Can someone explain to me the history of the Green Line?

Was it merely a circumstantial line formed by Jordanian defensive positions or did it take into account population demographics of the West Bank? Does the Green Line skirt cities or divide them? Let us avoid the issue of the Wall, and discuss the 1949 border in relation to a possible Palestinian state.

which was the original 1949 cease fire line correct?

..

Is basically the military front line at the imposition of the Armistice concluding hostilities in early 1949. There were some small adjustments to this, favorable to Israel, resulting from negotiations with Jordan during the Armistice period, mostly in the vicinity of Jerusalem. No account of demographics or property ownership was taken in the basic line, although in some ways these determined the pattern of fighting that determined the line, and the course of the fighting had a great effect on the demographics.

No judgment, on my part, but I just wanted your opinion on this. Thanks. Memsahib.:-)

Neither fairness nor equity were much on the minds of anyone concerned with the immediate process at the time.

In the broadest sense, the Armistice Line was the result of warfare, and so by definition can be considered neither fair nor just, as these concepts have nothing to do with warfare or its outcomes. The adjustments to the front line arranged between Israel and Jordan, at a time when Israel definitely held the military gage, were meant by Israel to secure various communication arteries from interdiction, while Jordan, for reasons of prestige, insisted on maintaining title to villages themselves, without regard for fields on which the inhabitants depended. Neither party was much concerned by the fate of the villagers.

At the time, it was believed that whatever the final Armistice Line was, that it would be modified in the near future by negotiation of a settled peace between Israel and the Arab states. Such negotiations were indeed embarked on, and broke down quickly on the intransigence of both parties. Thus, what was intended to be a temporary makeshift became a permanent boundary in effect.

There can be no question that the Arab people of Palestine were poorly treated by Israel in the course of the hostilities in '48, and poorly served by their purported champions then and subsequently in the Arab states. The original partition plan of the United Nations was, in my view, a reasonably fair solution to a difficult problem, and had it been adhered to by all parties, all people involved would have been much better off, both at the time, and into the present day.

My next question is, when is there going to be an armistice? It just seems that there is an exacerbation of the violence, beyond all reason. I do understand, now, why this is. Bush* may have been pushed into supporting the "road map," but never took it on as one of the important issues of his term. He ignored it as much as possible and was never engaged, like Clinton and Carter. I/P was a Clinton issue, like fighting terrorism, so, like a spoiled child, he sought to distance himself as much as he could from the priorities of the Clinton administration. Meanwhile, people are dying.

Is unfortunately inexact. Remember what an armistice is: an agreement to halt military operations between parties at war, without there being as yet a negotiated peace between those parties. Such an arrangement has been in force since 1949 between Israel and Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Granted, it has often been violated, from a variety of directions and for a variety of reasons, some worse than others. Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the other parties to the '48 war, never did, to the best of my immediate recollection, sign any armistice with Israel, but as they have no border with Israel, and the armistice agreements forbade any military action from a signatory's soil, that omission is in some sense immaterial. In the case of both Egypt and Jordan, treaties of peace have by now superseded the armistice arangements, though these treaties leave open the question of final boundaries for Israel, for settlement by negotiation concerning, or involving, the political leadership of Atab Palestine.

You may forgive me for suggesting that the question you meant to ask was: when will there be an armistice between Israel and Arab Palestine? For today, that is where the active hostilities in this matter are concentrated. No easy answer to that question is possible. The Arab Nationalist leadership of Arab Palestine chose not to declare a state on the ground alloted as the Arab Zone by the U.N. Partition in '47, because it rejected the whole partition plan, and felt that to declare such a state would be tantamount to acceptance of that plan. King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan was violently opposed to such a state being declared, because he hated the Grand Mufti al'Hussieni who would have controlled it, and King Abdullah directed his soldiers into the Jordan valley as much to prevent any such development as to to oppose Israel. The fighting ended with Egypt in control of Gaza, and Trans-Jordan in control of those portions of the proposed Arab Zone in the Jordan valley that Israel had not conquered. Both Egypt and Jordan then dummied up puppet enties proclaiming themselves representatives of the Arab Palestinian people, which in each case declared agreement with their sponsor's policy of annexing or controlling the portions of the Arab Zone they had come to occupy in the fighting. Thus, there was at the time no independent entity representing the people of Arab Palestine, that could have signed any agreement with Israel, even had the desire to do so existed.

