Iraq Pre-War Intelligence Manipulated by Defense Dept.

A BusinessWeek article today describes the manipulation of of pre-war Iraq intelligence by Pentagon officials, which provided the false information requested by the Bush administration to start the Iraq war. The issue is summed up in the article, 'Accusations of "Twisted Intelligence"'

"Defense Dept. Inspector General Tom Gimble told lawmakers that Pentagon officials manipulated data before the invasion of Iraq

by Dawn Kopecki

Top Pentagon officials, authorized by then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "inappropriately" misled the White House in asserting strong prewar ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, which turned out not to be true, and intentionally withheld data provided by outside intelligence agencies that challenged the Pentagon's conclusions, Acting Defense Dept. Inspector General Tom Gimble told lawmakers Feb. 9....

Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich) said..."The bottom line is that intelligence relating to the Iraq–al Qaeda relationship was manipulated by high-ranking officials in the Department of Defense to support the administration's decision to invade Iraq when the intelligence assessments of the professional analysts of the intelligence community did not provide the desired compelling case"....

Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Defense Dept. expanded the duties of its policy office, then run by former Under Secretary Douglas Feith, to find any connections between al Qaeda and the Iraqi and other governments and to develop its own intelligence assessments—separate from the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies. Feith's shop under then-Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz disseminated "alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al Qaeda relationship, which included conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the intelligence community and these were presented to senior decision-makers," Gimble said.

Levin said, "senior Administration officials used the twisted intelligence produced by the Feith office in making the case for the Iraq war." "

unlawflcombatnt

Economic Populist Forum

EconomicPopulistCommentary

___________
The economy needs balance between the "means of production" & "means of consumption."

I'm counting the days. We're down to less than 2 years.

The following link is to another DU thread by David Swanson that provides much better coverage of this issue.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=132&topic_id=3103492&mesg_id=3103492

All of this information was known, said and/or printed/published in a public forum prior to the 2002 October 11 vote in the Senate and in the house.


American Aides Split on Assessment of Iraq's Plans
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
WASHINGTON, Oct. 9 — A letter to Congress from the director of central intelligence has brought into public view divisions within the administration over what intelligence shows about Iraq's intentions and its willingness to ally itself with Al Qaeda.

The letter and other reports from the C.I.A. paint a worrisome picture of Iraq's pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. But they do not support the White House's view that Iraq presents an immediate threat to the American homeland and may use Al Qaeda to carry out attacks at any moment.

Current and former administration officials say divisions between the C.I.A. and the White House and civilian Defense Department officials over intelligence on Iraq have been simmering for months.

But with the Oct. 7 letter, sent in the name of the director, George J. Tenet, the divisions came into the open.

As some Democratic lawmakers sought to use the letter to challenge the administration's case for attacking Iraq, the C.I.A. told the Senate Intelligence Committee today that it would not declassify additional material the panel wanted.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/10/politics/10INTE.html?ex=1169010000&en=a886bd130c09ef7c&ei=5070


