Us and Them - The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism

Interesting take on the post WWII nation state. While not so much about I/P, I figured it had some bearing on the One State, Two State discussion.

L-

On Edit: For clarification, I believe Mr. Muller is of the same school as Mr. Friedman when it comes to ideas around globalization.

It is always pleasant to come upon something pretty similar to one's own thoughts in print. That nationalism is a chief driving force of modern politics, in the broadest sense of modern, has long seemed to me abundantly clear from the evidence of events, despite the tendency of many well-meaning types, distressed by its many apparent retrograde and irrational features, to dismiss it as a declining relic. My personal inclination is to stretch the genesis of the thing in its modern form back to the Hundred Years War between England and France, which, though it was certainly on the surface a dynastic war, came to be fought by people who felt themselves profoundly separate from their foes. Similar currents can be detected under the surface of the wars of the Reformation. It is no accident that, as the Professor remarks, by the dawn of real nationalism in Western Europe, the political and ethnic boundaries there were more congruent than elsewhere, or that France and England were the leading exemplars of the new form.

Several elements of the article do seem to me to have some broad bearing on the Israel v. Palestine conflict.

One of these is to demonstrate anew its ordinariness. Many persons approach the events and patterns of this conflict as if it were a thing unique and without parallel, and it is this that accounts for much of the heat and stridency, the sense that one side verges on the demonic and one verges on the angelic. The fact is that forcible separations and expulsions have been common, and were common as dirt in the period after the Second World War. The only thing unique about this one is the insistence by both sides, in their various ways, that it was unique, and on the part of one side that it absolutely had to be reversed at all costs. No one ever insisted, or at any rate, ever insisted with much political traction or effect on the policy of any state, that the refuge populations driven from their homes in Europe or the Indian sub-continent after World War Two be restored to native domiciles. These populations were assimilated into the places they fetched up in, rather than being held separate and indigestible by the authorities of those places. No one today, certainly, regards the descendants of persons who fled Konigsberg before the Red Army as Prussian refugees, or insists on their right under international law to return to their grand-parent's home in Kalinengrad as a matter of justice and right.

Another element is to demonstrate anew the real scale of the thing. In the period after the Second World War many, many millions were uprooted violently from their homes, untold thousands of people were killed or died of various privations in the process. The displacements and the deaths accompanying the establishment of Israel do not even form an appreciable portion of that toll. It is simply not possible to both preserve any sense of proportion regarding events as a whole and regard the events in the Levant as a tremendous crime and wrong deserving to echo down the decades, even down the ages. Why it is so regarded is a separate question, but it is not likely any reasons can be produced that are not highly colored by emotion and tunneled vision.

Certainly one further element is the one you point out, namely the practical impossibility of any "one state, two peoples" solution. That simply runs wholly counter to the trend of the forces at play, and these are things far more deeply rooted than the odd mix of good intentions on the part of some and hope for victory by demography rather than military force on the part of others that has birthed this unlikely chimera. The professor is quite correct in stating that past a certain point of communal violence it is not possible to maintain different nationalities within a single political framework. The truth of this can be seen today in the Balkans quite clearly. Kossovo is becoming independent, and this was on the cards from the moment Milosevic withdrew his garrisons from the place, whatever the various signed accords and stated policies of great nations may have said at the time. It may not even be a good thing that this is so: it is certainly going to be damned hard on the small remnant of Serbs left in the place, and it is conceivable it could lead to a war a generation or two down the road. But it is the only practical solution to the situation right now, for there is simply no possibility a Serbian government could today exercise authority in the place without fighting and winning a war to do so. If two peoples regarding the other, with reasonable cause, as bloody-handed butchers cannot be held peaceably within an existing political framework, what are the chances two such peoples could be brought together to create a political framework that would hold them peaceably? The question, for better or worse, answers itself in the posing.

The problem with the theory of ethnical/national conflict as a driving force of international political conflict is that it doesn't account for two factors: (1) that economic and political conflict appear to be ethnic conflict because political elites have tried organize political and economic boundaries around ethnicity and (2) that those same elites then manipulate ethnicity to generate conflict.

This makes the ethnic explanation of conflict somewhat tautological and non-falsifiable.

For example, you could look at the I/P conflict as an ethnic or nationalist conflict. It certainly appears to be an ethnic conflict with Israeli Jews on one side and Arab, largely Muslim Arabs, on the other.

