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Edited on Fri Jan-16-04 02:37 AM by solinvictus
The concept of guerilla warfare as a viable strategy was first discussed by Karl von Clausewitz in his doctrinal study "On War". His direct observation of small unit actions employed against a superior force led von Clausewitz to evaluate the relative utility of irregular forces as a means of effective resistance. Von Clausewitz was, along with Napoleon, a theorist of the first order whose observations and conclusions broke with traditional military theory. In short, both of these men correctly observed strategy as a fluid set of plans designed to seize initiative with changing battlefield conditions. In Ireland after the British repression of the 1916 Easter Rising, a young officer named Michael Collins saw the value of the concerted efforts of irregular units acting independently for the same strategic goals. The Crown employed both regular soldiers (the dreaded Black and Tans) and intelligence assets against the newly formed Irish Republican Army. Collins, a shrewed planner and spymaster, was able to obtain the names of British assets that had been planted inside various Irish factions. This group, called the Cairo Gang, was a select unit of spies and assassins. Collins dispatched hit teams and liquidated them before the group could become an effective intelligence source for the British. Michael Collins and others also organized select raids on police and military barracks to seize arms and munitions for the fight. As the British took reprisals on Ireland's civil population, Collins and others did likewise until public opinion in the UK turned against the occupation. Though the movement did not result in a complete withdrawal, it set the stage for the founding of the Free State and did cost the British a disproportionate number of casualties. After the Russian Revolution, many Czarist army units reconstituted themselves as irregular armies to fight against the Bolshevik government. Generals Deniken and Kolchak used hit and run tactics against large formations of the Red Army. The Cossacks did likewise as well as various nationalities who sought autonomy from Moscow. During the Civil War, this caused much chaos as internal borders and zones of control shifted about. The guerilla actions of various regional armies continued until about 1922-23. Mao Zedong introduced the modern concept of guerilla warfare. Mao combined Marxist ideology with the concept of a highly mobile army of peasant irregulars who moved at will within the countryside engaging the enemy at their advantage. Mao's operational strategy was based upon the classical Chinese theorist Sun Tzu's Art of War. Essentially, it called for limited engagements in which small isolated units of the superior army were joined in battles of limited scale and duration. The guerillas were to forage weapons and ordnance from their enemies while relying on a politically sympathetic populace for aid. From the 1930's until the post WW2 civil war, Mao used these tactics with varying degrees of success against Chinese warlords (particularly his rival, Chaing Kai Shek) and the Japanese. Mao's strategic vision is considered textbook modern guerilla warfare and inspired the majority of post WW2 guerilla movements across the world. Guerilla warfare is not a formula for short term success. It is meant to be a slow and demoralizing war of attrition for the larger army. The essence of guerilla warfare is that the insurgents uses its size and operational mobility to seize temporary opportunities to strike military, support, and hostile civilian targets; including vehicle convoys, aircraft, supply facilities, infrastructure, and personnel. The Iraqis have done this with varying degrees of success by a combination of selective assassinations of foreign military and civil personnel, domestic collaborators, and vital targets of economic importance. If I were a commander on the side of the Iraqi insurgents, this would be my plan of operations: 1) Selected assassinations of hostile natives and/or their families who are working with the Americans or other foreign government or civilian organizations. I would make certain that the killings were low key and at the same time, I'd leave warning notes indicating similar treatment for others. 2) Selected assassinations or attacks on international and domestic aid organizations. I would actively use the Jihadist zealots as suicide bombers to damage and to destroy effective aid efforts to contribute to the physical suffering of the population. In time, the people's blame will shift toward the occupying army. 3) Actively recruit children as informers and intelligence assets in both urban and rural areas. Appeal to their sense of religion, patriotism, or their desire to be a heroic figure. Children are effective spies in a superficial and limitied capacity. Additionally, they may be called upon to become assassins or suicide bombers as needed. 4) Continue the current use of roadside mines and remotely activated bombs. These efforts require a minimal risk to insurgent personnel and are effective at lowering the morale of enemy soldiers. 5) Actively recruit foreign zealots as Jihad fighters for either guerilla or suicide missions. Insure that there are adequate resources to perform at least one small to medium scale suicide bombing per week. Start using similar techniques as Hamas, which is one bomber wearing an explosive device in an urban area. Have the vest bombers attack police stations and barracks as the opportunity arises. 6) Plant snipers inside large metropolitan areas. Have the selected personnel remain as a sleeper until such need arises. In unstable areas, have the snipers to hit targets of opportunity; be they foreign or collaborator. 7) Continually disrupt the production and transportation of oil resources. At every opportunity, damage or destroy equipment and make a concerted effort to target technical specialists for assassination. 8) Recruit personnel inside the new government or Iraqis working for foreign contractors. Use intimidation, threats, or appeals to religion/patriotism to obtain their service. Have them to steal information or commit covert acts of sabotage as they are able. 9) Above all else, avoid large scale confrontations with the enemy. Also, all units should operate on the cell level with no more than five fighters per group. No cell should know details of the other and if any is proven to be an informer, liquidate the traitor and disband the cell immediately.
Keep in mind, all of this is entirely theoretical. I am no cheerleader for the Iraqi resistance and thank God that insurgent actions seem to have calmed a bit.
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