Cast Lead 2 – Uri Avnery

Published yesterday (updated) 27/12/2009 15:42

Did Israel win? Tomorrow marks the first anniversary of the Gaza War, alias Operation Cast Lead, and this question fills the public space.

Within the Israeli consensus, the answer has already been given: Certainly we won, the Qassams have stopped coming.

A simple, not to say primitive, answer. But that is how it looks to the superficial observer. There were the Qassams, we made war, no more Qassams. Sderot is thriving, the inhabitants of Beersheba go to the theater. Everything else is for philosophy professors.

But anyone who wishes to understand the results of this war has to pose some hard questions.

Was the real aim of the war to stop the Qassams? Could this have been achieved by other means? If there were other aims, what were they? Is the final balance sheet positive or negative, as far as the interests of Israel are concerned?
(snip)

Therefore, let’s ignore the protocols. What were the real aims of those who started the war? I believe that they were as follows, in order of decreasing priority:

1. To overthrow the regime in Gaza, by turning the life of the inhabitants into such hell that they would rise up against Hamas.
2. To return to the government and the army their self-respect, which had been severely damaged in Lebanon War II.
3. To restore the deterrent power of the Israeli army.
4. To stop the Qassams.
5. To free the captive soldier, Gilad Shalit.

Let’s examine the results, one by one.

This week, hundreds of thousands gathered in the Gaza Strip for a demonstration in support of Hamas. Judging from the photos, there were between 200-400,000. Considering that there are about 1.5 million inhabitants in the Strip, most of them children, that was quite an impressive turnout - especially in view of the misery caused by the Israeli blockade that has continued throughout the year and the ruined homes that could not be rebuilt. Those who believed that the pressure on the population would cause an uprising against the Hamas government have been proved wrong.

History buffs were not surprised. When attacked by a foreign foe, every people unites behind its leaders, whoever they are. Pity that our politicians and generals don't read books.

Our commentators portray the inhabitants of Gaza as “looking with longing at the flourishing shops of Ramallah.” These commentators also derive hope from public opinion polls that purport to show that the popularity of Hamas in the West Bank is declining. If so, why is Fatah afraid of conducting elections, even after all Hamas activists there have been thrown into prison?

It seems that most of the people in the Gaza Strip are more or less satisfied with the functioning of the Hamas government. In spite of the misery of their lives, they may also be proud of its steadfastness There is order in the streets, crime and drugs are decreasing. Hamas is trying cautiously to promote a religious agenda in daily life, and it seems that the public does not mind.

The main aim of the operation has failed completely...


read on...
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=249772

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Policy of destruction

Amid the endless, horrifying statistics a few stand out: Of Gaza's 640 schools, 18 were completely destroyed and 280 damaged in Israeli attacks. Two-hundred-and-fifty students and 15 teachers were killed.

Of 122 health facilities assessed by the World Health Organization, 48 per cent were damaged or destroyed.

Ninety per cent of households in Gaza still experience power cuts for 4 to 8 hours per day due to Israeli attacks on the power grid and degradation caused by the blockade.

Forty-six per cent of Gaza's once productive agricultural land is out of use due to Israeli damage to farms and Israeli-declared free fire zones. Gaza's exports of more than 130,000 tonnes per year of tomatoes, flowers, strawberries and other fruit have fallen to zero.

http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/gazaoneyearon/2009/12/200912269262432432.html

Do you actually believe this stuff?

I like to see different opinions and try to understand them. Reality doesn't need me to defend it, and it does whatever it does pretty much without my help.

to indiscriminately and without comment post opinions by someone with so little credibility? It doesn't provoke much discussion.

I post things that I find interesting for one reason or another, I get tired of seeing the same crap all the time.

It's nice that you think I don't discriminate though, thanks for the compliment.

Avneri sometimes has something of value to say, but this is not one of them. I was really hoping for a discussion of WHY he believes that the Israeli leadership had his proposed hierarchy of war aims. Alas, all we have is his belief that the Israeli leadership's main priority was to overthrow Hamas. Sure it's possible, but it's not something anyone should believe without proof, and Avneri offers none. In fact, the only observable reason for his belief is so he can have a straw man to show that the war failed to achieve its main objective. If you want to believe along with him, that's your problem.

What are you talkinga about?

However, for your sake, I'll clarify. It was very convenient of Avneri to say that he believes that the primary goal of Israel was to overthrow Hamas, just to be able to say that Israel failed in its primary goal. He doesn't present a shred of evidence or argument to support the belief that overthrowing Hamas was Israel's major war aim, and there isn't much proof of it. He simply wanted to show that the war was a failure so he came up with something that Israel obviously failed to achieve, and then claimed that it was Israel's major goal. How does he know that the overthrowing Hamas was a major israeli goal? How does he know that it was even on the agenda? He doesn't.

1. To overthrow the regime in Gaza, by turning the life of the inhabitants into such hell that they would rise up against Hamas.
2. To return to the government and the army their self-respect, which had been severely damaged in Lebanon War II.
3. To restore the deterrent power of the Israeli army.
4. To stop the Qassams.
5. To free the captive soldier, Gilad Shalit.


There can be disagreement about order of priority, but I recall when OCL was happening that each of these were stated by Israeli officials to be aims of OCL. I can go back into the archives and look for a few articles about it if you like...

He also listed them in his believed order of priority. He assumed that the primary goal was overthrowing Hamas, and he did so without any evidence or argument at all. My challenge is to his ranking of these supposed goals.