Nor does it seem that any such desire existed at that time, and for many years subsequent. The Arab Nationalist leadership of Arab Palestine, in various ways, maintained its origional rejectionist attitude, and conducted, with assistance from Egypt and Syria, and acquiesence from Jordan, sporadic guerrilla campaigns against Israel. The modern bodies of Arab Palestinian leadership took form and power, really, only after the '67 war, when both Gaza and the "West Bank" were detached from their de facto annexation by Egypt and Jordan in the course of the fighting, and came under Israeli military control. The rejectionist attitude remained predominant, and the matter soon became further complicated by the rise of a jihadist strain of religiously oriented resistance that was even less open to compromise with the existance of Israel, and that did not acknowledge the authority of the secular Arab Nationalists.

The great problem now is that there is no state authority, with real control of the use of violence for political ends, extant in Arab Palestinian political life, and able to command the allegiance, and the obedience to its decisions, of the preponderance of the people of Arab Palestine. Even if the decision were made by Arafat to cease a rejectionist stance, or to end violence against Israel, there are a variety of actors who would continue in such a stance, and in such actions, that he could not control and prevent from doing so. This, of course, leaves open the field for rejectionist and ezpansionist elements in Israel to raise the cry that "there is no one to talk to," and continue to press policies of expanding into political and military vacuum, which in turn only hardens the resistance of the rejectionists, and the popularity of the "hard men" of violence, among the people of Arab Palestine.

The situation tends to drive me towards the final wisdom of The Deteriorata: "The Universe continues to deteriorate. Give up." It is hard to see how, without some widespread changes of heart among leading participants, the circumstances can admit of much improvement....

for your educated and well-articulated explanation. You are the resident expert on war, while I am merely a dedicated pacifist. But you were right about the question that I meant to ask.

The situation as you describe it, with its complicated history of violence and hatred and the numerous factions, sounds pretty hopeless to me. But something has to be done. The effort cannot just be abandoned, as it has been by the Bush* administration. It is just too important.

I understand how it is difficult to negotiate any agreement with so many extremist groups, all with different beliefs and agendas, and no central power on the part of the Palestinians. I thought the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas was a good first step, but now he is out and you rarely hear much news about his successor. Arafat seems to still hold the few cards that there are to hold. And Sharon's continued use of "targeted killings" only serves to exacerbate the situation and inflame groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The situation which once seemed faintly hopeful has now, again, spun completely out of control. The news coming out of Gaza, just this weekend, was particularly bleak.

The thing that is mostly overlooked and doesn't make the news is that the overwhelming majority of ordinary Palestinians and Israeli citizens, alike, are sick to death of the violence and of living in fear. They just want to get on with their lives and be able to live them normally. That should be their right, as it should be for anyone. It is because of them that anything and everything should be done. Ending the violence is the first step. Negotiations can come later. But finding a way to do that is certainly beyond me.

If it were up to me, I would bring in Clinton or Carter, someone who has a way with people, with knowledge of the region and the personalities involved and who can be perceived by all parties to be completely impartial. And someone who genuinely cares. Bush* has none of these qualities and that's the reason that his half-hearted and long overdue brief effort failed. But Bush* would never go for this. He is far too partisan and would never agree to be upstaged. I just hope for a U.S. regime change in November, if it's not already too late.

There is also the issues of the battle between the Political Islamists (primarily Sheikh Qassam and the Muslim Brotherhood pre-1947, the Gaza Branch of the Muslim Brotherhood post-1947 and ultimately later Hamas), the traditional Islamic authority (the waqfs and ulama controlled by Ali-Hussein acting as the British sponsored Grand-Mufti pre-1947 and the governments of Israel, Jordan, and Egypt post 1947. Also includes the Jordanian/West Bank Muslim Brotherhood and later Fatah and the PA), and the secularists (comprised of several families opposed to Hussein in pre-1947 and represented only by a handful of leftist groups post 1947) for control of the hearts, minds (and I guess souls) of the Palestinians.

The battles for Israeli Independence not only sowed the seeds for the battle between the Socialists and Political Judaism now being played out in modern day Israel, it also did the same for the Arab Palestinians, again being played out today.

Very interesting parallels can be made.

These are extremely interesting parallels, but I wonder if those living there today can appreciate this, as they are so caught up in the violence. This should be very important to them and should help them in their efforts to wage peace.

I now better understand the alliances, but still need to know how this can help rectify the seemingly hopeless situation that we are faced with there. Perhaps we could put you on a peace committee sent to this region. You have a better understanding and more sincere goals than anyone since Clinton's failed effort, and we now know the truth about that. This was sabotaged by Richard Perle, who, unfortunately, is still at large.