But Jordan is also mostly Muslim Arab, and indeed mostly Palestinian, and yet Israel and Jordan are at peace.

What is the independent variable that makes Palestinians have a violent conflict with Israel and Jordan not have a violent conflict with Israel? It can't be ethnic nationalism.

It's conflict over real economic assets (land, water) and political entitlements (voting, political power, freedom of movement). But elites on each side use ethnic claims and passions in order to rally each side and intensify identification. But even these so-called ethnic identifications are constantly under manipulation and transformation by elites. From 1948, one side's "ethnicity" has been transformed from secular Marxist Arabs to Islamicist, while the other side's "ethnic nationalism" has been manipulated and transformed from secular, socialist, ethnic-but-not-religious Jewish-Israeli to a nationalism based on biblical claims to the "land of Judea and Samaria."

Analying the I/P conflict an ethnic conflict can be a way of avoiding or even delegitimating Palestinians' material claims about what they want and how they are being treated.

Ethnic analysis is also a way of simply avoiding solving violent political conflcit altogether: if the conflict is based on "age old hatreds," then it is simply not possible to solve them; they are timeless and immutable. Until they are solved, of course, like the Israel-Jordan conflict.

This "let them kill each other" mentality in the 1990s was partly responsible for the reluctance to intervene in the Rwanda genocide and in the Yugoslavian civil war.

At the time that Yugoslavia began to fall apart, some analyses based on "ethnic nationalsm" argued that Europe and America should not intervene because the "ancient hatreds" between Christian Serb "Slavs" and Muslim Bosnians went back centuries to the ancient feudal era fight against Muslim control of the Balkans in the late 1400s. When it was pointed out that there was no war between Muslims and Slavs before the breakup of Tito's Yugoslavia, and for many long stretches of time during the hundreds of years between the late 1400s and the 1990s, the answer was that the "ancient hatreds" were just lying dormant during those times. In other words, the "ancient hatreds" theory is non-falsifiable: when there are conflicts over resources that are organized ethnically, those conflicts "prove" the nationalism theory; when there is no such conflict, the absence of conflict does not disprove the theory because the ethnic conflict is "hidden," "suppressed," and "dormant."

Right now, South Africa, is being swept by violent riots being labelled "ethnic hatred" against Zimbabweans in some quarters. But what could be the basis of "South African nationality" versus "Zimbabwean nationality" -- when black South Africa itself has about 10 "ethnic groups" (Zulu, Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa, Ndebele, Pedi, etc.) and Zimbabwe has 2 major groups (Shona and Matebele), with, even more ironically, South Africa's Tswana, Sotho and Pedi being much closer linguistically and culturally to Zimbabwe's Shona than to other South African ethnicities, and South Africa's Ndebele and Zulu being closer to Zimbabwe's Matebele than to other South African ethnicities. Moreover, South African guerillas fought in Zimbabwe's liberation army in the 1970s, and Zimbabwe provided support for South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle.

The answer: The current conflict is not about ethnic hatred at all. It's about jobs and wages and housing. The fact that some street thugs can inflame people using nationalist language does not mean that the underlying conflict is nationalistic.

It's about a lot more than jobs and wages and housing.

It's not about ethnic "hatred" either.

It's about resisting tyranny and the exercise of freedom.

Certainly the conflict within Zimbabwe is about "resisting tyranny and freedom," but the riots withing South Africa, in which South African gangs are attacking Zimbabweans refugees, cannot be described as "resisting tyranny and freedom."

And the jobs/housing comment only was meant to refer to South Africa.

It's conflict over real economic assets (land, water) and political entitlements (voting, political power, freedom of movement).

From 1948, one side's "ethnicity" has been transformed from secular Marxist Arabs to Islamicist, while the other side's "ethnic nationalism" has been manipulated and transformed from secular, socialist, ethnic-but-not-religious Jewish-Israeli to a nationalism based on biblical claims to the "land of Judea and Samaria.

it may play well within the nice liberal circles in the ivory towers of the university..but its not even close to reality.....

It's not about something called "the West Bank"?

if it was the hamas and company wouldnt be attacking the israeli border points in gaza that bring in supplies....the result of their attacks has only lowered their standard of living....and their continued attacks lower it still.

let me guess...you've never spoken to a Palestinian or israeli about what the motivations are.

They all seem to agree it's about the West Bank. The Palestinians in particular talk exclusively about how they are treated in the occupied territories and have no hatred of Israelis as an "ethnicity."

