I'm not certain, but that's what the gist of this article in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists says. Wow. MI-Complex is right. These guys may've thought the only way to make sure we came out on top was to outspend and outhink and outnuke everybody else on the planet. So far, so good. But the future still doesn't look any brighter, considering how so many nutty nations have their own nukes.
Thanks for the info, Lisa. This is opening up some connections that I had not considered or imagined...
Atoms for Peace
Did the 50-year-old Atoms for Peace program accelerate nuclear weapons proliferation? The jury has been in for some time on this question, and the answer is yes. By Leonard Weiss
November/December 2003 pp. 34-41, 44 (vol. 59, no. 06) © 2003 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The character of the Atoms for Peace program and the political decisions that shaped it have been the subject of numerous books and scholarly papers. But many popular narratives of the program begin with Dwight Eisenhower's famous December 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations, giving the impression that the program as we know it and its consequences were the logical result of the proposals contained in the speech. This ignores the political context of the speech, as well as the history of earlier thought on peaceful nuclear activities following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Not only did the execution of the Atoms for Peace program essentially ignore the basic idea in Eisenhower's speech, but the program also went down a path that experts had predicted would lead to proliferation. Understanding the historical background of the speech is vital to explaining why.
SNIP...
Truman also proposed creating a U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to direct nuclear research and to establish control over the basic materials essential to the development of nuclear energy, peaceful or otherwise. The AEC was "to interfere as little as possible with private research and private enterprise."
Truman's message came at a time when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons as well as a head start on nuclear development. His subsequent meetings with the prime ministers of Britain and Canada resulted in the Agreed Declaration of November 15, 1945, which called for international control of nuclear energy; the signers believed that neither countermeasures nor secrecy provided adequate defense from the bomb's revolutionary destructiveness. Truman was prepared to negotiate with the Soviets as well, but Secretary of State James Byrnes did not favor dealing directly with the Soviets and latched onto a proposal by Vannevar Bush, one of the organizers of the bomb effort, to have the United Nations be the forum in which the future of the bomb would be debated. At a meeting in Moscow, the Soviets agreed to help create a U.N. commission on atomic energy.
The Acheson-Lilienthal reportTo craft U.S. policy proposals for submission to the U.N. commission, Byrnes asked Acheson to chair a committee, which consisted of Bush, James Conant, John McCloy, and Leslie Groves. Acheson appointed a board of consultants to work out the details of the proposals. The board was chaired by David Lilienthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and included Robert Oppenheimer, former scientific director of the Manhattan Project.
After six weeks of intensive work, on March 16, 1946, the board presented the committee with a 57-page policy report on the international control of atomic energy. What has come to be known as the Acheson-Lilienthal report contained some startling conclusions about nuclear development and the risk of nuclear proliferation. The board determined that the pursuit of atomic energy and the pursuit of atomic bombs were in large part interchangeable and interdependent, and that because of global rivalries, an international inspections regime based on good faith was doomed to fail.
CONTINUED...
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd03weiss