IDF recommends major, but short-term, ground offensive in Gaza

The Israel Defense Forces recommended a major, but relatively short-term, ground offensive in the Gaza Strip on Wednesday, as military preparations continued on the border. The army was given the green light to forge ahead with Operation Cast Lead, which enters its sixth day Thursday.

Detailed briefings have been underway for the past two days at Southern Command, with officers receiving their orders. The General Staff believes that more pressure must be put on Hamas to make it agree to a long-term cease-fire under conditions more favorable to Israel.

The IDF said rocket fire on the south was expected to continue during a ground operation. The army recommends that a diplomatic exit plan be prepared while a cease-fire agreement is formulated.

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On Wednesday, some 70 rockets were fired from Gaza at the Negev, among them some 10 Katyushas with a range of about 40 kilometers. These landed in Be'er Sheva and around Ashdod.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051682.html

Global Security has a decent writeup on them and the differences

Katyusha's or Grad's are mostly WWII era munitions and also unguided they do however have a greater range than kassams

They are a 122mm rocket and carry up to a 44lbs HE warhead. Rockets are by definition unguided (rocket with a guidance section is a missile), but that does not make them less deadly.

I think of those rocket batteries mounted on trucks, like the Soviets used in WWII; thanks for clearing it up for me.

like the air strikes.

Maybe a probe. And lots of men and machinery on the move. And apparently some disagreements at the top about how to proceed. That's all I've seen.

I have had the time and the inclination. We live in interesting times.

I thought this thread was the "disclaimer" for what is coming

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=124&topic_id=233443&mesg_id=233443

Ynet that published the original story later published a rebuttal story from a Gazan hospital director? Post #36, bottom of the list.

Back to surprises, the IAF took a very different approach that has been done before, and with considerable success. Whats left of Hams leadership are still screaming SPIES!!! at everyone, including Fatah and the PA. The IAF approach had some serious psychwar impacts that must be effecting Hezbollah as well as Hamas.

Normal doctrine would have had the ground forces going in right after the major air strikes had completed, sometime on the second day. That they haven't seems very odd. Sabras are decisive, so I doubt its waffling as some here have suggested. Just going to have to wait and see what happens.

Its morning over there. Lets see what happens today...

The first question anyone contemplating a violent course must ask and answer, with ruthless honesty and calculation, is whether or not the goal desired can actually be obtained by the course of violence contemplated.

Neither side's stated goals can be obtained by the violence being pressed. Hamas cannot, by use of the capacity for violence at its disposal, force any alteration of Israeli policy it might desire, let alone destroy the Israeli state and restore Jerusalem and the rest to Moslem rule. Israel cannot, by use of the capacity for violence at its disposal, compel an end to violence against Israeli citizens emanating from militant bodies of Arab Palestinians, let alone secure a widespread peaceable acceptance of Israel among that people.

The actual, measurable results of each side's employment of violence, in fact, run counter to the stated goals of each. The employment of violence by Hamas only serves to bring cataclysmic harm to the people of Arab Palestine, and weaken it even further in contest with Israel. The employment of violence by Israel only serves to increase bitterness and hostility towards Israel among the people of Arab Palestine, and root these things ever deeper into their society.

In such a situation, it becomes necessary to consider whether stated goals are different from actual goals, and what would fit into that gap on both sides, with a precision that a qualified machinist would be proud to display, is a toxic mixture of careerism and frustration in various proportions afflicting the leadership of both Hamas and Israel....

Hamas is being disowned to the point where the PA may be able to resume control in Gaza. If it does, the rockets will stop. Not saying its going to happen but it is certainly possible. Egypt and the PA are supporting Israel in this.

That will not stop acts of violence against Israeli citizens by various militant bodies among the Arab Palestinian people, nor will the disposition of that people towards Israel improve.

Hamas was staking its claim to legitimacy based on attacking Israel. PA's claim to legitimacy is based on the claim its a real government that is in control of its territory and the people. No doubt there would continue to be isolated incidents, but the mass launches would stop, especially of the longer range Grads. Israel would then have to stop the attacks.

The wounds and hate on both side will take a generation or more to heal, but first the shooting has to stop and the Palestinian have to decide to quit being disposable proxies and tools of other Arab and Muslim groups.

No organized body purporting to rule the Arab Palestinian people can hope to be regarded as legitimate enough to maintain civil order without countenancing, if not actively carrying out itself, acts of violence against Israel. The leaders of Fatah are more reasonable in some ways than those of Hamas, and are preferable overall on that count, but if a larger view is taken the difference is not so great in practical issue. Fatah in the past has never managed to hold militant bodies in check, and nothing leads me now to expect they will do any better at that in future. The unfortunate facts are that to too great a degree, the short-term interests of political leadership diverge from the long-term interests of the peoples they lead, and the most intransigent elements of both societies hold an effective veto over any progress towards peaceable settlement the reasonable majorities desire.

My personal guess is that Israel is testing the strength of Hamas' military to see if the restoration of Fatah is possible within the capabilities of Fatah's military elements. Without any visible change in Fatah's training, I would view that as a tremendous gamble.

As for Hamas' as I understand it, their support inside of Gaza is waning to some degree and they are needing this confrontation to restore a modicum of nationalist support.

Obviously the more Israel attacks, the more support grows for Hamas which will potentially hurt Fatah. There are a pair of lines, one being the rise of internal support that will prevent a return of Fatah, the other the decline of Hamas' military capability.

L-

The Fatah leadership is somewhat more reasonable than that of Hamas, but Fatah has not in the past shown itself capable of effectively restraining militant bodies, even some within its own penumbra. Were Fatah to emerge victorious in a civil clash with Hamas, its first domestic political step would have to be turning a blind eye at the least to 'acts of resistance' against Israel.

But I suspect the attacks would become lower in nature and key. Also, I think there would be a delay as old scores are settled.

L-

everybody gets to "guess," what REALLY happened or is going on.

WRT Gaza, it is usually a mistake to take at great cost something you don't intend or want to keep. While I have no doubt the IDF can take and even hold Gaza militarily, it will be expensive, and it will not improve the position.

I'm surprised we don't have more "Siege of Gaza" opinion pieces. And it's been going on essentially since Hamas took power in Gaza. But there are various oddities about it: the seal is not hermetic, and cannot be for political reasons; and the city could be taken well enough, but at political and military costs that are not (so far) acceptable; and the attacking party does not really want to keep the besieged city once it takes it, it just wants to impose a more congenial government; yet, without continued occupation, an imposed government may not stand for long, and any abatement of the rocket fire may be temporary.

There will be one of two outcomes eventually: the siege is broken, or the city is taken. In the meantime, since the seal on the city cannot be hermetic, it can continue more or less indefinitely undecided. And there is no reason to expect the result to be permanent, once it occurs.

And it all seems very expensive for such an uncertain outcome.

You will have noticed my comments on this matter generally have grown very infrequent over the last few years, and that is because the entire mess has reached levels of futility that can only be classed as squalid, and cannot be contemplated without acute depression....

But this latest boondoggle got me interested, it's always interesting to sees ones views tested by events, and the end of the year has been a sort of hiatus for me. I think the collapse of US power will lead to all sorts of changes, damn if I know what it's going to look like, but I don't expect it will be pretty.

And a Happy New Year, Sir.
-- B