Myth vs fact as known on Niger intelligence

Report On The US Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
available in pdf at: http://intelligence.senate.gov/

Although heavily redacted in sections, reading the Niger Section of the report, sending former ambassador Wilson to Niger, was in response to Cheney's inquiry, who was not satisfied with an assessment submitted by DCI's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control or WINPAC. This report in essence saying, that the allegation of a uranium contract comes exclusively from a foreign government service report and lacks crucial details, and they were working to determine whether it can be corroborated.

While there is no direct recollection by some officials of how ambassador Wilson was selected by the office, Mrs Wilson did recommend her husband due to his contacts and knowledge of the country in question.
I find no problem with this fact as it is merely the selection of the highest qualified person to be assigned this mission. Further, reportedly Mr. Wilson was not paid for his time and effort.

It is quite amazing that the US Embassy as well as the State Department issued skepticism from the beginning, whereas the CIA and it's departments appear to have been under some pressure to give a concrete answer to Cheney. Which in itself, would merely suggest thoroughness considering it's implications.

Some of the reasons of suspicion noted are:

In view of the origin, the uranium probably is in the form of yellowcake and will need further processing to be used in an uranium enrichment plant. Iraq has no known facilities for processing or enriching the material. (page 36)

On November 20,2001, U.S. Embassy Niamey disseminated a cable on a recent meeting between the ambassador and the Director General of Niger's French-led consortium. The Director General said "there was no possibility" that the government of Niger had diverted any of the 3,000 tons of yellowcake produced in its two uranium mines. (page 37)

Reporting on the uranium transaction did not surface again until February 5,2002 when the CIA'S DO issued a second intelligence report which again cited the source as a " government service." Although not identified in the report, this source was also from the foreign service. The second report provided more details about the previously reported Iraq-Niger uranium agreement and provided what was said to be "verbatim text" of the accord. (page 37)

1C analysts at the CIA and the DIA were more impressed with the detail and substance of the second report. One analyst noted that the report provided much more information than they had seen previously in similar reporting about alleged uranium transactions to other countries. INR analysts continued to doubt the accuracy of the reporting, again because they thought Niger would be unwilling and unable to sell uranium to Iraq and because they thought Iraq would be unlikely to risk such a transaction when they were "bound to be caught." Because of these doubts. an INR analyst asked the CIA whether the source of the report could submit to polygraph. A CIA analyst also inquired about the source and says he was told be CIA's DO that the report was from a "very credible source" (page 38)

The dispatching of ambassador Wilson was viewed as redundant, it was believed as highly unlikely, as you see below:

INR (State Department)
This is from the date of February 19, 2002 meeting whether to send the ambassador to Niger.

(U) The INR analyst's meeting notes and electronic mail (e-mail) from other participants indicate that INR explained its skepticism that the alleged uranium contract could possibly be carried out due to the fact that it would be very difficult to hide such a large shipment of yellowcake and because "the French appear to have control of the uranium mining, milling and transport process, and would seem to have little interest in selling uranium to the Iraqis." The notes also indicate that INR believed that the embassy in Niger had good contacts and would be able to get to the truth on the uranium issue, suggesting a visit from the former ambassador would be redundant. Other meeting participants argued that the trip would do little to clarify the story on the alleged uranium deal because the Nigeriens would be unlikely to admit to a uranium sales agreement with Iraq, even if one had been negotiated. An e-mail from a WINPAC analyst to CPD following the meeting noted "it appears that the results from this source will be suspect (page 40)

at best, and not believable under most scenarios." CPD concluded that with no other options, sending the former ambassador to Niger was worth a try. (page 41)

Another interesting side note is that it appears ambassador Wilson's name at this juncture was not revealed by the intelligence community to the WH.

The forged documents.

Correct me if I am wrong, but within the report up to October 2002 when Burba delivers the forged documents to the US embassy in Rome, there is no mention of actual documents which are in any of the US intelligence' posession. It refers to "a foreign government service report". It would be interesting to see whether any documents existed and were in possession of the "foreign government service".
Of all, why did none of the agencies directly interview an Algerian businessman, who arranged a meeting between Iraqi officials and Nigerian officials in 1999? Another so called African businessman appearing during the course of time was also never interviewed. Remember Burba obtained the documents from an Italian businessman.

This is October 2002
(U) Immediately after receiving the documents, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst e-mailed 1C colleagues offering to provide the documents at a previously planned meeting of the Nuclear Interdiction Action Group (NIAG) the following day. The analyst, apparently already suspicious of the validity of the documents noted in his e-mail, "you'll note that it bears a funky Emb. of Niger stamp (to make it look official, I guess)." (U) The INR Iraq nuclear analyst told Committee staff that the thing that stood out immediately about the documents was that a companion document - a document included with the Niger documents that did not relate to uranium - mentioned some type of military campaign against major world powers. The members of the alleged military campaign included both Iraq and Iran, and was, according to the documents, being orchestrated through the Nigerien Embassy in Rome, which all struck the analyst as "completely implausible." Because the stamp on this document matched the stamp on the uranium document, the analyst thought that all of the documents were likely suspect. The analyst was unaware at the time of any formatting problems with the documents or inconsistencies with the names or dates. (page 58)

Ultimately this intelligence report concludes and places the failure on the CIA, however as a layperson while at first glance, there appears to have been utter disorganization in the communication between all parties involved, however one can also perceive a deliberate dismissal of crucial facts. In order to figure out from where it needs further analysis.

on edit
How on earth can the uranium claim be made with all this background is beyond me.

:shrug:

And it is so convoluted and unclear---like a "he said"-"she said" thing. I also noted on another related thread that it has, conveniently, been the basis for the Repugs talking points (in smearing Wilson), as the Repugs have taken several statements of this report out of context, and used them to their apparent "advantage".

Bottom line, I agree that it did not help clarify things for me--a lay person, and as on your edit, I agree how the uranium claim could have been made with all of this confusion occuring, is beyond me, as well. Of course, that confusion just helps (and helped) matters for Bush & Co. and probably was part of the plan to begin with.

Lastly, in reading this section of the report twice now (the Niger section, that is) and reviewing the entire report, I am very curious what lies behind all of the blacked-out parts, particularly in the section about the British documents. Knowing the source of the Brits' docs would help clarify some things.

blacked out.

In another thread some time ago, I did a timeline of events based on the report by Sy Hersh in his book on this matter.

I find the circumstances of the documents highly suspect, which appears to be a deliberate planting of falsehoods.

Blair, Berlusconi and Bush all had meetings in early fall after the creation of the WHIG the same summer.

And, what is the title of Hersh's book on this matter. I would also like to read that.

On another note, unrelated specifically, but peripheral to this matter is Cheney's insistance that he did not "send" Wilson. Why would it matter so much to Cheney (and Repugs) whether others thought he sent Wilson or not? I might be splitting hairs here, but it seems Cheney 'doth protest too much'-- trying very hard to distance himself from being the source of the CIA sending Wilson. Is he trying to distance himself from a set up against Wilson, in other words? Just food for thought, there.

Anyway, thanks for bringing up this matter of the Senate Committee report. Everyone should look at it in light of all the discussion about Wilson, forged docs, etc. It's been bugging me for some time now, as has this issue of who forged the uranium docs (why has the FBI halted the investigation that Sen J Rockefeller requested?), and, as you alluded to, what Blair, Berlusconi and Bush were up to with specific regards to this matter.