Reconstruction: Afghanistan: Who Exactly Is The Enemy?

http://www.afgha.com/?af=article&sid=50756

Afghan President Hamid Karzai on 12 November repeated calls for the armed opposition to his government to join a national-reconciliation program that he has championed, on and off, since early 2003. Karzai chose a gathering of provincial officials at a meeting of the Commission for Strengthening Peace and Stability as the setting for his latest plea to militants. (That commission is alternatively known as the Independent National Commission for Peace in Afghanistan, or simply as the "Peace Commission.")

Coming as it does in the deadliest year since the demise of the Taliban regime, the plea highlights the fact that the success of the Afghan leader's tack on reconciliation is open to debate.

Years In The Making

The idea of reaching out to most former members of the Taliban regime is not new. In April 2003, Karzai urged Afghans to draw a "clear line" between "the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country," on one hand, and those "who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country," on the other (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," 3 July 2003). While the reconciliation program has garnered some success in attracting a limited number of the latter (neo-Taliban), most of the major success cases have represented former detainees or low-level figures within the insurgency.

The reconciliation policy, articulated more clearly by Karzai after April 2003, initially maintained that some 100-150 former members of the Taliban regime are known to have committed crimes against the Afghan people; all others, whether dormant or active within the ranks of the neo-Taliban, could begin living like normal citizens by denouncing violence and renouncing their opposition to the central Afghan government.