Back to the preemptive strike

The talkbacks are interesting, this fellow catches a lot of flack. There seems to be a global audience, too.

The outcome of the war in Lebanon raised existential fears, even among people with deep roots in the Israeli experience, people who have fought in our toughest wars. Many of them wonder: What happened to us? The question arises because from the military point of view, this was not a war for survival. And if this was the result of a fight against a small guerrilla organization, ask those who are concerned about the future, what will happen when we have to fight the Syrians, the Iranians, or an even broader Arab coalition?

Most of the answers so far have concerned tactical failures. This has been so ever since it became clear, during the war, that the military and political establishments had completely lost their way. These failures consisted of choosing erroneous methods of action, faulty logistics, intelligence failures and lack of talent in the senior military and political ranks. The Winograd Committee will also apparently try to provide answers in these areas.

But both the official investigators and others are totally ignoring the social and cultural misconceptions that were at the heart of the "military concept" that collapsed in Lebanon. Therefore, we must not rely on the assurances of senior military and political officials that if a war were to erupt with Syria or Iran, "everything would be different." Until people change their way of thinking, and until the leaders are replaced, what happened in Lebanon will happen again.

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The second Lebanon war was a few years overdue, mainly due to a perceived lack of legitimacy, which has constrained Israel for more than three decades. We ourselves gave up the doctrine that once formed the basis of Israel's security concept, and of our lives: the right to strike preemptively.

Haaretz