Disappearing the DeadIraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a "New Warfare"
Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #9
Carl Conetta
18 February 2004
Among those endeavors that a state or a people may undertake, none is more terrible than war. None has repercussions more far-reaching or profound. Thus, a grave responsibility to one's own nation and to the global community attends any decision to go to war. And part of this responsibility is to estimate and gauge the effects of war, including the collateral damage and civilian casualties that it incurs.
As the experience of both the Afghan and Iraq conflicts suggest, estimating the casualties of a war can be as controversial as the war itself -- although this should not be the case. The number of casualties incurred in a war does not by itself decide the strategic meaning or wisdom of that war. It is only one variable among others in an equation that includes, for instance, an assessment of the ends that a war is meant to secure and the threat that it is meant to address. An estimate of collateral damage is critical in one sense, however: without it, a true cost-benefit analysis of a war is impossible.
In some circumstances, attention to collateral damage is more urgent than in others. Its importance may vary inversely with the perceived necessity of a war, for instance. When war is literally forced on a nation -- as it was on the Alliance powers in the Second World War -- the prospect of suffering casualties and adding to collateral damage may not be pivotal in the decision to take up arms. A threat to national survival trumps all other considerations. But when a prospective threat does not immediately imperil national survival, or when a contest turns on the need to broadly win hearts and minds (as does the war on terrorism), then the issue of collateral damage (as well as other war costs) may loom larger in debates about how to proceed.
Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #9
Carl Conetta
18 February 2004
Table Of Contents
Introduction
1. War and perception: the battle to enable American power
1.1 The evolving American calculus of war
1.2 The media, casualty intolerance, and asymmetric warfare
1.3 The public information battlespace after 9/11
1.4 Perception management in support of Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
2. Shaping the public discourse on civilian casualties: case studies
2.1 Spinning the Iraqi market place bombings
2.2 Framing the air attack on Baghdad
Waging lawfare
Strategic bombing and the illegality of air defense
3. Framework propositions on war casualties and collateral damage
3.1 Claims about "precision attack" and the "new warfare"
3.2 Claims about damage limitation efforts
3.3 Assessing the claims
4. Precision attack and the new warfare
4.1 Have America's recent wars been "low casualty" events?
US personnel attrition
Adversary casualties
4.2 Results may vary: How measures of accuracy mislead
Errors: systematic and contingent
A 2,000 pound scalpel?
Closing the precision gap: the continuing relevance of brute force
"Precision warfare": A triumph of branding
5. Damage limitation and "military necessity"
6. Casualty agnosticism
6.1. A failed news frame: "it's not our fault and it's not a story"
6.2. A more effective frame: casualty agnosticism
What does the World Trade Center bombing teach us?
Casualty agnosticism in the Iraq war
Media impact
6.3. Assessment of casualty agnosticism
Leveraging uncertainty
The most intensively reported wars in history
The quality of media coverage
Managing uncertainty
Making policy in an uncertain world
7. "We don't do bodycounts": the irrelevance of enemy combatant casualties
8. Conclusion: The strategic significance of the casualty issue
8.1. Acceptable casualties
8.2. Effects on the ground
8.3. Impact on world opinion
8.4. Strategic consequences
8.5. Filler for the precision gap
8.6. America's damaged discourse on war
http://www.comw.org/pda/0402rm9.html