Can you explain what your views are rather than ask leading questions?

what is it about the westbank that makes it so important?

from a natural resource point of view/economics ..not much: semi arid, with two aquifers: one goes under both sides of the green line the second is in the jordan valley...which feeds just the local residents.

agricultural and local light industry is the mainstay...no mining, no raw materials, to be found in the area.
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if jobs were the issue, then there would have been no need for intifada I nor intifada II which saw major drop for the Palestinians in jobs, income, health and security, freedom of movement. The sole thing they didnt have was self-determination, which is not an economic factor

Gaza was the same...except that when israel left they had the additional aspect of self government, and a chance to improve their own standard of living to perhaps pre intifada days...they chose not to put their meager resources into that and instead chose to attack israel, knowing full well the results would harm their economy, security, heath etc.....

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and your theory about the changing in the populations reasons for the conflict is just wrong: arab/palestinian nationalism was never "left/communistic/socialistic"...and zionism always had a religious "wing" to it-but really, thats I/P conflict 101 (see other posts for more patient and detailed explanations). Perhaps study the history before make up a theory?...as opposed to first having the explanation and then attempting to mangle the history to fit your view?

For the Palestinians, it's their homes. You seem to be suggesting that because the area isn't economically rich, the Palestinians should be content to just pick up and leave.

Their message is pretty consistent: This is where they have lived for a long time, it's their homes, towns and communities and they don't want to leave.

Why would anyone expect them to think otherwise?

having a place to call home is not economics.....its emotional, its about ethnicity and nationalism and identity.

The point here is about a good deal more than simply periods of conflict between ethnic groups. The point is that identification as nationalities based on ethnicity and language and religion is the dominant form of political organization in the world today, and that over the past few centuries, this has gathered in strength, rather than diminishing, as it began to be posited that it would in the early and middle decades of the twentieth century. Thus analysis of events based on the idea that such nationalism is dwindling or being replaced or otherwise departing will have little predictive value, since it does not match the facts. The article focuses on the potential for conflict between different ethnic and linguistic and religious groups within a national political frame-work, rather than the potential for or causes of conflicts between separate nations based on such nationalities, and indeed, seems to suggest that sortings out of ethnic and linguistic and religious groups into separate political entities may act to reduce conflict between nations, as one motive for conflict between them, at least, the incorporation of bretheren across some border, whether couched as rescue from affliction or re-unification into the greater nation, is removed. The article touches on the conflict between Israel and Palestine only glancingly, putting it into the context of the widespread reordering of populations with an eye towards increased homogenity in the period after the Second World War, and observing that at its nativity, it matched a common enough pattern of two nationalities that each strove to drive out the other from within its desired political boundaries. It is silent on any details of why they attempted to do this.

It does not seem to me you succeed in making the case that positing motivations of ethnic nationalism driving conflicts between peoples is not falsifiable. The Balkan example seems to me particularly weak. Again, the point of the article is that conflict of peoples within a single political framework, pressed till the frame-works match the peoples, is the norm under the present organizing principle. Thus the lack of much open warfare in the Balkans between Christian and Moslem groups during a period when a Moslem imperium ruled the place has no bearing at all, and to say that open conflict was suppressed in this period is hardly a special pleading. Empires have an interest in maintaining peace within their possessions, and the means to maintain it. In this particular case, the power of the empire was definitely ranged on the side of co-religionists against their subject rivals. No one pretends that open expression of hostility cannot be deterred by fear of consequences, or that such deterrence means the hostility ceases to exist. That two people shouting angrily at one another will fall silent at the sight of an approaching police patrol does not mean their quarrel has ended, and it can be expected to resume at full volume once the gendarmes are out of sight. The only period in the Balkans really relevant to this analysis is that during which the various nationalities were grouped into a single political entity, namely the period between the end of World War One and the final collapse into the late Balkan Wars of our own day. In this, the period of Mr. Tito stands as the exception rather than the rule. In the inter-war period the Kingdom was riven by violent political strife; partisan activity after the Nazi invasion was as much civil war between the peoples of the place as resistance to the invader, with whom some of the peoples openly allied. Tito ruled by a skillful manipulation of ethnic rivalries, using one group to check another, and demonstrating his willingness to use force against the least hint of centrifugal tendencies. His successors lacked his practiced craftsman's knack for the task.