editorial | posted June 20, 2002 (July 8, 2002 issue)
War on Iraq Is Wrong
In making the case for taking pre-emptive action against Iraq, the White House has been long on innuendo and very short on evidence of an Iraqi threat requiring such drastic remedies. What we do know is that since the Gulf War, Iraq's military capabilities have weakened significantly, to the point where they pose little or no threat to its neighbors, a fact reflected in Saddam Hussein's bid to improve relations with both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The United Nations inspections regime that operated in Iraq until late 1998 destroyed most of Iraq's ballistic missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons program. Since then, UN financial controls have deprived the regime of the money it would need to rebuild its military machine or redevelop the infrastructure needed to produce weapons of mass destruction. We know that the regime lacks the reliable means for using any weapons it might have. Of the 819 Scud missiles that Saddam once possessed, all but two were accounted for before the inspections ended. The regime has some short-range missiles, and it is suspected of working on longer-range missiles, but since none have been tested they therefore would be of highly questionable reliability. Even if Saddam had been able to hide away one or two longer-range missiles, it is not clear what he would hope to gain from irrational and ultimately suicidal attacks on Israel or his other neighbors.
snip
The Administration seems to recognize the weakness of its case and has begun to shift the rationale for a pre-emptive strike to the danger that Saddam may pass weapons of mass destruction on to terrorist groups that threaten the United States. Again, there is no evidence that Saddam has cooperated with Al Qaeda or other "terrorist groups with global reach," in the Administration's words. In fact, according to the State Department's own report, Iraq's support for terrorist activities is modest compared with that attributed to some of the other states on its list. As the State Department said earlier this year, Saddam has not been involved in any terrorist plots against the West since his attempt to target Bush Senior during his 1993 visit to Kuwait. Nor is there any reason for the Iraqi leader to aid the apocalyptic goals of Islamic fanatics, who are seen to threaten his secular regime and his bid for leadership in the Arab world.
snip
A Security Council-coordinated containment and engagement strategy--involving international inspectors and targeted sanctions backed up by the threat of international force--would be an important precedent for world order and a much better guarantee of security than a pre-emptive war whose outcome is fraught with dangerous uncertainties. Democrats and Republicans, and all citizens with civic courage, must challenge a policy that poses a clear and present danger to international and American interests.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020708/editors

"Bush Developing Military Policy Of Striking First: New Doctrine Addresses Terrorism"
Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writers
The Washington Post, 10 June 2002

The Bush administration is developing a new strategic doctrine that moves away from the Cold War pillars of containment and deterrence toward a policy that supports preemptive attacks against terrorists and hostile states with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

The new doctrine will be laid out by President Bush's National Security Council as part of the administration's first "National Security Strategy" being drafted for release by early this fall, senior officials said.
snip
Inside the Pentagon, some officials suspect that the new doctrine may be acted upon sooner rather than later.

"I think the president is trying to get the American people ready for some kind of preemptive move" against Iraq, said a Pentagon consultant. He said it would not necessarily be against Iraqi weapons sites but might instead involve a seizure of Iraqi oil fields.

Rumsfeld may have captured this situation best when he declined to discuss preemption last week. Asked in an interview whether the U.S. government is contemplating preemptive moves against other nations' weapons of mass destruction, he replied: "Why would anyone answer that question if they were contemplating it?"
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/ricks.htm

"West sees glittering prizes ahead in giant oilfields,"
Michael Theodoulou in Nicosia and Roland Watson,
The Times (London), 11 July 2002

THE removal of President Saddam Hussein would open Iraqs rich new oilfields to Western bidders and bring the prospect of lessening dependence on Saudi oil.

No other country offers such untapped oilfields whose exploitation could lessen tensions over the Western presence in Saudi Arabia.
snip
However, regime change in Baghdad will be of little value to international oil companies unless it is followed by a stable Iraq with a strong central government. Companies cant go in unless there is peace. To develop Majnoon, you need two to three billion dollars and you dont invest that kind of money without stability, one industry analyst said.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/iraq.htm

Mike Salinero, "Gen. Zinni Says War With Iraq Is Unwise,"
Tampa Tribune, 24 August 2002

TALLAHASSEE - One of President Bush's top Middle East trouble- shooters warned Friday against war with Iraq, saying it would stretch U.S. forces too thin and make unwanted enemies in the volatile region.

Retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, the president's special envoy to the Mideast, made some of his strongest comments to date opposing war on Iraq. Speaking to the Economic Club of Florida in Tallahassee, Zinni said a war to bring down Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein would have numerous undesirable side effects and should be low on the nation's list of foreign policy objectives.

``I can give you many more before I get to that,'' Zinni said when asked if the United States should move to remove Saddam.

Zinni said the country should instead concentrate on negotiating a peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians, and on eliminating the Taliban in Afghanistan and the al-Qaida terrorist network that launched the Sept. 11 terror attacks.