I would actually think that your original idea of having Carter and Clinton together would make a very strong team though I imagine their styles would prove counter-productive when it came down to getting people together to talk.

As to how to rectify the events, the only way is to give more credence to the moderates and the progressives who have been disenfranchised from the process. The leadership of Political Judaism and the Judaistic processes, like that of Political Islam and the Traditional Islam processes have been taken over, or at least silenced, by RW extremists.

At this point, it will require a unified effort, creative initiatives, and long term tangible committment by outside parties such as the US, Jordan, Egypt, and the UN to to do this. Unfortunately because of the US's current RW leadership, the involvement of extremely biased nationalistic players as Richard Perle and Christian Fundamentalists as well as well-funded interests, I just don't see that happening anytime soon.

L-

just as Bush* has divided this country and the world like never before. Clinton got Barak and Arafat to actually sit down together, which, in itself, was a pretty amazing accomplishment. And you can see by my avatar what I think of Mr. Carter. He has long been a hero of mine.

I certainly agree with you that the extreme right has hijacked the process. And, for I/P, caused it to be completely ignored. Since this initiative, along with fighting terrorism and reducing the threat posed by North Korea, were signature issues for Clinton, Bush*, like a spoiled child, intentionally put them on the back burner and look at the terrible mess that has resulted on all three fronts.

I especially like your idea of bringing in numerous interested parties, like neighboring countries and the U.N. However, if I remember correctly, this was proposed earlier and Sharon summarily rejected outside help. He said that it must be solved by the parties involved. And his solution seems to be to kill as many people as possible. A Carthaginian peace.

I, too, am extremely discouraged by the fundamentalist leadership in this country and its lack of creative thinking. If you remember a previous thread of mine which you replied to, Richard Perle was somewhat responsible for Clinton's effort having failed. His surrogates whispered in Barak's ear to hold out for a Bush* presidency. So he walked away. Obviously, many other factors were in play, but Perle was culpable and should have been made responsible for his involvement. Meanwhile, innocent people continue to die in this region everyday.

King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan was violently opposed to such a state being declared, because he hated the Grand Mufti al'Hussieni who would have controlled it, and King Abdullah directed his soldiers into the Jordan valley as much to prevent any such development as to to oppose Israel.

I agree that he was opposed to a Palestinian state being declared, but I've been reading that his motives weren't to oppose Israel. The Zionists were also opposed to a Palestinian state being declared, and had an understanding with Abdullah that he could take over what's now the West Bank and leave what was to become Israel alone. If his motive had been to oppose the emergence of Israel, he would have committed a much larger force than he did...

Violet...

King Abdullah's intentions are difficult to discern with certainly: he was a wiley fellow, grown up in a hard and unforgiving school.

From the foundation of the Emirate in 1922, he had expressed great displeasure and resentment at being deprived of Jerusalem and any port on the Mediterranean by its boundaries. Securing both, or either, of these things was a leading object of his policy. Among his proposals to the Zionists before the outbreak of the '48 war was that the Jewish Zone become a semi-autonomous province of his kingdom. That he was willing to co-operate with Israel in destroying al'Hussieni's power does not preclude further designs west of the Jordan.

From the military conduct of King Abdullah's forces during the '48 war, it seems clear that his intention was to emerge from the conflict with control of Jerusalem at the least. The principal initial operation of the Jordanian Legion was the occupation of the Old City, and the reduction of the Jewish Quarter within it. Its subsequent operations in the period before the first cease fire aimed at maintaining under seige the Jews of the New City. After the Israelis managed to break the seige, the Jordanian Legion continued to operate on either side of the communications neck to Jerusalem, seeking to maintain positions from which it might, in future, be cut once more.

From the Israeli point of view, certainly, an attempt at reduction of the Jewish lodgement in Jerusalem, and bringing that city under Jordanian control, must be viewed as hostile on a fundamental level. There is real question whether an Israel without Jerusalem would have proved politically viable, particularly if Jerusalem were under control of an Arab state instead.

It is also unclear to me that King Abdullah did not put into the venture all the forces that he could. There are several complicating factors, such as the need to maintain police control of the Trans-Jordan tribes, the danger of intercine conflict with Syria and Saudi Arabia, and the degree of English control over the financing of his army, that must have conditioned the deployment decisions. It is certainly the case that the Jordanian Legion bore the brunt of the fighting on the Arab side during the '48 war, and was the most active and effective portion of the Arab forces involved.

He repressed Palestinian nationalism and railed against Israel. If he had driven Israel into the sea, he might have become the sole ruler over what had been the British mandate.

Could this have been his ambition?

