http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/bpuz.htm#1"
0. Inferential role semantic. One of the main tenets of Making it Explicit is an inferential approach to meaning: the meaning or the "conceptual content" of an expression is its inferential role. The original idea is traced back to Frege's Begriffsshrift: here Frege suggests that two sentences have the same conceptual content if they may be substituted one another preserving the goodness of the inferences in which they appear, or preserving the consequences we may trace from them (the original example of Frege is a pair of sentences in active and passive form).
# Commitments and entitlements The original contribution of Brandom to the inferential approach to meaning is an highly normative definition of inferential role in term of entitlements and commitments. The definition of "commitment" is much stronger that the definition given, for instance, in Levi; for Brandom a commitment is not just an expression of what you are committed when you recognize a set of beliefs and update it, but it represents the claims you have to avow because they follow from what you claim, even if you are not aware of them: in making a claim you are committed to the consequences recognized by the society as valid consequences of that claim.
Given these assumptions a general definition of inferential rolein terms of commitments and entitlements has an intuitive appeal. Brandom makes some reference to Dummett's view of meaning as given by circumstances and consequences of application (or as introduction and elimination rules). Entitlements are to be interpreted as the circumstances of applications or premises which entitle you to make a claim; commitments are the consequences you are bound to accept, given the claim you have made.
# Conceptual content of noninferential perceptual reports Brandom's inferentialism is intended in a broad way, not strictly relying on logical premisses and consequences, allowing also nonlinguistic circumstances of application to figure as entitlements. The coherence of this step with an inferentialist view of meaning is given via a connection with an idea of Sellars' Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind : any utterance can be understood properly only as a move in the game of giving and asking for reasons; in order to utter a "meaningful" perceptual report you need not only to have a reliable responsive disposition, but you need to understand the commitments held in uttering the report. Therefore a perceptual report, like "it is red", is a proper meaningful utterance only in a game where the speaker is committed to the consequences of the utterance, for instance: "it is not blue" or "it has a color". A parrot who has been trained to utter the same sounds when facing a red thing does not give to the sounds any conceptual content.
A problem remains: which kind of inferential role may be given to subsentential parts? It is easy to define an inferential role for predicates (let us think, for instance, to a semantic network given via meaning postualtes); but it is really hard to define an infernetial role for indexicals and proper names. One of the most original aspect of Brandom's analysis is to enclose also these kinds of subsemntential expressions in an inferentialist framework, via the concept of anaphora."