BBV: Statement of Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) on H.R. 2239 (10/8/2003)

Congressional Record
House of Representatives - October 08, 2003

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to follow my friend, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott). And to think that the gentleman got in some hot water not too many months ago for saying that, well, he might question the veracity of some in the administration who were talking about the facts leading us to war. I think the American people have come to see that the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) knew what he was talking about.

But I would like to talk about another subject: voting, the single most important act of a democratic republic.

Now, citizens in my State of New Jersey tell me they want voting techniques, technologies that are reliable, accessible, and verifiable. And they are concerned that in the stampede to replace the unreliable butterfly and punch card ballots, that we may be replacing one unreliable voting technology with another.

Now, consider electronic machines like, for example, touch-screen machines. They are convenient, they are accessible, they are fast and efficient. In many ways, they make good voting machines. They report the election results promptly and can reduce clerical errors and errors in addition. And certainly Members of Congress, I for one, have encountered in an election where the county clerk makes errors of addition that, in some cases, take hours and, in other cases, days to uncover. But these electronic machines are good, except that they are inherently unverifiable. Voters ask me, now, after I vote on an electronic machine, how will I know that back there in the electronics, back in the ether, back in cyberspace, the vote was recorded as I intended. The answer is, they do not know. They cannot know. Because of software or hardware errors, the votes might have been misrecorded. Innocent, accidental errors, or malicious, intentional, hacking errors. The real problem is that there is no way for the voter to verify the reliability of the electronic count.

Voters are plenty skeptical these days, and we cannot afford to have voters more skeptical about the process that they are supposed to own.

Mr. Speaker, I have introduced legislation under which each voter gets to see a printed record of his or her vote to verify that the vote is recorded as the voter intended and that the printed record becomes the vote of record. Now, this gives all the convenience, accessibility, and reliability of the electronic voting machines. And, it gives the added element of verifiability, of verification that belongs to each voter, as it should.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_record&page=H9358&position=all

He's doing a wonderful job. We are learning, though, that if you open a tiny hole they think it is for tunneling --

a reminder to us folks -- VERIFIED not "verifiable"
paper BALLOT not paper trail and always, PAPER not something electronic.

Don't mean to pick, because Rush Holt has been something of a visionary, in Congress. Thanks for catching this and posting it.

Bev Harris
http://www.blackboxvoting.com

sounds like something from The West Wing.

NOw! Course, he did with me back when he was in Iraq!

I'm grateful for Rush Holt and what he is doing in Congress with the BBV! :kick:

that's why he can think... He was trained to do that... -C

And so are we!

Kick!

McDermott is my Rep and my hero

"the printed record becomes the vote of record"