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Clark: The Anti-War But Pro-War Resolution Candidate Clark told a reporter on September 17, 2003, the day he declared his candidacy, that had he been in congress on October 11, he "probably would have voted for the resolution" giving the president authorization to go to war. This is being pounced on as an admission by Clark that he backed the war. His former press secretary Mary Jacoby encapsulated what she heard him say: "You said you would have voted for the resolution as leverage for a U.N.-based solution." "Right," General Clark responded. "Exactly." This is absolutely consistent with Clark's testimony to the Armed Services Committee on September 26, 2002: The United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be further strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing US determination to act if the United Nations will not.The use of force must remain a US option under active consideration. The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force, but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force, if other measures fail. The more focused the resolution on Iraq and the problem of weapons of mass destruction, the greater its utility in the United Nations. The more nearly unanimous the resolution, the greater its impact in the diplomatic efforts underway.
The President and his national security team must deploy imagination, leverage, and patience in crafting UN engagement. In the near term, time is on our side, and we should endeavor to use the UN if at all possible. This may require a period of time for inspections or even the development of a more intrusive inspection program, if necessary backed by force.This is foremost an effort to gain world-wide legitimacy for US concerns and possible later action, but it may also impede Saddam’s weapons programs and further constrain his freedom of action. Yes, there is a risk that inspections would fail to provide the evidence of his weapons programs, but the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by opportunity to gain allies and support in the campaign against Saddam.
In October, when the resolution passed, polls showed American support for using the military to oust Hussein was over 60 percent, but 70 percent believed he should first get UN approval. Clark's statement that he would have supported the resolution to use as leverage for the UN is not inconsistent with the opinion of many at that time, although it's clear Clark would have preferred a resolution that threatened force without directly authorizing it.
The resolution was not a declaration of war. The United States Congress has not declared war since World War II. The resolution authorized the president to act with force if he deemed it necessary but fell far short of a war declaration. When Clark says he would have voted for the resolution but would not have voted for the war, he is saying he would not have voted for a congressional declaration of war and that he opposed the actions taken by the Bush administration under the shelter of the October resolution. These actions contradicted the case the administration made to win congressional support for the resolution, which was advertised as a platform to secure peace not authorize war.
Bush used the leverage argument to convince skeptical lawmakers to support the resolution even if they opposed war. In a September 19 photo-op in the Oval office, a reporter asked whether the resolution would authorize force. Bush responded "That will be part of the resolution, the authorization to use force. If you want to keep the peace, you've got to have the authorization to use force. But it's -- this will be -- this is a chance for Congress to indicate support. It's a chance for Congress to say, we support the administration's ability to keep the peace. That's what this is all about. "
According to CBS, Powell reinforced the idea that the resolution was more to secure peace than to actually authorize war by telling lawmakers that "the Bush administration was unlikely to use force except if Iraq continued to refuse to get rid of weapons of mass destruction."
Few doubted Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. During previous UN inspections, Iraq failed to provide evidence they had been destroyed. The belief that Hussein possessed chemical and biological agents was bolstered by intelligence some now believe was provided by Iraqi double agents posing as defectors. Some, like Hans Blix, now speculate that Hussein may have believed the US would not attack if they were convinced he possessed such lethal weapons. After all, despite North Korea's continued claims that it possessed and would use nuclear weapons, the US declined to act against North Korea.
The day before congress passed the war resolution, Time published Let's Wait to Attack, in which Clark calls for the US to consider public sentiment and expresses strong support only for multi-lateral action with a detailed post-conflict plan and only if the UN cannot resolve US concerns about whether Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons.
Clark never wavered in his belief that Hussein had chemical weapons, and said to Paula Zahn on April 2, 2003, "I think they will be found. There's so much intelligence on this." Clark, however, was a civilian during the buildup to the Iraq war and received the same intelligence provided to the American people--intelligence that we now know was fraught with errors and omissions. What did waver was his faith in the president's stated determination to 'exhaust diplomacy' and work with the UN and US allies on Iraq. He also lacked conviction that the threat from Hussein was imminent enough to justify pre-emptive action, expressed to Global Viewpoint editor Nathan Gardels at the start of the war on March 19.
In an April 4 London Times editorial, Clark crowed at the easy victory. "Liberation is at hand. Liberation-- the powerful balm that justifies painful sacrifice, erases lingering doubt and reinforces bold actions." He added "George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair should be proud of their resolve in the face of so much doubt." But remember, any opposition Clark had to the war was not because he disbelieved the case for WMD or harbored doubts that Hussein was a tyrant who deserved to be deposed. His opposition was predicated on the fact that Bush did not do enough to exhaust diplomacy and coordinate with the UN.
Who is surprised that a career military man would rejoice at a successful outcome to the war, which resulted in few casualties for US troops? Indeed, weren't most Americans--even those opposed to the war--relieved that it was so swift and painless (at least to the US)?
However, as evidence surfaces showing that both UK and US intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was hyped and that, as Rumsfeld stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, "The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass murder," many who previously supported the war are now filled with doubt and have questions about whether it was justified. The poor planning for the aftermath of the war and the continued deaths of US servicemen and Iraqi civilians has compounded these doubts.
Clark has never referred to himself as the anti-Iraq-war candidate, although he could have tried to do so to steal Dean's thunder. Instead, he has taken what can only be considered the tougher road. He acknowledges that he most likely would have voted for the resolution but with reservations, a position no different than the one expressed by Kerry and Gephardt and no different than the position held by the majority of Americans back in October 2002.
Whether this should be held against him is for voters to decide, and they can consider General Clark's own words on his sentiments toward war, taken from a September 9, 2002, editorial in USA Today: "Our strategic priorities need to be kept in order: We can best face a possible fight against Iraq if we have strong allies and a weakened al-Qaeda. While we eventually may have to use force against Iraq, we should use our resolve first to empower diplomacy, with war as the last resort."
It is difficult to fault those who supported the resolution as a means to secure cooperation from Hussein when the threat of force from the US was likely responsible for the unprecedented access Hussein gave the UN inspectors this go around. The proverbial 'fly in the ointment' was the Bush team. Before congress passed the resolution, the administration misled congress, America, and the UN into believing the US would allow the inspectors ample time to ferret out the truth concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. With resolution in hand, the administration abandoned their promises and began the push for immediate action against Iraq.
***UPDATE: Clark confirms his position in interview with Associated Press: "Let's make one thing real clear, I would never have voted for this war," Clark said before a speech at the University of Iowa. "I've gotten a very consistent record on this. There was no imminent threat. This was not a case of pre-emptive war. I would have voted for the right kind of leverage to get a diplomatic solution, an international solution to the challenge of Saddam Hussein." And later, to the Des Moines Register: "I would have voted for a resolution which gave the president leverage to seek a diplomatic, non-military solution to the problem in Iraq. I would have never voted for war," he said. "I'm a soldier. I know what war is like."***
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