``We need to make sure the Taliban and al-Qaida can't come back,'' he said.

Much more important to Mideast stability than Iraq is Iran, Zinni said. Iran has been one of the leading financiers of Islamic terror organizations such as Hezbollah since followers of the Ayatollah Khamenei took American hostages in 1979.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/zinni2.htm

"The War on What? The White House and the Debate About Whom to Fight Next,"
Nicholas Lemann, The New Yorker, 9 September 2002
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020916fa_fact
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So let me quote what Feingold said back in 2002 on the floor of the Senate ....

October 9, 2002
Many of us have spent months reviewing the issue of the advisability of invading Iraq in the near future. From hearings and meetings on the process and the very important role of Congress to the difficult questions of substance, including foreign policy and military implications, after my own review and carefully listening to hundreds of Wisconsin citizens in person, I spoke on the floor on Thursday, September 26, and, Mr. President, I indicated my opposition to the original draft use of force authorization by the President...

Now, after many more meetings and reading articles and attending briefings, listening to my colleagues' speeches, and especially listening to the President's speech in Cincinnati on Monday, Mr. President, I still don't believe that the President and the Administration have adequately answered the critical questions. They have not yet met the important burden to persuade Congress and the American people that we should invade Iraq at this time.

Both in terms of the justifications for an invasion and in terms of the mission and the plan for the invasion, Mr. President, the Administration's arguments just don't add up. They don't add up to a coherent basis for a new major war in the middle of our current challenging fight against the terrorism of al Qaeda and related organizations. Therefore, I cannot support the resolution for the use of force before us.
http://www.feingold.senate.gov/speeches/02/10/2002A10531.html

Here's Sen. Byrd on 10/4/02:

"Let's go back to the war in Vietnam. I was here. I was one of the Senators who voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Yes, I voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I am sorry for that. I am guilty of doing that. I should have been one of the two, or at least I should have made it three, Senators who voted against that Gulf of Tonkin resolution. But I am not wanting to commit that sin twice, and that is exactly what we are doing here. This is another Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
snip
Does the Senator have any idea, based on his having information from the administration, what is the likelihood we might find ourselves bogged down in the hot sands of the Middle East and our men and women may have to fight a house-to-house, apartment-to-apartment battle in any one of the cities of Iraq? What would be the cost in terms of human life, not only of Iraqis but of our own men and women, if we were faced with a war in which we have to go street by street, avenue by avenue, house by house, floor to floor, to root out the snipers? What would be the cost in American lives?
snip
I wonder this further, if the Senator will allow me: Have the American people been asked to face up to that possibility? And, no, the administration will not make its military officers available for one reason or another to accommodate the Senate Armed Forces hearings, but why then do we have to rush in and make a decision before an election that is only 30 days away? Why should the leadership of this Congress not say we are going to go home, we are going to talk to the people, we are going to listen to what they have to say? After all, they are the ones who are going to have to pay the price. We will go home and we will await this fateful, momentous, all-important, vital decision until after the election, and we will come back.

When I was the majority leader of this Senate, I, from time to time, included in the adjournment resolution a provision
http://www.monitor.net/monitor/0210a/iraqdebate.html

Here's Sen. Kennedy on 10/04/02

I intend to oppose the Lieberman-Warner resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. America should not go to war against Iraq unless and until all other reasonable alternatives are exhausted.
snip
It is an open secret in Washington that the Nation's uniformed military leadership is skeptical about the wisdom of war with Iraq. They share the concern that it may adversely affect the ongoing war against al-Qaida and the continuing effort in Afghanistan by draining resources and armed forces already stretched so thin that many Reservists have been called for a second year of duty, and record numbers of service members have been kept on active duty beyond their obligated service.

A largely unilateral American war that is widely perceived in the Muslim world as untimely or unjust could worsen, not lessen, the threat of terrorism. It could strengthen the ranks of al-Qaida sympathizers and trigger an escalation in terrorist acts. As General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, that kind of war against Iraq, would "super-charge recruiting for al-Qaida."