In regard to the Middle East, your example does not seem to bear the strain you would put on it either. Arab Nationalism is a complex phenomenom. Its original form was a Pan-Arabism that took the whole Arab Nation as its object, in reaction to both Ottoman rule and the encroachments of the West. Local strains that arose originally harbored hopes of coming to lead this wider entity, and only later came to focus on establishing their own separate nations, taking for borders the lines drawn by English and French colonial authorities, whether by simple marks on maps or by military force in the case of the northern boundaries of Saudi Arabia. The distinction between the peace that exists between states such as Jordan and Egypt and Israel, and the continued hostile relations between Israel and Arab Palestinians, owes a good deal to the outcome of various wars, which led those states to regard meaningful state to state hostility with Israel as a bad bargain that threatened their own power. Nor do these state relations of peace necessarily reflect the feelings and will of the people ruled by the governments of Jordan and Egypt. In both places, a great deal of popular hostility towards Israel is encountered, and their governments work very hard to keep this contained lest it recoil against them as betrayers. It is worth pointing out that there is no economic or resource conflict, or even direct political question, between Israel and either Egypt or Jordan to explain this popular hostility. Nor have the characteristics of the fight pressed between the peoples of Israel and Arab Palestine undergone as much real change over the years as you suggest. Arab Palestinian resistance from the Mandatory period was frequently cast in religious language and definitely motivated in many instances by conceived religious duty; Marxism was simply the language that had to be spoken to receive support from the Soviet Union and the Western Left in the Cold War period, and one would be hard put to find any real Socialist activity undertaken by the P.L.O. throughout its history. Zionism has always drawn a goodly proportion of its energy from Scripture, in both its Jewish and Christian forms.

I find that the very premises of the article, which you summarize, simply don't fit my understanding of how the world is currently structured.

For one thing, much of its argument is based on constantly shifting goal posts and definitions: is the argument about nationalities or ethnic groups? is it about popular ethnic hatreds of state actions?

You take on the article is that one point it is making is:

"identification as nationalities based on ethnicity and language and religion is the dominant form of political organization in the world today, and that over the past few centuries, this has gathered in strength, rather than diminishing,..."

That's somewhat of a premise or assumption. But what are the dominant "political organizations" in the world? The United States for one. But the US is the proto-type for the universal nation, not based on ethnicity, if by ethnicity we mean sub-national racial and ethnic groups. The US is based on citizenship and adherence to certain political values and the Constitution. (Of course if you define "American" as an "ethnicity" you win by definition -- but that's I think what the article does throughout, constantly shifting between ethnicity and nationality.)

Another dominant political organization is the European Community -- which reflects the radical decline in importance of both ethnicity and nationality as an organizing principle in Europe.

There are various states in Africa, almost none of which have a single ethnicity as the definition of its nationality. South Africa, like the United States, is a universal nation. Nigeria is made up of Yoruba, Ibo, Hasua, Fulani and struggles to create a national identity. Very few states in Africa are "nation states" comprised of a single linguistic and cultural ethnicity that correlates with a national government politically and that has a sense of national identity. This obviously causes political disputes and even political violence in some countries, but nowhere except the Sudan has this led to popular demands to partition any country along ethnic lines.

Even in the few cases where there are national states based on ethnicity in Africa, scratch the historical surface and you find a more complex story. My favorite example in Africa is the comparison of Botswana and Somalia. Both are said to be "ethnically" homogenous -- comprised of the "Tswana" in one case and the "Somalis" in the other. Yet one is peaceful, democratic, stable and before the AIDS crisis hit, was experiencing strong economic growth. The other is in a state of constant civil war, not between ethnic groups, but between "clans".

But in the 1800s, most people in Botswana (then Bechanaland) would not have thought of themselves as "Tswana." They comprised various city states involved in cattle ranching, farming, iron making and trade -- each kingdom named after a dominant lineage (like a clan) -- the crocodile people (BaKwena), the iron people (BaRolong), the people of the place of dew (BaFokeng) and so on. They often cooperated with each other but often were at war. As separate kingdoms, many generally identified themselves as aligned with the bigger kingdom of similar language to the east -- the BaSotho under King Moshoeshoe.

As the British explorers who first encountered and described them, traveled north, however, the explorers would ask their hosts, in effect, "if I go north, what are the people of the next kingdom like?" And the answer was always the same, a puzzled, "they are the same as us," which in their language was "Ba Batswana." The British reported back of the "Great Bechuana Nation" that stretches all the way north to the Limpopo! Yet when the Boers arrived and began stealing their land and cattle, the chiefs of the "Bechuana" nation got together and decided to embrace the identity the British had inadvertently created, and they became "the Tswana." They actually had a meeting and decided to become the BaTswana!

