The CAPPS II "no fly" list helps terrorist cells succeed.

I had really hoped that you would have done at least marginal research on this.

Both of your referenced articles prove the point I was making in the original discussion which started here:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=132&topic_id=39411#40019

The problem with your research is that you still don't understand the difference between CAPPS and CAPPS II. Both of these articles are discussing the the problems of the CURRENT security system we have in place which is CAPPS. The current system only uses very basic information which would indeed make it much easier for terrorists to game the system if there were little or no random checks in place (which there are). CAPPS II enlarges so much on that information that it would be FAR more difficult for terrorists to try to game the system. And as I said in the original discussion, CAPPS II would not abandon the random checks, there would just be less of them to make it easier on all those innocent passengers that have been stopped.

From the first article:

"On average, after a terrorist group successfully sends members on three round-trip test flights, the chance that they will be stopped by CAPPS on the next flight is no greater than through random screening."

Exactly what I was saying... the current system (CAPPS) doesn't do much as far as catching terrorists goes while it causes problems for far more innocent passengers.

From the second article:

"The government believes the best way to increase security and efficiency is to create a more advanced computer system.

CAPPS II, an upgrade expected to cost more than $105 million, is designed to transform a few simple database searches into an omniscient eye on terrorism.

In addition to checking travel records, CAPPS II would require each passenger to provide his name, birthdate, home address and phone number."

Once again, the flaws reported in the article are in regard to CAPPS, which is the current system, and not CAPPS II.

And as I said in the original discussion, CAPPS II would not replace all the other human devices and physical security precautions already in place but would lessen the intrusiveness on innocent passengers by having less random checks.

I'll also cut and paste what I said in the original discussion about my feelings on CAPPS II so no one need freak out here that I think it's a dandy plan because they didn't go read what I said in the original discussion:

"Personally, with the level of terroristic threat in this country now, I'd be more inclined to go by a security system somewhat closer to that of El Al... they haven't had a terrorist problem in 30 years despite the fact that there have been terrorist incidents in Israel almost on a daily basis for decades.

...

The biggest problem with CAPPS II is that the current administration would no doubt use such a system for other purposes then what it was designed for, and it is THAT reason that makes people uncomfortable with it. Another problem is that the money for such a program which is arguably marginally better then the current system may be better suited toward other measures of security.

As I said, NO system is perfect. Personally, I don't see the value of the CAPPS II system with all it's pre-existing problems especially in light of what such a system would cost. And as I said, I personally would prefer a system more in line with what El Al does, however, most people would be horrified at that level of personal scrutiny every time they fly. I believe that as far as terrorists go, rigid security systems on the actual plane would be more of a deterent to a would-be terrorist. However, once again, the security system is not ONLY designed to catch terrorists but also smugglers and other criminals and a CAPPS II system would be better then the current system for catching them however marginally.

In no possible way would I want such a system to be used with the asswipes we have in the White House now as there's really no doubt they would use such a system for twisted purposes other then the intent of the system, bought and paid for by US citizen tax dollars. But again, the government already HAS all the personal information about US citizens that the CAPPS II system would utilize anyway, and the current system is already a problem as far as abuse goes.

Once again, a balance has to be achieved between securing the privacy rights and dignity of passengers with the security rights of those same passengers."