In a September 10 article, General Clark wrote: "Unilateral U.S. action today would disrupt the war against al-Qaida."

We ignore such wisdom and advice from many of the best of our military at our own peril.
http://www.monitor.net/monitor/0210a/iraqdebate4.html

Bob Graham OP-ed in the WAPO on the intelligence on Iraq provided in 2002 and why it didn't add up, and so he voted NO on the resolution. John Edwards was on that committee, so he saw the same information that Graham saw

At a meeting of the Senate intelligence committee on Sept. 5, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet was asked what the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided as the rationale for a preemptive war in Iraq. An NIE is the product of the entire intelligence community, and its most comprehensive assessment. I was stunned when Tenet said that no NIE had been requested by the White House and none had been prepared. Invoking our rarely used senatorial authority, I directed the completion of an NIE.

Tenet objected, saying that his people were too committed to other assignments to analyze Saddam Hussein's capabilities and will to use chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons. We insisted, and three weeks later the community produced a classified NIE.

There were troubling aspects to this 90-page document. While slanted toward the conclusion that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stored or produced at 550 sites, it contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the information, especially by the departments of State and Energy. Particular skepticism was raised about aluminum tubes that were offered as evidence Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. As to Hussein's will to use whatever weapons he might have, the estimate indicated he would not do so unless he was first attacked.

Under questioning, Tenet added that the information in the NIE had not been independently verified by an operative responsible to the United States. In fact, no such person was inside Iraq. Most of the alleged intelligence came from Iraqi exiles or third countries, all of which had an interest in the United States' removing Hussein, by force if necessary.

The American people needed to know these reservations, and I requested that an unclassified, public version of the NIE be prepared. On Oct. 4, Tenet presented a 25-page document titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." It represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them, avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version. Its conclusions, such as "If Baghdad acquired sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year," underscored the White House's claim that exactly such material was being provided from Africa to Iraq.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802397_pf.html

Edwards after the fact...stating that he didn't vote against Iraq due to lack of intelligence....

John Edwards, meanwhile, wants to set the record straight - he was not fooled by the administration into supporting the war. And, he adds, neither was any other senator.

In an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in the latest issue of The New Yorker, Edwards said: "I was convinced that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons and was doing everything in his power to get nuclear weapons. There was some disparity in the information I had about how far along he was in that process. I didn't rely on George Bush for that. And I personally think there's some dishonesty in suggesting that members of the United States Senate relied on George Bush for that information, because I don't think it's true. It's great politics. But it's not the truth."

Edwards refused to single out anyone, but Goldberg wrote that he appeared to be referring to John Kerry, who chose Edwards as his 2004 presidential running mate. Like Nelson, Kerry claims he was misled and "given evidence that was not true."

"I was on the intelligence committee," Edwards went on, "so I got direct information from the intelligence community. And then I had a series of meetings with former Clinton administration people. And they were all saying the same thing. Everything I was hearing in the intelligence committee was the same thing I was hearing from these guys. And there was nary a dissenting voice."

For Edwards, the question at the time was not whether the information he was getting was accurate but whether to trust George Bush. "I decided to do it, and I was wrong."

He should have listened to Bob Graham.
http://www.ocala.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070117/OPINION/201170311/1030/OPINION01

And Lastly....GENERAL CLARK'S Testimony to congress - 9/26/02

"The war is unpredictable and could be difficult and costly. And what is at risk in the aftermath is an open-ended American ground commitment in Iraq and an even deeper sense of humiliation in the Arab world, which could intensify our problems in the region and elsewhere.

we're going to have chaos in that region....; in fact, what may happen is that we'll remove a repressive regime and have it replaced with a fundamentalist regime which contributes to the strategic problem rather than helping to solve it.

