Don't Play With Maps

By DENNIS ROSS
Published: January 9, 2007

Washington

I BECAME embroiled in a controversy with former President Jimmy Carter over the use of two maps in his recent book, “Palestine Peace Not Apartheid.” While some criticized what appeared to be the misappropriation of maps I had commissioned for my book, “The Missing Peace,” my concern was always different.

I was concerned less with where the maps had originally come from — Mr. Carter has said that he used an atlas that was published after my book appeared — and more with how they were labeled. To my mind, Mr. Carter’s presentation badly misrepresents the Middle East proposals advanced by President Bill Clinton in 2000, and in so doing undermines, in a small but important way, efforts to bring peace to the region.

In his book, Mr. Carter juxtaposes two maps labeled the “Palestinian Interpretation of Clinton’s Proposal 2000” and “Israeli Interpretation of Clinton’s Proposal 2000.”

The problem is that the “Palestinian interpretation” is actually taken from an Israeli map presented during the Camp David summit meeting in July 2000, while the “Israeli interpretation” is an approximation of what President Clinton subsequently proposed in December of that year. Without knowing this, the reader is left to conclude that the Clinton proposals must have been so ambiguous and unfair that Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, was justified in rejecting them. But that is simply untrue.

More at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/opinion/09ross.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

This article contains a first-hand account of what happened at the Camp David and Taba talks.
Some of the most salient points:

From Ross's book:

"This was not a case of tactics or bargaining. Pres Clinton had put unprecedented ideas on the table. Arafat had the best deal he would ever get. He could not get more and had hit the proverbial wall. He could not wring out one more concession or gain one more tactical advantage. We had left the realm of tactics and now we had to face a strategic reality, Arafat could not do a deal that ended the conflict. Partial deals were possible because they did not require him to adopt any irrevocable positions. But a comprehensive deal with Arafat was not possible. Too much redefinition was required. He was not up to it. He could live with a process, but not with a conclusion."