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Edited on Mon Mar-14-05 09:57 AM by ck4829
This report appears in the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2004. It is available online on a P2P Network, just type 'Diebold Voting Machine Analysis' and look for a file with that name.
I will type the Conclusion of this report.
"Using publicly available source code, we performed an analysis of the April 2002 snapshot of Diebold's AccuVote-TS 4.3.1 electronic voting system. We found significant security flaws: voters can trivially cast multiple ballots with no built-in traceability, administrative functions can be performed by regular voters, and the threats posed by insiders such as poll workers, software developers, and janitors is ever greater. Based on our analysis of the development environment, including change logs and comments, we believe that an appropriate level of programming discipline for a project such as this was not maintained. In fact, there appears to have been littler quality control in the process."
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