Surprising conversationsA few days after the Six-Day War, major general Ariel Sharon asked me to come to his office. Sharon, who had been the commander of a division, was already considered one of the war's heroes. Sharon's appointment to this position had been an emergency one; at the end of the war he returned to his regular job as head of the training division in the General Staff.
Sharon had a highly unusual request of me. "I would like to ask you not to criticize prime minister Levy Eshkol anymore," he said. I expressed amazement on how it was possible that he, of all people, who had levied such harsh criticism on the prime minister during the war, was approaching me with a request like this. "What happened? What's the reason for this change of heart?" I asked.
Sharon replied frankly. "Understand," he said, "at a time like this in particular, after the victory, it's desirable that Israel should have a weak prime minister. This will make it possible to quickly transfer the Israel Defense Forces' training camps and military exercises to the West Bank. That will be my job, and that's what I will have to deal with as head of the training division. A weak prime minister will be wary of interfering in a move of this kind. But he must not be made too weak; otherwise he could be toppled."
Sharon revealed for the first time his point of view on the territories, as well as his modus operandi, which was carried out in a crafty and sophisticated way. About a year before that, Sharon had been promoted by the chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, to the rank of major general. Sharon was concerned about the leadership qualities of the prime minister, Eshkol, and not about the new chief of staff, Moshe Dayan. It is possible he was aware that Dayan would not hold back a plan to transfer the IDF's training bases to the territories.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/865719.html