The TED Talk debate between Mark Jacobson and Stewart Brand is up

http://www.brainpickings.org/index.php/2010/02/12/ted-2010-highlights-2/

Despite his charisma, Brand 'lost' in the end -- the audience skew moved from 75/25 in favor of nukes in the beginning of the debate to 65/35 by the end.

http://www.laweekly.com/2005-11-10/news/green-to-the-core-part-2/2

If there’s a lot Brand hasn’t worked out — he didn’t, for instance, know the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor produced so much waste — no matter; Brand has enormous faith in future engineering and human invention. “It may well be true about the pebble bed and waste,” he allows. “But then, okay, back to the old drawing board! ... we have responsibility for this thing for 175 years. After that, it is fair to say that it is the next generation’s problem. Let them deal with it.”

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x236360

Some 56 nuclear reactors are now officially being built—but 13 of these have been “under construction” for more than 20 years, ...

http://www.flickr.com/photos/16721844@N00/429450898/



Every two years the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) together with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) publish detailed data about existing reactors, reactors under
construction, shut down reactors and also forecasts for the next 20–30 years. An early
forecasts in 1975 predicted the nuclear capacity of OECD member countries to grow to
between 772–890 GW by 1990. Based on such forecasts the uranium production capacities
were extended. But in reality, the installed capacity grew to 260 GW falling far below the
IAEA target range. The 1977 forecast was less ambitious, envisaging a range of between
860–999 GW by 2000. As the year 2000 came closer, the more modest the forecasts became
eventually predicting a capacity ranging between 318–395 GW by 2000. Actually, a total of
303 GW were installed in the year 2000. Every forecast by the IAEA in the past eventually
turned out as having been too optimistic.

http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/2009/0813/the-bumpy-road-to-nuclear-energy



In 1974, President Nixon announced Project Independence – a plan to build 1,000 nuclear stations. But of the 253 reactors eventually ordered by the US electric industry, 71 were canceled before construction began, according to a tally by the antinuclear group Beyond Nuclear.

Of the 182 construction permits granted by government commissions, 50 were abandoned in construction with billions in investment lost and 28 were closed before their 40-year licenses expired – including the Three Mile Island plant’s Unit 2.

Gary McCool knows all about the financial pitfalls of nuclear power. Thirty years ago the Plymouth State College reference librarian warned managers at his tiny New Hampshire Electric Cooperative that its plan to purchase 2 percent of the new Seabrook nuclear power plant’s generating output when it was completed could push the coop into bankruptcy – or perhaps produce the highest electric rates in the nation.

It turned out to be both. Today he’s still paying the price of nuclear power – even though his coop no longer purchases any. There on his monthly bill is a $6.06 charge for “stranded costs” – the cost of paying off the coop’s adventure into Seabrook.

It was a calamity echoed nationwide. Several government-owned power companies, including the Washington Public Power System, went bankrupt. Other investor-owned utilities, such as Long Island Lighting Company and Consumers Power, were nearly bankrupted.

This is a sidebar to the full story, Nuclear power’s new debate: cost

What the market should not take for granted

GDP impact on demand and load factors

Consensus view is that electricity demand in the wide European region will grow by 1.5% p.a. over the next couple of decades. This is a view shared by UCTE in its latest System Adequacy Report. Although it is virtually impossible to produce irrefutable electricity demand forecast we are tempted to argue that the risks are on the downside since:

1. During the boom years of 2003-07, when GDP growth was strong and infrastructure investment high on the back of very liquid debt markets and due to the convergence of the new EU joiners, electricity consumption grew by 2.1% p.a.

2. Energy efficiency is likely to become a bigger driver as technology advances and as awareness rises. It is important to highlight that such measures also fall under the Climate Change agenda of governments, which has been one of the driving forces behind the renaissance of new nuclear.

As a result, we would expect electricity demand growth to be in the 0-1% range for at least the next 5 years, before returning to more normal pace of 1.5-2%. We therefore see scope for an extra 346TWh of electricity that needs to be covered by 2020 vs. 2008 levels.

Should EU countries go half way towards meeting their renewables target of 20% by 2020 that would be an extra ca. 440TWh. Even if EU went only half way, which by all means is a very conservative estimate, that would still be ca.220TWh of additional generation. Under its conservative ‘scenario A’ forecast, UCTE expects 28GW of net new fossil fuel capacity to be constructed by 2020. On an average load factor of 45% for those plants that’s an extra 110TWh.

Therefore under very conservative assumptions on renewables, we can reliably expect an extra 330TWh of electricity to be generated by 2020, leaving a shortfall of 16TWh to be made up by either energy efficiency or new nuclear.

There are currently 10GW of nuclear capacity under construction/development, including the UK proposed plants that should be on operation by 2020. If we assume that energy efficiency will not contribute, that would imply a load factor for the plants of 18%. Looking at the entire available nuclear fleet that would imply a load factor of just 76%. We do believe though that steps towards energy efficiency will also be taken, thus the impact on load factors could be larger.

Under a scenario of the renewables target being fully delivered then the load factor for nuclear would fall to 56%.

(Bold in original)

Citigroup Global Markets European Nuclear Generation 2 December 2008

Over the next 50 years, unless patterns change dramatically, energy production and use will contribute to global warming through large-scale greenhouse gas emissions — hundreds of billions of tonnes of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide. Nuclear power could be one option for reducing carbon emissions. At present, however, this is unlikely: nuclear power faces stagnation and decline.

This study analyzes what would be required to retain nuclear power as a significant option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and meeting growing needs for electricity supply. Our analysis is guided by a global growth scenario that would expand current worldwide nuclear generating capacity almost threefold, to 1000 billion watts,by the year 2050.Such a deployment would avoid 1.8 billion tonnes of carbon emissions annually from coal plants, about 25% of the increment in carbon emissions otherwise expected in a business-as-usual scenario. This study also recommends changes in government policy and industrial practice needed in the relatively near term to retain an option for such an outcome. (Want to guess what these are? - K)

We did not analyze other options for reducing carbon emissions — renewable energy sources, carbon sequestration,and increased energy efficiency — and therefore reach no conclusions about priorities among these efforts and nuclear power. In our judgment, it would be a mistake to exclude any of these four options at this time.

STUDY FINDINGS
For a large expansion of nuclear power to succeed,four critical problems must be overcome:

Cost. In deregulated markets, nuclear power is not now cost competitive with coal and natural gas.However,plausible reductions by industry in capital cost,operation and maintenance costs, and construction time could reduce the gap. Carbon emission credits, if enacted by government, can give nuclear power a cost advantage.

Safety.
Modern reactor designs can achieve a very low risk of serious accidents, but “best practices”in construction and operation are essential.We know little about the safety of the overall fuel cycle,beyond reactor operation.

Waste.
Geological disposal is technically feasible but execution is yet to be demonstrated or certain. A convincing case has not been made that the long-term waste management benefits of advanced, closed fuel cycles involving reprocessing of spent fuel are outweighed by the short-term risks and costs. Improvement in the open,once through fuel cycle may offer waste management benefits as large as those claimed for the more expensive closed fuel cycles.

Proliferation.
The current international safeguards regime is inadequate to meet the security challenges of the expanded nuclear deployment contemplated in the global growth scenario. The reprocessing system now used in Europe, Japan, and Russia that involves separation and recycling of plutonium presents unwarranted proliferation risks.