What I'm getting at is that "BoTswana" is very much an invented identity, created for political and security purposes, which has been spectacularly successful, but it in no way encompasses a single polity (the small kingdoms are now chiefdoms) nor does it entirely embrace a single linguistic of cultural group (which would have to include the Tswana of South Africa, the Sotho of S.A. and Lesotho, and the BaPedi of northern S.A.) Southern Africans have really complicated identities in this regard, and a person in Botswana will call himself a Mokwena, a Tswana (ethnically Tswana), a MoTswana (citizen of Botswana) and a Black African.

The Somalis could have created a similar identity, but didn't.

In South America, the states were like the US and SA, ie, multi-ethnic and multi-racial. As a result of the wars for independence, some states had a sense of nationalism, but one would be hard pressed to describe the cultural and linguistic differences between say a Venezuelan and a Colombian. Whatever nationalist feeling existed is, moreover, on the decline, being replaced with a pan-Latin, or cross border identities embraced by the current generation of leaders like Hugo Chavez, Lula and Evo Morales.

In other words, it seems to me that the article is assuming a premise that isn't really borne out by global trends in political development. Given world trends towards regional economic and political organization, the idea that "sorting out of ethnic and linguistic and religious groups into separate political entities may act to reduce conflict between nations" seems like a particularly bad and even retrograde idea.

As I view 19th and 20th century history, it seems to me that while people as individuals and communities may grumble about people of other ethnicities, there have been almost no spontaneous, mass movements of one ethnic group attacking another, attempting to sort out land or territory; by contrast, most of these conflicts have been generated or intensified by state elites, casting around for rhetoric to mobilize the masses to their state ends. If it weren't ethnicity, it could, as Somalia suggest, be something as seemingly irrelevant as "clan." It could as well be ideology (America's use of "democracy," or the Soviets' use of the "inevitable" march of socialism).

The point about Jordan and the Palestinians is that they constitute about as close as you can get to a controlled experiment, the Jordanians being largely of Palestinian ethnicity. The Jordanians may grumble about the Israelis, but it is mostly about a material conflict -- the way Palestinians are treated -- rather than free floating ethnic hatred. More importantly, however, the article is suggesting that these ethnic hatreds are driving state actors, not vice versa. If the article's thesis was correct, then the Jordanian people's hatred would force the state to act. But the reality is that those conflicts are generated (and managed) at the state level, not the mass level. As you yourself admit, Jordan doesn't fight Israel because the state elites aren't interested in ethnic/national war with Israel. That seems to contradict the idea that ethnic conflict is so inevitable, so unmanageable, that the end result must be sorting people into ethnic nation states. Until ruthless politicians get involved, ethnic incompatibility is mostly a matter of private grumbling or at worse various kinds of public and private discrimination (which a state can decide to combat).

By contrast with Jordanians, the Palestinians are under direct rule of Israel and suffer various disabilities, discrimination, limits on movement, etc., that make their lives miserable and that they can plausibly blame on the Israeli state. It seems unfair to blame the Palestinians opposition to the occupation on their ethnic hatred rather than acknowleding the pretty obvious suffering they endure. I mean, I have no "ethnic" grudge against Israelis but if I were suddenly subjected to what the Palestinians experience, I would be pretty angry, and it would have nothing to do with ethnicity or nationalism.

if the Palestinians were basing their violence and anger only on the occupation.

But of course, all their violence and anger isn't about the occupation of the WB (or formerly Gaza) at all, but on the "occupation of all of greater Palestine".


The Palestinians have made suffering their national identity, but shouldn't simply blame the Israelis for their bad lot in life. They have had ample opportunity, before Hamas made things infinitely worse, to improve their lives.

They have taken absolutely no resposnibility whatsoever in the past 60 years (including the 20 years when they were under Jordanian and Egyptian occupation) to achieve statehood, reduce their misery, etc.

The Palestinian areas were pretty quiet through much of the late 1960s and early 1970s. During that time, most West Bank towns had Palestinian mayors who worked closely with the Israelis. The terrorism came mostly from Palestinians outside I/P's borders.

There was also a long period of peace and cooperation after Oslo, before the 2nd Intifada. Remember when Palestinian, Jordanian and Israeli businessmen were making plans and joint ventures throughout the West Bank?

