"The third lesson is, by now, generally accepted: our intelligence is sometimes, dangerously inadequate. That was certainly the case as we went into Iraq. The appalling incompetence at the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community left us largely ignorant of such basic information as the state of Iraq’s infrastructure (and therefore the pace at which basic services could be established when the fighting ceased) and the size, organization and tactics of elements of Saddam’s regime, which later emerged as the core of the insurgency. There is reason to believe that we were sucked into an ill-conceived initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double agents planted by the regime. And as we now know the estimates of Saddam’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction was substantially wrong.
(SNIP)
"I have, on previous occasions urged this and other committees of the Congress to conduct a quiet retrospective analysis of the competence with which the intelligence community has rendered its analyses of the middle east region, and especially the Gulf, over the last 30 years. I believe such an analysis would show chronic failure: faulty estimates accompanied by smug confidence about future developments rendered in the face of repeated nasty surprises."
Regarding faulty estimates and smug confidence, let's hop into the wayback machine for a moment:
"It's very clear that the CIA and the State Department are energetic opponents of support to the Iraqi opposition, partly because they believe that we are safe. That's going to get serious reconsideration when we examine the prospect that Saddam Hussein could -- and very possibly will -- transfer weapons of mass destruction to anonymous terrorists..."
- Perle in mid-October, 2001.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/perle.html:eyes:
He slammed the CIA before the war for not sharing his faith in the INC, and for feeling that Iraq was not a threat. Now he slams them for having been so horribly wrong about Saddam's armory. Incredible.