What is permissible for America

What would happen if American congressmen were to meet with Ismail Haniyeh or with Hamas members of parliament to discuss "Middle East affairs?" Would Israel boycott them? Would Israel activate its lobby in Washington to prevent their reelection?

Israel is not yet facing this difficult dilemma, but Egypt is. Last Sunday, four American congressmen met with members of Egypt's parliament, including Dr. Saad al-Katatni, head of the Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary faction. This movement has been outlawed since 1954. Its members are hounded and arrested by the regime, which regards them as a threat to both it and Egyptian society. In accordance with the norms of open diplomacy, Egypt expected the American guests to honor the Egyptian boycott and refrain from meeting with members of a movement defined as illegal. The congressmen made it clear they were meeting with a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in his capacity as a member of parliament and not as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. "If so, why don't they meet with Palestinian members of parliament affiliated with Hamas?" complained Suleiman Awad, the spokesman for President Hosni Mubarak. After all, the status of Hamas in Israel is similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

But apparently, what is permitted to American elected officials is prohibited to Israel, and what is permissible for the American regime has been rejected by Israel. Thus, while House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met last month with Bashar Assad, Israel continued to claim that Washington forbids it to conduct negotiations with Syria, until it was learned, about 10 days ago, that this policy had changed. Suddenly, Washington no longer objects, perhaps because it needs Syria for stabilizing the situation in Iraq. And while Israel is engaged in a mighty diplomatic struggle to impose additional sanctions on Iran, the U.S. opened the first public dialogue in 27 years with the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the dialogue will apparently continue. Slowly, the suit of armor behind which Israel chose to hide, the American policy that gave permission in some places and prohibited in others (obliging Israel to follow suit), is now in advanced stages of disintegration.


The U.S. and Israel admit they are locked in two wars that do not have a military solution. Both are searching for a partner to at least moderate, or stop, the firing of rockets from Gaza and the infernal attacks in Baghdad. Nearly 3,600 American soldiers have been killed in Iraq, and in Israel, people are being killed by rockets. On both fronts, the occupying governments do not seem to know what to do.

And here, in the special arena of the U.S., a light of insight has begun to flicker, indicating that perhaps negotiations with the enemy can produce political results. If until now Washington sufficed with conducting direct or indirect discourse with subversive organizations in Iraq after previously boycotting them entirely, the time has come for negotiating with the archenemy, Iran. And a country that talks with Iran is liable to talk with Syria, even if it recently advised Israel not to do so.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/866017.html

A few comments:

1.) I don't think it's fair to say Israel was "hiding" behind US policy, there used to be a convergence of interest in being rejectionist, the perception was that one had the upper hand and had no need to compromise. It's a common negotiating attitude, both as a reality and as a pose. What has changed is that that pose is becoming unsustainable as a result of the Iraq war and the Second Lebanon War.

2.) Mubarak in Egypt, as this piece notes, is in a similar position of having his common interest with the USA erode as a result of the Iraq mess and the Second Lebanon War. There are a number of other "regimes" in the Middle East with similar issues.

3.) On the flip side, you have political organizations like Hizbullah, Hamas, the various sorts of jihadis in Iraq and Afghanistan, that have gained crediblity and clout. With that comes money, recruits, and armaments, and the ability to insist on recognition.

4.) The political classes, of course, need to avoid accountability for their errors, hence the sudden desire to find someone to cut a deal with. It is going to be interesting to see whether such partners can still be found and will still be willing to deal.

5.) It is still possible that the war lovers will give it one more shot, one last attempt to restore "deterrence" in Iran or Lebanon or Syria.