If the only source of Palestinian violence and anger were ethnic hatred and the existence of Israel, there wouldn't have been long periods of peace and quiet.

The existence of periods of peace and quiet disprove your thesis. If the cause of "anger and violence" was what you say it is, then there could never have been long periods of peace and cooperation.

I just don't see how any fair minded, objective person cannot acknowledge the causal relation and correlation between conditions suffered by Palestinians and the levels of "anger and violence."

Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War

Jan 1, 1952 - Seven armed terrorists attacked and killed a nineteen year-old girl in her home, in the neighborhood of Beit Yisrael, in Jerusalem.

Apr 14, 1953 - Terrorists tried for the first time to infiltrate Israel by sea, but were unsuccessful. One of the boats was intercepted and the other boat escaped.

June 7, 1953 - A youngster was killed and three others were wounded, in shooting attacks on residential areas in southern Jerusalem.

June 9, 1953 - Terrorists attacked a farming community near Lod, and killed one of the residents. The terrorists threw hand grenades and sprayed gunfire in all directions. On the same night, another group of terrorists attacked a house in the town of Hadera. This occurred a day after Israel and Jordan signed an agreement, with UN mediation, in which Jordan undertook to prevent terrorists from crossing into Israel from Jordanian territory.

June 10, 1953 - Terrorists infiltrating from Jordan destroyed a house in the farming village of Mishmar Ayalon.

June 11, 1953 - Terrorists attacked a young couple in their home in Kfar Hess, and shot them to death.

Sept 2, 1953 - Terrorists infiltrated from Jordan, and reached the neighborhood of Katamon, in the heart of Jerusalem. They threw hand grenades in all directions. Miraculously, no one was hurt.

Mar 17, 1954 - Terrorists ambushed a bus traveling from Eilat to Tel Aviv, and opened fire at short range when the bus reached the area of Maale Akrabim in the northern Negev. In the initial ambush, the terrorists killed the driver and wounded most of the passengers. The terrorists then boarded the bus, and shot each passenger, one by one. Eleven passengers were murdered. Survivors recounted how the murderers spat on the bodies and abused them. The terrorists could clearly be traced back to the Jordanian border, some 20 km from the site of the terrorist attack.

Jan 2, 1955 - Terrorists killed two hikers in the Judean Desert.

Mar 24, 1955 - Terrorists threw hand grenades and opened fire on a crowd at a wedding in the farming community of Patish, in the Negev. A young woman was killed, and eighteen people were wounded in the attack.

Apr 7, 1956 - A resident of Ashkelon was killed in her home, when terrorists threw three hand grenades into her house.
Two members of Kibbutz Givat Chaim were killed, when terrorists opened fire on their car, on the road from Plugot Junction to Mishmar Hanegev.
There were further hand grenade and shooting attacks on homes and cars, in areas such as Nitzanim and Ketziot. One person was killed and three others wounded.

Apr 11, 1956 - Terrorists opened fire on a synagogue full of children and teenagers, in the farming community of Shafrir. Three children and a youth worker were killed on the spot, and five were wounded, including three seriously.

Apr 29, 1956 - Egyptians killed Roi Rotenberg, 21 years of age, from Nahal Oz.

Sept 12, 1956 - Terrorists killed three Druze guards at Ein Ofarim, in the Arava region.

Sept 23, 1956 - Terrorists opened fire from a Jordanian position, and killed four archaeologists, and wounded sixteen others, near Kibbutz Ramat Rachel.

Sept 24, 1956 - Terrorists killed a girl in the fields of the farming community of Aminadav, near Jerusalem.

Oct 4, 1956 - Five Israeli workers were killed in Sdom.

Oct 9, 1956 - Two workers were killed in an orchard of the youth village, Neve Hadassah, in the Sharon region.

Nov 8, 1956 - Terrorists opened fire on a train, attacked cars and blew up wells, in the North and Center of Israel. Six Israelis were wounded.

Feb 18, 1957 - Two civilians were killed by terrorist landmines, next to Nir Yitzhak, on the southern border of the Gaza Strip.

Mar 8, 1957 - A shepherd from Kibbutz Beit Govrin was killed by terrorists in a field near the Kibbutz.

Apr 16, 1957 - Terrorists infiltrated from Jordan, and killed two guards at Kibbutz Mesilot.

May 20, 1957 - A terrorist opened fire on a truck in the Arava region, killing a worker.

