(PINR)Iraq's Perilous Election and the Need for Exit Strategies

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Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
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17 January 2005
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Iraq's Perilous Election and the Need for Exit Strategies

Drafted By: Erich Marquardt
http://www.pinr.com

Just two weeks from Iraq's general elections that decide who will sit on the 275-member national assembly, Baghdad's course toward that end grows more perilous each day. Attacks on U.S. forces have grown deadlier; ambushes of Iraq's budding security forces are increasingly successful; the marginal stability that presently exists is being further threatened by the lethal insurgent targeting of politicians and government figures; intelligence reports show that the insurgency is growing stronger with each passing day. The electoral quest has proven to be so messy that it is difficult to conclude that the elections will bring enough peace and stability to alter significantly the present dynamic in Iraq.

Attacks on U.S. Troops and Iraqi Security Forces

Since the beginning of the insurgency in 2003, attacks on U.S. forces have swelled, increasing in deadliness and effectiveness. Each day, attacks are initiated throughout the country, highlighting its instability. On January 3, a suicide car bomber drove his vehicle into a checkpoint near the Baghdad offices of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's political party, the Iraqi National Accord. Hours later, another explosion brought casualties at a checkpoint entrance to the Green Zone, the most heavily fortified area of Iraq containing the headquarters of the Iraqi government and the U.S. embassy.
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Insurgency Creates Heightened Level of Instability

The surging attacks by guerrillas in the last months are part of a strategy to create massive instability throughout Iraq in an effort to prevent or discredit the January 30 general elections. The other element of the insurgent strategy is the targeting and killing of politicians and government figures participating or working with U.S. forces. A series of assassinations and assassination attempts have made the prospect of participating in the U.S.-fostered political process extremely risky, a reality that grows more and more precarious with each passing day.
For instance, on January 4, the governor of Baghdad province -- Ali al-Haidari -- while traveling in a three-vehicle convoy in the northern Baghdad neighborhood of Hurriyah, was assassinated by insurgents. The murder of al-Haidari is significant since he is the most senior figure to be assassinated by insurgents since the killing of the former president of the Iraqi Governing Council, Abdel-Zahraa Othman, in May 2004.
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Insurgency Steams Ahead

These developments speak to Washington's failure to quell an insurgency that is rapidly growing in depth and size. In November 2003, U.S. General John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, estimated that the insurgency "does not exceed 5,000" fighters. Now, in January 2004, new estimates place the insurgency at more than 200,000 fighters and active supporters -- a major increase from Abizaid's previous claims of 5,000. General Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani, the director of Iraq's new intelligence services, said on January 3 that "the resistance is bigger than the U.S. military in Iraq. … I think the resistance is more than 200,000 people."
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Exit Strategies

The present conditions in Iraq are turning more and more undesirable for U.S. interests. Troop losses are turning American public opinion away from the conflict, with 50 percent of Americans now saying it was a mistake to send U.S. troops into Iraq; the economic costs involved are skyrocketing, with the war costing thus far $130 billion, well above the Bush administration's initial estimates of $50-$60 billion; and the military is overextended and has therefore inadvertently decreased the potential threat of U.S. military action elsewhere in the world, which works potentially to weaken U.S. power. As a result of deteriorating conditions, the Pentagon announced on January 6 that it would be dispatching retired four-star Army General Gary E. Luck to Iraq in order to carry out a review of the military's entire Iraq strategy. In light of all these developments, Washington needs to concentrate on both short-term and long-term exit strategies that will scale back its level of present involvement.
Washington will find difficulty in discovering exit strategies that do not damage U.S. interests. One potential exit strategy is a mass influx of U.S. troops into the country. This strategy has been pushed by members of Congress, in addition to former presidential candidate John Kerry. Much of the instability that reigns today is a result of the initial Bush administration decision to use as few troops as safely possible to occupypost-Saddam Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assured in February 2003, before the invasion, that "The idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far from the mark." However, in that same month, General Eric K. Shinseki, the former chief of staff of the U.S. Army, advised that "Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems."
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Conclusion

The United States is facing an increasingly complicated intervention in Iraq. Washington is presently focused on creating as much stability as possible before the upcoming general elections on January 30. Nonetheless, a heightened level of violence is occurring and there are still doubts over whether the elections will be able to proceed as scheduled. For instance, on January 3, Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim Shalan advised that the elections could still be delayed, provided that such a delay would result in a higher participation rate from Iraq's Sunni Arab population. Until this is decided, or until the elections occur, little will change in regards to the Bush administration's Iraq policy.
After the elections, however, the administration will have to examine its viable exit strategies critically. While the best case scenario is the creation of a popular democraticgovernment, the odds of this occurring are now highly unlikely. While it would be disadvantageous to U.S. interests for Washington to completely withdraw from Iraq, it may be even more disadvantageous to remain. In the words of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, "We will have to decide to what extent we want to be involved in what may become a civil war ."
While one potential exit strategy is increasing U.S. troop levels in Iraq to foster conditions of stability, the overarching present strategy is to create viable Iraqi security forces. The failure to create viable Iraqi security forces will mean the failure of the intervention. If Washington's best exit strategies are unsuccessful, then, for the sake of its interests in the Middle East, the United States must withdraw the bulk of its forces and reluctantly offer support to whichever Iraqi powerbroker has the best ability to stabilize Iraq, even if that stabilization takes place violently.

complete report at http://www.pinr.com
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Report Drafted By:
Erich Marquardt
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The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

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