Then we're dealing with the longer mid term, the mid term problems. Will Iraq be able to establish a government that holds it together or will it fragment? There are strong factionary forces at work in Iraq and they will continue to be exacerbated by regional tensions in the area. The Shia in the south will be pulled by the Iranians.

The Kurds want their own organization. The Kurds will be hemmed in by the Turks. The Iraqis also, the Iranians also are nervous of the Kurds. But nevertheless, the Kurds have a certain mass and momentum that they've built up. They will have to work to establish their participation in the government or their own identity."

We've encouraged Saddam Hussein and supported him as he attacked against Iran in an effort to prevent Iranian destabilization of the Gulf. That came back and bit us when Saddam Hussein then moved against Kuwait. We encouraged the Saudis and the Pakistanis to work with the Afghans and build an army of God, the mujahaddin, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now we have released tens of thousands of these Holy warriors, some of whom have turned against us and formed Al Qaida.

My French friends constantly remind me that these are problems that we had a hand in creating. So when it comes to creating another strategy, which is built around the intrusion into the region by U.S. forces, all the warning signs should be flashing. There are unintended consequences when force is used. Use it as a last resort. Use it multilaterally if you can. Use it unilaterally only if you must."
http://www.rapidfire-silverbullets.com/2007/01/mining_and_finding_prescient_g.html

This is excellent. You should post this as an OP. (Or did you already?)

There was one extremely important statement that I want to review. It was the statement "The United Nations inspections regime that operated in Iraq until late 1998 destroyed most of Iraq's ballistic missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons program."

Are there any other sources for this besides The Nation? This is something I had not heard before, and it's very critical if true.

RITTER: Well, look: As of December 1998 we had accounted for 90 to 95 percent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability -- "we" being the weapons inspectors. We destroyed all the factories, all of the means of production and we couldn't account for some of the weaponry, but chemical weapons have a shelf-life of five years. Biological weapons have a shelf-life of three years. To have weapons today, they would have had to rebuild the factories and start the process of producing these weapons since December 1998.
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/17/saddam.ritter.cnna/

III - IAEA Achievements in Iraq
Look under this heading here: http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html

The United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi WMD throughout the 1990s in spite of persistent Iraqi obstruction. Washington withdrew weapons inspectors in 1998, resulting in Operation Desert Fox, which further degraded Iraq's WMD capability.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction

Those are some excellent links.

One of the sublinks to the IAEA assessment provided the following information:

"As of 16 December 1998, the following assessment could be made of Iraq's clandestine programme:

There were no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons was considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation.

Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon

There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapons-grade nuclear material through its indigenous processes.

There were no indications that Iraq otherwise clandestinely acquired weapons-usable material

All the safeguarded research reactor fuel was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.

There were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance...."

I'd say that's pretty conclusive. The IAEA removed all research reactor fuel, and states there were no indications any was left in Iraq. The report goes on to further state:

"III - IAEA Achievements in Iraq"
(pertaining to) "Procurement and production of uranium compounds:

Removed all known weapon usable materials


All known indigenous facilities capable of producing uranium compounds useful to a nuclear programme were destroyed during the Gulf War; IAEA inspected and completed the destruction of facilities; IAEA monitored the sites as part of their OMV activities.

Took custody of all known imported compounds and indigenously produced uranium compounds"

(pertaining to)"Industrial-scale facilities for the production of uranium compounds suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment:

All known indigenous facilities capable of producing uranium compounds useful for fuel fabrication and for isotopic enrichment were destroyed during the Gulf War; IAEA inspected and completed the destruction of facilities; IAEA monitored the sites as part of their OMV activities.
R&D of indigenous uranium enrichment technologies

Destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless all known single-use equipment used in enrichment R&D

Destroyed all known facilities and equipment for the enrichment of uranium...."

There's more still, but that's good enough for me.

Iraq didn't have any WMDs when Bush invaded Iraq. And the intelligence indicating no WMDs was already available before the invasion.

Bush was not "misinformed." He lied. Period.