacres.

When it became clear that this theory involves duties on its behalf, Khartoum returned the crisis to the internal arena. Thus, the crisis would be about sovereignty, and would be treated within an internal Sudanese framework. When the idea of a national conference about it was raised, the effective Sudanese parties were excluded, and other Sudanese forces were accused of conspiring against it. Hence, it gave up this failed idea to begin the phase of seeking a solution from the outside.

....

It is unlikely for contradictions and paradoxes in the official Sudanese stance to be a misunderstanding of the crisis or inability of treating its reasons. What happened in the past weeks indicates that the government's goal is managing the crisis with whatever tools are available. It is important to keep taking action, regardless of the nature of the actions themselves. However, what is dangerous in this policy is that the lives of millions hang in the balance, which Khartoum did not realize that it is difficult to ignore. Therefore, taking advantage of feelings of solidarity, support, and warning from foreign occupation, to maintain the principles of managing the crisis, cannot continue to serve Khartoum's interests.

Managing, Not Solving The Crisis

Less astutely, the latest word from the editors of Arab News:

The invective about officially-sanctioned massacres has been driven in large part by the non governmental organizations (NGOs) gathering reports from refugees. These reports have helped mobilize the international community to assist these millions of wretched displaced people. Though the NGOs were doing their job in drawing attention to the scale of the disaster, it could be argued that they were exceeding their brief when they sought to define the tragedy as “genocide.”

Angered by such charges, Khartoum was probably disinclined to allow the NGOs to bring in relief. This was an error because it merely seemed to confirm the NGOs charges of government-sponsored extermination. Why else would Sudanese officials be obstructing aid except in the hope that the Janjaweed gangs could complete their business of genocide?

It was never like that but the Sudanese government’s misjudgment and vociferous NGO’s claims combined to make it seem so. Khartoum, however, has much more work to do before it can successfully avert international interference. It could be argued that rejecting the African Union’s proposed military peace-keeping force was a missed opportunity. With AU forces ear-marked for Darfur, it would have been hard for Washington to propose a more widely-drawn peacekeeping force. Sudan’s voice also carries more weight in the AU than in the UN.

....

There is a final issue which has yet to be properly addressed by the Sudanese government and that is the alleged involvement of elements of the police and military in Janjaweed depravities. These are serious accusations which, if true, would indicate that some local officials have neglected their duties. The commission appointed by the government to look into what really happened in Darfur must try to do its work as throughly and as quickly as possible. Its report must pull no punches. If it seems balanced and fair, it will be hard for outsiders bent upon interfering in Sudan to take their case further. If, on the other hand, it seems to be a whitewash, the outsiders will have their case considerably strengthened.
Unexpected Support

I say less astutely, because, for one thing, the involvement of police and military in the atrocities has been confirmed by many independent observers, and examples of whitewashing have already been noted, for instance, already common criminals (including wine drinkers, aged men, and people who have been imprisoned for many years) have been tried as janjaweed.

In a recent news report, Still hiding in the forest, the villagers too scared to go back home, the reporter Kim Sengupta tells of discovering three young boys in an abandoned village. They gave the boys a ride to a nearby town, and had an encounter with a Sudanese government military patrol:

On the way we were stopped by a military patrol on three pick-up trucks. At first, Major Mohammed Aziz wanted to take Idris, the oldest brother, for questioning to their camp. When he was persuaded to change his mind, it brought angry remonstrations from an Arab militia officer who had to be physically restrained by some of the soldiers from dragging off the boy.

Asked whether he was a member of the Janjaweed, the man came out with a string of invective about zurghas, an insulting term for blacks. Major Aziz, who is African, and supposedly in charge of the patrol, looked away.

There had been "inter-tribal fighting" in the area, he said, and the Janjaweed had taken advantage. Asked if government troops had taken part in attacks and looting, he said he was "not aware" of any such thing.

"We want people to go back to their homes. It is no good for them to be in the camps, there will be terrible diseases there. I know they're afraid to return, but they have got to be persuaded that they will be protected." What about disarming the Janjaweed, which the Sudanese government have accepted must be done in its agreement with the United Nations? "Look, Musa Hilal alone has 12,000 armed men. How are we going to get them to give up their guns? That is why our leaders are trying to reform them and make them part of the government militia."

Yeah, they've been recruiting genocidal racist thugs to join the armed forces, but they mean well?