Well, here's the deal.
To buy 1% of Diebold's shares (symbol DBD) on the open market would run about $36 million.
The entire market cap (meaning all the shares x market price) is $3.8 billion. That's with a B. To control it would be half that, or $1.9 B.
Okay, let's say you got lucky and a bunch of people had $1.9 B to spend on Diebold stock. Problem is, 77% of the stock is held by institutional entities, like Fidelity etc.
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=DBD Another 1% is held by insiders, like top execs, like Wally "Ohio's electoral votes for you Dubya" O'Dell. So, unless something weird happened, you'd have trouble obtaining more than 22% of the stock.
Then, there's the self-interest problem -- would folks want to put down $1.9 B, only to expose the rampant problems inside the company's election division, and shrink their investment?
Okay, and here's another problem -- ES&S is looking less clownish about their security than Diebold, but perhaps every bit as dangerous to the public. And, who knows about the others -- they may be as bad. The UC/Berkeley study of Florida seemed to find ALL electronic voting machines spitting out odd results.
And, here's the big problem -- even if Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia and Hart InterCivic do EVERYthing right, programming, hardware, security, etc., there is no way they can make paperless electronic voting secure. Can't be done. Too many points of attack, too much money at stake, too lucrative to steal, too little chance of getting caught. This is the opinion of esteemed computer scientists I've talked to -- you've talked to some of the same ones! The chain of custody of the machines/software is too long, from development to manufacture to trucking to warehousing to voting to transport to tabulator.....
It's an inherently insecure design to use paperless electronic counting of confidential votes.
Let me know when you get the $1.9 billion, and I'll help you design a PR campaign instead of buying Diebold, ok? <G> Hey, I'll even throw in a couple of Senators at no extra charge.