All the things he listed should be on the list, and most made appearances during various stages of OCL as being primary aims, but I'd want to rearrange them a bit...like this:


1. To stop the Qassams.
2. To overthrow the regime in Gaza, by turning the life of the inhabitants into such hell that they would rise up against Hamas.
3. To free the captive soldier, Gilad Shalit.
4. To return to the government and the army their self-respect, which had been severely damaged in Lebanon War II.
5. To restore the deterrent power of the Israeli army.

I think #2 was already being carried out by the blockade a long time before OCL happened, and that #4 and #5 are so closely related that they're one and the same...

The Futility of Operation Cast Lead

By Stuart A. Cohen

16 Feb 2009

snip...

strategic thinkers repeatedly pointed out during the Cold War (which is when most of the theoretical work on deterrence was done), the side intent on attaining deterrence is never in a position to determine whether or not that aim has been achieved. Ultimately, the decision rests with the putative deteree: Only if he acts in accordance with my wishes does he signify that my deterrence has been "successful." But as long as he refuses to make any such move, he in fact forces me to try to "deter" him by resorting to a far greater dosage of force than was my original intention.

In other words, operations aimed at attaining deterrence in fact leave the intended target of the exercise with far more liberty than the would-be administrator of deterrence to decide whether or not the desired effect has been attained.

Genuine statesmen do not allow themselves to be caught in this situation. Instead, they formulate concrete and tangible aims (the conquest of a particular slice of territory, control over a strategically important resource, the surrender of a hostile government, or – in the present context – the repatriation of a soldier held captive by the enemy). These are the sort of objectives that, because they are immediately visible, are likely to make the most profound impact. “The restoration of deterrence,” by contrast, is far too slippery a concept to provide a policy guideline. Properly speaking, it should be considered the consequence of a successful strategy – and not a strategic aim in itself.

Israel’s failure to appreciate this rule of thumb in effect left Hamas with far more room for strategic maneuver than the movement really had a right to expect. Given the imprecision of Israel’s war aims, the Hamas leadership did not have to make any formal concession at all in order to bring about a cessation of the IDF onslaught. Hence, it could always claim that the attack had in fact failed. And provided enough Hamas leaders survived to tell that tale – which was indeed the case – their work was done.


http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/perspectives68.html

Broadcast: 20/03/2002
Reporter: Jennifer Byrne

Transcript

Byrne: Thanks for joining us tonight on Foreign Correspondent. How has it come to this, Martin... how is it that the mighty Israeli army – one of the world’s most powerful - with its helicopter gunships, with its tanks, with it’s missiles, can be losing to this relatively small, relatively under-armed if fanatical group of Palestinians?

Van Creveld: The same thing has happened to the Israeli army as happened to all the rest that have tried over the last sixty years. Basically it’s always a question of the relationship of forces. If you are strong, and you are fighting the weak for any period of time, you are going to become weak yourself. If you behave like a coward then you are going to become cowardly – it’s only a question of time. The same happened to the British when they were here... the same happened to the French in Algeria... the same happened to the Americans in Vietnam... the same happened to the Soviets in Afghanistan... the same happened to so many people that I can’t even count them.

Byrne: : Martin you used the word ‘cowardly’ yet what we’ve seen tonight – these commando units, the anti-terrorist squads – these aren’t cowardly people.

Van Creveld: I agree with you. They are very brave people... they are idealists... they want to serve their country and they want to prove themselves. The problem is that you cannot prove yourself against someone who is much weaker than yourself. They are in a lose/lose situation. If you are strong and fighting the weak, then if you kill your opponent then you are a scoundrel... if you let him kill you, then you are an idiot. So here is a dilemma which others have suffered before us, and for which as far as I can see there is simply no escape. Now the Israeli army has not by any means been the worst of the lot. It has not done what for instance the Americans did in Vietnam... it did not use napalm, it did not kill millions of people. So everything is relative, but by definition, to return to what I said earlier, if you are strong and you are fighting the weak, then anything you do is criminal.

Byrne: : You are a military historian, but let’s face it the Prime Minister was a general... how could General Sharon – Prime Minister Sharon – be getting it so wrong, by your analysis?

Van Creveld: It’s not a question of personalities, it’s a question of the balance of forces. I’ll use a metaphor that I’ll take from Lao-tzu – the Chinese sage who lived about 2,400 years ago – ‘a sword put into salt water will rust’ – it is only a question of time. And this is happening to the Israeli army and to the Israeli society, almost regardless of who is leading it.

http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/stories/s511530.htm

One thing that he missed of course, is that it's impossible to build a wall over which even birds (or Qassams) can't fly. So let's assume that Israel does exactly what Van Creveld says. It pulls out of the West Bank completely, and builds a huge wall on the Green line. It tells the settlers that they're on their own. Now what? What if the Palestinians don't try to send anyone over the wall? What if instead they just fire rockets? What should Israel do then? What can it do then?

A compare and contrast sort of thing. I've liked Mr van Creveld for a long time, he is a well-respected Israeli scholar and historian, and the post I replyed to reminded me of him.

I don't think he meant to be taken seriously about the wall birds can't fly over, do you?

The serious point he is making is that he thinks the present course is futile.

However, he didn't anticipate the Qassams back in 2002, when the interview took place. In any event, my real point is that if israel were to follow Van Creveld's suggestions, then it also needs to be prepared for what happens next, and posters to this site need to be honest about what might happen next. I don't necessarily have an answer as to what israel should or could do in a situation where it pulls out of the West Bank and attacks continue. But I think it's the height of wishful thinking to believe that an Israeli pullout would solve everything, or even end the violence.

But that's sort of why I posted it, plus ca change, plus meme, to point out that no forward progress has been made since then. I thought it was interesting to consider the Gaza War in the light of Mr van Creveld's opinions from back then.

I don't expect the rockets to stop anytime soon, I've never said anything of the sort.