How can they manipulate casualty numbers? They classified them in Vietnam

AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD POW/MIAs

By the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Republican Staff

Notwithstanding numerous government documents available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), documents in public archives, and published works, most of the extensive covert military operations throughout Southeast Asia between 1955 and 1975 remain classified. As a result, DOD's list of U.S. personnel lost while on covert or "black" military operations in Southeast Asia (i.e., Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, and the southern provinces of the People's Republic of China) is highly suspect.

As a result, this precludes a presentation of evidence that the lists of POW/MIA and KIA-BNR from Southeast Asia are skewed as a result of withholding of casualty counts from black operations. But the continued effort by the U.S. government to keep records of these operations classified, or to withhold information related to these operations under FOIA exemptions tends to indicate information on U.S. casualties related to these activities may not be accurate. An early 1970's Senate hearing on military operations on Southeast Asia was given classified information on losses from classified operations in Southeast Asia, but that information remains classified and is not included in this report.

Needless to say, the covert nature of classified operations has to remain secure even when personnel involved disappear. According to sources interviewed for this report, if an individual on a covert military of intelligence operation is lost -- becomes an unrecovered casualty, i.e. either captured or KIA-BNR -- he might be declared dead immediately (KIA- BNR); or he might be listed MIA, followed by presumptive finding of death issued after 12 months elapsed. According to these sources, benign cover stories were sometimes prepared to explain the disappearance of individuals lost on covert or classified missions in Southeast Asia to reflect a MIA or KIA-BNR status. If such a cover story remains as the official account of such casualties, then it would impact on any future evaluations of an individual casualty file because the official case file contains erroneous information as to circumstances or location of the casualty.

One source interviewed alleges that, in order to protect the existence of some classified operations conducted during the Second Indochina War, U.S. casualties from these operations may have been explained away as training accidents in an entirely different geographic location (e.g., Thailand or Okinawa), or as battle losses in areas of South Vietnam even though the loss occurred in another Indochina location (e.g.,Laos, Cambodia, or North Vietnam). If casualty information has been manipulated, as alleged by some people, to protect the secrecy of special operations, then what guarantee is there of oversight of accountability for U.S. personnel who were declared KIA-BNR or MIA from such covert operations?

Due to the classified nature of these covert or special warfare missions, there exist no easily accessible records of those involved in these missions; therefore, "presumptive findings of death" might be based upon faulty data in such individual case files. Or, perhaps if the review boards for individual casualty cases for persons lost during classified operations in Southeast Asia had access to the true circumstances of the loss, they might be able to make absolute findings of death in some cases rather than prolonging the agony of the survivors by ublishing faulty findings based on circumstances contrived to conceal covert operations.

In order to arrive at a true accounting for U.S. personnel from "black" operations in Southeast Asia, the following fundamental questions must be answered: <snip>

The extent of United States covert operations in Southeast Asia identifiable through nonclassified, or declassified sources indicates a large number of U.S. military and civilian personnel were lost on these missions. DOD has publicly stated, after release of this investigation's Interim Report last October, all personnel lost on covert missions during the Second Indochina War are on the public casualty lists and that there is no secret list of casualties from covert operations in Southeast Asia.

However, sources interviewed by staff indicate otherwise. Are the public versions of these lists accurate as to the time, date, place, and status of the individuals engaged in classified operations when lost? Are survivers from classified operations the source of live-sighting reports of American POWs in Laos? There is reason to question DOD further on this problem of losses related to classified or covert operations in Southeast Asia.

One case in point is the March 11, 1968 combat loss of a U.S. Air Force communications/navigation site located on top of Phou Pha Thi, Sam Neua Province, Laos, known as Site 85. Eleven U.S. Air Force personnel were lost when the site was overrun by Communist forces. Except for four personnel lifted out by an Air America helicopter during the battle, the remaining eleven personnel manning the site that day are officially listed as KIA-BNR.

The site was classified, its mission classified, and the circumstances of these March 1968 battle casualties remain classified for many years. Even today, much of the information related to Site 85's equipment, purpose, effectiveness, and battle loss is still classified.

The site provided the Air Force with all-weather capabilities for bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, North Vietnam. Its primary electronic navigation system was known by the acronym TACAN. The site was identified with a nearby classified landing strip operated under CIA covert funding and known as Lima Site 85. The former Air Force TACAN site on Phou Pha Thi is generally referred to as "Site 85."

Site 85 was built in 1967, over the objections of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, and manned by a handpicked team of Air Force technicians in 1968. The Air Force technicians for Site 85, listed as Lockheed Aircraft Systems employees on paper, had been discharged from the military and were paid through Lockheed. The Air Force promised that their service credit would be restored once their classified mission was completed. This cover was necessary to avoid violating the provisions of the 1962 Geneva Peace Accords for Laos prohibiting foreign military presence in Laos.

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