May 29, 1957 - A tractor driver was killed and two others wounded, when the vehicle struck a landmine, next to Kibbutz Kisufim.

June 23, 1957 - Israelis were wounded by landmines, close to the Gaza Strip.

Aug 23, 1957 - Two guards of the Israeli Mekorot water company were killed near Kibbutz Beit Govrin.

Dec 21, 1957 - A member of Kibbutz Gadot was killed in the Kibbutz fields.

Feb 11, 1958 - Terrorists killed a resident of Moshav Yanov who was on his way to Kfar Yona, in the Sharon area.

Apr 5, 1958 - Terrorists lying in ambush shot and killed two people near Tel Lachish.

Apr 22, 1958 - Jordanian soldiers shot and killed two fishermen near Aqaba.

May 26, 1958 - Four Israeli police officers were killed in a Jordanian attack on Mt. Scopus, in Jerusalem.

Nov 17, 1958 - Syrian terrorists killed the wife of the British air attache in Israel, who was staying at the guesthouse of the Italian Convent on the Mt. of the Beatitudes.

Dec 3, 1958- A shepherd was killed at Kibbutz Gonen. In the artillery attack that followed, 31 civilians were wounded.

Jan 23, 1959 - A shepherd from Kibbutz Lehavot Habashan was killed.

Feb 1, 1959 - Three civilians were killed by a terrorist landmine near Moshav Zavdiel.

Apr 15, 1959 - A guard was killed at Kibbutz Ramat Rahel.

Apr 27, 1959 - Two hikers were shot at close range and killed near Massada.

Sept 6, 1959 - Bedouin terrorists killed a paratroop reconnaissance officer near Nitzana.

Sept 8, 1959 - Bedouins opened fire on an army bivouac in the Negev, killing an IDF officer, Captain Yair Peled.

Oct 3, 1959 - A shepherd from Kibbutz Heftziba was killed near Kibbutz Yad Hana.

Apr 26, 1960 - Terrorists killed a resident of Ashkelon south of the city.

Apr 12, 1962 - Terrorists fired on an Egged bus on the way to Eilat; one passenger was wounded.

Sept 30, 1962 - Two terrorists attacked an Egged bus on the way to Eilat. No one was wounded.

Jan 1, 1965 - Palestinian terrorists attempted to bomb the National Water Carrier. This was the first attack carried out by the PLO's Fatah faction.

May 31, 1965 - Jordanian Legionnaires fired on the neighborhood of Musrara in Jerusalem, killing two civilians and wounding four.

June 1, 1965 - Terrorists attack a house in Kibbutz Yiftach.

July 5, 1965 - A Fatah cell planted explosives at Mitzpe Massua, near Beit Guvrin; and on the railroad tracks to Jerusalem near Kafr Battir.

Aug 26, 1965 - A waterline was sabotaged at Kibbutz Manara, in the Upper Galilee.

Sept 29, 1965 - A terrorist was killed as he attempted to attack Moshav Amatzia.

Nov 7, 1965 - A Fatah cell that infiltrated from Jordan blew up a house in Moshav Givat Yeshayahu, south of Beit Shemesh. The house was destroyed, but the inhabitants were miraculously unhurt.

Apr 25, 1966 - Explosions placed by terrorists wounded two civilians and damaged three houses in Moshav Beit Yosef, in the Beit Shean Valley.

May 16, 1966 - Two Israelis were killed when their jeep hit a terrorist landmine, north of the Sea of Galilee and south of Almagor. Tracks led into Syria.

July 13, 1966 - Two soldiers and a civilian were killed near Almagor, when their truck struck a terrorist landmine.

July 14, 1966 - Terrorists attacked a house in Kfar Yuval, in the North.

July 19, 1966 - Terrorists infiltrated into Moshav Margaliot on the northern border and planted nine explosive charges.

Oct 27, 1966 - A civilian was wounded by an explosive charge on the railroad tracks to Jerusalem.

Anyone can cut and paste propoganda from one side or the other.

How many of those attacks you cite include phrases like, "terrorists infiltrate from Jordan..." or "Egyptians opened fire..." As far as I can tell every single one of your points is non-responsive to the issue at hand.

In other words, the point I am making is: were or were there not long periods during which the communities of the West Bank were relatively quiet? Yes.

Does "violence and anger" from West Bank communities correlate with the treatment of those communities by Israel? Yes.