The gentleman does seem to have had a knack for manuover, and for accepting what could be had at a particular time. Whatever he might have desired, he does not seem to have judged the grandest possibilities achieveable, at least once the fighting had been underway for a while. The first generation of Israeli leadership felt he was potentially a friend, even after '48, and certainly a man business could be done with.

The collusion between King Abdullah and the Zionists is fact, and not something that can be disputed by anyone. Likewise, Abdullah not committing all the forces he could have is pretty clear-cut...

Violet...

That implies that the Zionists were King Abdullah's principle enemies, which they weren't. King Abdullah was probably more concerned with Hussein and the Saudis and that any relationship with the Zionists were geared towards these goals, primarily the former.

Remember, what records have been made indicate they were discussions on what to do with the Palestinian sections of the Mandate should Israel declare it's independence. The understanding was that King Abdullah should take control over them which is what happened.

That King Abdullah and Mr. Ben-Gurion took al'Husseini for a common enemy in '48 establishes no identity of interests beyond that: England and the U.S. joined with Stalin in taking Hitler for a common enemy during World War Two, despite previous and subsequent hostilities between the war-time partners of convenience, and history is rife with similar examples of the limits of the maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The hostility between the two wings of the alliance against Hitler dictated a great many aspects of military strategy in that conflict, particularly in the employment of Western forces in the Mediterranean and the Near East, which could easily have been used for a massive invasion into the Balkans and the Caucasus, on the right flank of Hitler's position in Russia, a course desired by Mr. Churchill, but vetoed bitterly by Stalin, as it might well leave Western armies in possession of the old pre-war cordon of the Little Entente, and threaten Soviet oil reserves.

The clash between King Abdullah and Mr. Ben-Gurion was over Jerusalem, which neither was content to leave to international control, and possession of which the Israelis considered, and still consider, fundamental to the viability of their state. A defeat at Jerusalem in '48 might well have scuppered the Israeli state, and the strain of the Jerusalem fighting might well have collapsed the Israeli military that spring. Whether the destruction of Israel was King Abdullah's intention is beside the point, since his actions might well have caused it.

That King Abdullah might have committed more forces to the conflict in '48 is certainly a possibility, but it is undeniable he had sound reasons for maintaining forces in hand against other possible needs. The Arab powers at that time were no monolith acting in harmony and unison, and the old King had many enemies. Again, an example from the Second World War is instructive: there is no doubt Imperial Japan was serious about its conquests in China and Burma and the South Seas, yet throughout that war as much as a third of its army, with much of its most modern equipment, remained sequestered in Manchuria. These forces might easily have tipped the balance in any of those other theaters, and on the face of it, with a non-aggression pact in place with Stalin, it could be argued that they could, and should, have been so employed. But considerations such as distrust of Stalin, and internal politics of the armed forces, as a practical matter precluded that course of action, clear as it has shone to some amatuer strategists.

Stalin's very secretive transfer of the Siberian reserves to defend Moscow in December 1941 while extremely decisive, also showed his desperation. Had the Japanese been made aware of the extent of the transfer, they probably would have utilized those resources in Manchuria sooner, rather than in 1945, to deliver a decisive blow to China.

Remember they still came close in 1945 when they did commit these reserves to taking the Chinese out of the war. Had this occured in 1942, the balance of power would have greatly shifted in Asia - I think it likely that the British would have been forced out of India or the Soviets out of Siberia. As it was, their commitment in 1945 was a desperate move which backfired on them when the Soviets easily captured Manchuria in the waning moments of WWII.

L-

THE SELFISH GENE, Robert Trivers noted Dawkins'
emphasis on the role of deception in animal life and added, in
a much-cited passage, that if indeed "deceit is fundamental
to animal communication, then there must be strong selection
to spot deception and this ought, in turn, to select for a degree
of self-deception, rendering some facts and
motives unconscious so as not to betray -- by the subtle signs
of self-knowledge -- the deception being practiced." Thus,
"the conventional view that natural selection favors
nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images
of the world must be a very naive view of mental
evolution." <[12>]

 
The Maximum Power Principle (or "MPP") states that all
open systems (Bernard cells, ecosystems, people,
societies, etc.) evolve to degrade as much energy as
possible while allowing for the continued existence of the
larger systems they are part of. Thus, the MPP gives direction
to evolution and is consistent with modern biological
evolution theory.
 
The MPP suggests that as systems are moved away
from equilibrium they will take advantage of all available
means <[17>] to resist externally imposed reductions in power.
As the MPP suggests, we social animals are natural-born
killers:

http://www.dieoff.com/page193.htm