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GEORGIA AND THE TRUTH ABOUT SOUTH OSSETIA -- (Senate - December 08, 2004) GPO's PDF
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Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the republic of Georgia, America's ally in the war on terror and partner in Iraq.
I am not sure if you are aware of this, but the republic of Georgia has dispatched 150 of its troops to participate in the coalition that liberated Iraq and is now assisting in the rebuilding of that country. Last month, the Georgian government announced that it would nearly quintuple its number of forces in Iraq.
In recent weeks, much has been heard and seen of the political crisis in Ukraine. A little more than 1 year ago, a similar crisis befell Georgia following its November presidential election. As with Ukraine, the election results appeared rigged in favor of the ruling party candidate.
As we all know, the people of Georgia, through a group of brave, young reformers, patriots, and democrats, brought about historic political change in that country. Known now as the Rose Revolution, the forces of democracy, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, prevailed in Georgia and forced then-President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. During the past year, President Saakashvili's government has dramatically reformed the Georgian government, instituting far-reaching political, economic, and legal reforms. And, just last month, the U.S. Senate passed S. Res. 472 honoring the 1-year anniversary of the Rose Revolution and recognizing the achievements the Georgian government has made in democratizing that country.
I would like to focus the remainder of my remarks on a small region in the republic of Georgia called South Ossetia, a place I'm sure relatively few Americans have heard of. But the potential for violence in this region was highlighted by the vicious terrorist attack in September of this year against a school in North Ossetia--in Beslan, Russia, just over the border from Georgian South Ossetia.
In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and many republics gained independence, including Georgia. But almost since the beginning, some in Russia did not accept the end of the Soviet empire. Russian overt and covert pressure worked to undermine the new-found sovereignty among bordering countries. No former republic was subject to more pressure than Georgia. Russia refused to withdraw its troops--a refusal that continues even today, some 13 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In South Ossetia (in north central Georgia), as well as in Abkhazia (in western Georgia), disputes broke out shortly after independence. In both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian forces aided ethnic separatists as a way to weaken Georgia. They sent arms, money, ``volunteers'' and military advisers. In South Ossetia, Russian President Boris Yeltsin negotiated a ceasefire in 1992 and forced Georgia to accept Russian and North Ossetian ``peacekeepers.'' In 1994, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (now the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE) took responsibility for diplomatic efforts and monitoring in South Ossetia with the full support of the Georgian government. In 1999, the OSCE added monitoring of the Chechen-Georgian border, and later the Ingush and Dagestani portions of the Georgian border.
For 10 years following the OSCE's involvement in South Ossetia, several things happened. First, it became clear that the OSCE was unwilling or unable to take effective measures to resolve the separatist conflict--chiefly because Russia has a veto in the OSCE. The ``peacekeeping'' force has the Georgians out-numbered and out-gunned by South Ossetians, North Ossetians, and Russians. Any effort to expand the OSCE beyond its limited monitoring role or limited geographical area is opposed by Russia. The OSCE mission is unable to monitor Russian violations of Georgian airspace and only rarely uncovers illegal arms shipments. While individuals working in the OSCE mission perform admirably under difficult conditions, the unavoidable fact remains: the OSCE mission in Georgia is deeply and structurally flawed.
The second major development was in the economy of South Ossetia. Deeply isolated from the rest of Georgia but having a land link to the Russian Federation, South Ossetia became a giant smuggler's market--in effect criminalizing its entire economy. Cigarettes, alcohol, drugs, arms, and foodstuffs all came in duty-and-tax free. A massive open-air black market operated with impunity in Tskhinvali, the provincial capital of South Ossetia. Profit from the contraband smuggling and sale was distributed among Russian border guards, Russian military officers, and corrupt South Ossetian officials. Some foreign diplomats even suggested this smugglers paradise was positive because it provided employment and low-cost goods.
Earlier this summer, Georgian President Saakashvili decided the long-festering status quo was unacceptable--as it would be to the head of state of any democracy. What leader could tolerate separatists armed and sustained by a foreign power, the same foreign power that refuses to withdraw its own illegally stationed troops? What leader could tolerate a massive contraband market supplied directly from Russian
GPO's PDF
territory and operating under the noses of international monitors? What leader could tolerate threats against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia while foreign ``volunteers'' from Kuban, Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester arrived to fight Georgians--as happened in July 2004? What leader could tolerate separatists whose loyalty is to a foreign country and whose closest connections are with the intelligence services and criminal mafias of that country?
It should surprise no one that President Saakashvili began to take steps for the peaceful reincorporation of South Ossetia into Georgia. It should surprise no one that the Russian media portrayed President Saakashvili as rash, reckless, and irresponsible for his efforts. Surprisingly, Russian propaganda was picked up by some in the western media who portrayed democratically elected President Saakashvili's efforts toward national integration as impulsive or erratic. They were not. They were a legitimate effort to reach a peaceful resolution in accordance with international law.
In July, South Ossetian forces captured Georgian policemen operating legally in Georgian territory. The Georgian police were disarmed, detained, and paraded in a deliberately humiliating fashion--made to kneel in the town square before Ossetian women while TV cameras filmed everything. Yet, Georgia did not retaliate. In July, Georgian forces intercepted an illegal shipment of air-to-ground missiles for helicopters. The Russians claimed they were for their ``peacekeepers'' who didn't even have helicopters--a claim so dubious as to be ludicrous. Yet, the Georgians promptly offered to return the missiles to the Russians.
Despite relentless provocations, Georgia continues to search for a peaceful political solution. President Saakashvili has offered far-reaching autonomy status for South Ossetia, including complete freedom to use the Ossetian language--the issue that originally sparked conflict in 1991. Georgia has continually tried to expand the mandate and mission of the OSCE, including monitoring of the vital road link at the Roki tunnel between Georgia and Russia. Russia blocks any expansion, and the OSCE remains paralyzed.
This is where things stand today. On one side is a democratic ally of the United States backed by international law. On the other side is a criminal regime sustained by Russians who have not reconciled themselves to the loss of the Soviet Empire. The United States needs to do more to help our Georgian friends. We should work with the European Union on a joint diplomatic approach so that democratic Georgia is not outnumbered and to avoid the ever-present Russian veto. In the OSCE and the U.N., we should push for expanded monitoring and for genuine peacekeeping forces independent of Russian military and intelligence forces. If this draws a Russian veto, let Russia explain its veto. In the wake of appropriate sympathy for all the Russian victims of separatist terrorism, we should force Russia to explain and justify its continued support for separatists in Georgia. We must also be clear about the ultimate outcome. There will be no independence and there will be no incorporation into Russia for South Ossetia. The only solution for South Ossetia is within a sovereign Georgia.
Finally, the U.S. should increase our assistance to Georgia, especially our military assistance. The Georgia Train and Equip Program, GTEP, was very successful in improving Georgian capabilities so that terrorists in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge were killed, apprehended, or forced out. Unfortunately, GTEP was halted after the training of one battalion. GTEP should be reinstated to further increase Georgian capabilities. A strong Georgia is the best guarantee of deterring Russian or South Ossetian military action. A strong and secure Georgia is the best guarantee for the patience required for a multilateral diplomatic solution. And a strong and secure Georgia is in America's interest. Despite all the problems Georgia faces internally and externally, they have deployed troops to fight at our side in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Georgia is a steadfast ally in the war on terror. |
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