The problem with this debate is that many people involved in it have completely closed their minds to reasoned inquiry. It's as though if you admit even the most blatantly obvious sociological fact, Israel will slide into the sea.

I don't have a dog in this fight. I'm not Palestinian, not Jewish, not Arab, not Israeli, not Muslim. So I'm not interested in trading propoganda points. I'm trying to have a reasoned debate in this thread, as you can see with the exchange between the Magistrate and me.

I would suggest you save your style of argument for your counterpart on what you perceive to be "the other side".

Does "violence and anger" from West Bank communities correlate with the treatment of those communities by Israel? Yes

a bit more research and you would discover that during intifada II for instance when israel would pull out of an area..i.e. leave it, the next bunch of suicide bombers would inevitably come from that very area.....

the reason being having nothing to do with any specific action of israel, just that without the IDF around, they were free to prepare the next bunch of bombers.....

More so, Intifada II erupted at several points simultaneously....again nothing to do with any treatment by israel on those communities at that specific date....

those are just two general examples, in fact another example of which you couldnt know is that when army units switched the locals might try them out with some violence.....see how they react...again nothing to do with any specific action of israel.

You are just plain wrong, and I was providing evidence.

People cannot just make idiotic and false statements and not expect them to be challenged.

Palestinian terrorism increased quite significantly after Oslo

are monolithic.

When Arabs meet in the US, for example, the first question they ask each other is: where are you from? Morroccan Arabs are not interchangable with Lebanese, or Iraqi, or Tunisians, or Saudis. Food is different, language is different, history is different, political culture is different...

Arabs of Jordan (especially those of Jordanian descent) are not synonymous with Arabs of Palestine.

And of course, by now, a lot of 'Arab' identity is rooted not so much in real shared ethnic ancestry as it is in a commonly shared, though still much varigated, history of having been conquered and ruled by Arabs in the early expansion of Islam, once you get away from the actual heartland of the Arab people, particularly through Egypt and on into the Mahgreb.

"There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. We are all part of one nation. It is only for political reasons that we carefully underline our Palestinian identity… the existence of a separate Palestinian identity serves only tactical purposes. The founding of a Palestinian state is a new tool in the continuing battle against Israel."

Zuheir Muhsin, former head of the PLO's Military Department and member of its Executive Council

You may not be familiar with Arab history. Movements designed to unite "the arab nation," such as Nasser tried to do, ultimately met with failure.

Do you contend that Arabs are indeed monolithic?

I do not pretend to know a great deal re Arab history.

'Do you contend that Arabs are indeed monolithic?'
No of course not.

this guy, Zuheir Muhsin, former head of the PLO's Military Department and member of its Executive Council, disagreed with your assessment... quote
"Arabs of Jordan (especially those of Jordanian descent) are not synonymous with Arabs of Palestine."

That's all.

They are generally no more ethnographers than they are philanthropists or ethicists.

Obviously, a leading figure in a stateless body in great measure dependent on fraternal assistance from existing states will make noises proclaiming unity and indivisibility in terms that would make Ms. Cartland blush to apply to marriage for true love. But the facts of the matter are quite different.

The Syrian state, of course, sees no difference between Syria and Lebanon, since it considers Lebanon an orphaned province of Syria, and has long desired to incorporate it. In the early days of the Syrian state, even while under French Mandatory authority, its leaders at Damascus considered Palestine properly a part of Syria, as it had been administratively, more or less, under the Ottoman. Some elements of Arab Palestinian nationalist leadership at that time, perceiving France more hostile to Zionism than England, made noises of agreement, often bolstered by real family ties to the Damascene leadership.

The Kings of Jordan from its inception have viewed the leadership of Arab Palestine with great distaste, that has largely been returned in full. King Abdullah entered the '48 conflict as much to pre-empt any state emerging under the leadership of the Mufti al'Husseini as for any other reason. King Hussein famously turned his army to the expulsion of the P.L.O. from Jordan, a thing accomplished with great bloodshed. In the early days of the Emirat of Trans-Jordan, guerrilla fighting across the border with French Syria was frequent, and reflected hostility between the Hashemites and the local notables who held the reins in Damascus, which the Hashemites thought still should be their's.

Lebanon, which as recent news reports forcibly remind us, is a polity so divided as to constitute more a civil war pressed at varying degrees of intensity than a state, contains ethnic and religious factions which variously despise Syrians and Arab Palestinians, and probably think none too highly of Jordanians either. Only their mutual dislike for one another prevents there being much expression of these more distant enmities.