by horizonr, Thu May 03, 2007 at 09:03:08 PM EST
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Hillary Clinton just released a statement that makes it very clear that she has no intention to push the Senate -- or lead the country -- to get out of Iraq anytime soon. This is a Mack-truck-wide opening -- especially for Barack Obama. Both he and Edwards should use this and exploit it to the hilt.
The statement is at
http://clinton.senate.gov/news/statements/details.cfm?id=273563&& Today, Senator Byrd announced on the Senate floor our intention to introduce legislation which proposes October 11, 2007 -- the five-year anniversary of the original resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq -- as the expiration date for that resolution. As Senator Byrd pointed out, the October 11, 2002 authorization to use force has run its course, and it is time to reverse the failed policies of President Bush and to end this war as soon as possible.
Earlier this week, President Bush vetoed legislation reflecting the will of Congress and the American people that would have provided needed funding for our troops while also changing course in Iraq and beginning to bring our troops home.
I believe that this fall is the time to review the Iraq war authorization and to have a full national debate so the people can be heard. I supported the Byrd amendment in 2002 which would have limited the original authorization to a year and I believe a full reconsideration of the terms and conditions of the authorization is overdue. This bill would require the president to do just that.
The American people have called for change, the facts on the ground demand change, and the Congress has passed legislation that requires change. It is time to sunset the authorization for the war in Iraq. If the president will not bring himself to accept reality, it is time for Congress to bring reality to him.
I urge my colleagues to join Senator Byrd and me in supporting this effort
to require a new authorization resolution for these new times.
If Clinton believes "it is time...to end this war as soon as possible"...
• Why do we need to wait 5 months before we "review" the Iraq authorization?
• Why do we need to wait 5 months before having "a full national debate so the people can be heard"? Haven't we already
had a national debate? Weren't the people already heard in November 2006?
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There is a reason why the new sign-up feature on Clinton's Web site -- "DEAUTHORIZE THE WAR" in giant capital letters, followed by an invitation to "Join Hillary in her call to bring an end to the war by cosponsoring her resolution to
deauthorize the war" (emphasis mine) -- requires visitors to sign up right then and there, with no link to the statement itself:
Hillary Clinton is NOT moving to "deauthorize the war."Look at the statement. Clinton proposes:
• an "expiration date" for "the original resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq"
• "reconsideration of the terms and conditions of the authorization" (of the use of force in Iraq)
• "a new authorization resolution" (of the use of force in Iraq)
This is both a set-up and an excuse for Clinton to vote in favor of a funding-only resolution that sets no timetable for troop withdrawal.
And it is not what Bill Richardson has in mind when he says, on his own Web site, that Congress must "De-Authorize the War." On Tuesday, Richardson "called on Congress...to
immediately pass a resolution, under the War Powers Act, that would de-authorize the Iraq War and provide a rapid timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces." (emphasis mine).
linkAll three conditions are part of Clinton's bill. So if passed, Congress would have to reauthorize with no timetable and no cutting funds.
Even as Richardson one-ups Clinton with his proposal, he gives the impression that this is a simple majority vote, when in fact it has to be a supermajority in both houses. Wanted: 16 Republican Senators to de-authorized the war! If 16 Repubs stepped up to the plate and the measure is passed, the Supreme Court would likely get involved.
Even if there were a prohibition in the Constitution against so-called congressional "micromanagement" of a war -- and there's not -- this wouldn't be that. There would be no congressional officials here overseeing the President's discretionary responsibilities; no requirement that the President get approval of one or both Houses before taking certain actions. There would, instead, simply be limitations on a war imposed by statutes passed with the President's signature or by supermajorities of both Houses of Congress over the President's veto.
Just as the McCain Amendment prohibits the President from using cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment against Al Qaeda prisoners; just as numerous other statutes and treaties place limitations on how the President can conduct war or other conflicts (e.g., the torture statute; the War Crimes Act; the War Powers Resolution; FISA; the Habeas Act; the UCMJ (upheld in part in Hamdan, over the President's objections that it would impinge on his ability to defeat the enemy); the Boland Amendments; a bunch of statutes at the tail-end of the Vietnam War prohibiting the use of funds for the use of armed forces in particular nations, such as Cambodia); just as numerous other statutes have authorized hostilities only for certain purposes and on certain conditions, thus imposing implicit limitations (e.g., the statute upheld in Little v. Barreme; the 1993 Defense authorization provision that funds could be obligated in Somalia beyond March of 1994 only "to protect American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, and noncombat personnel to advise the United Nations commander in Somalia"; etc.); -- and odds are that Senator Biden voted for the vast majority of these statutory limitations on the Commander-in-Chief . . .
. . . so, too, the hypothetical statute here would prohibit him from using more than a specified number of troops in Iraq, and/or require that the troops be used only for particular purposes and only for a specified period of time.
The issue is a complex one. Arguments are, indeed, often made for disabling Congress from limiting the Commander-in-Chief's discretion. And one can certainly imagine the President and the Vice President making such arguments. But Democratic critics in Congress? Does it make any sense for them to disclaim some of Congress's most important powers for checking the Executive, when there is a rich history of such statutory limitations and where there is almost no judicial authority questioning Congress's power?
Ask yourself this: Imagine a hypothetical situation in which an armed conflict has gone disasterously awry, resulting in a devastating and spiraling civil war in a major Middle Eastern nation and profound harms to both U.S. troops and our nation's long-term foreign interests. Over 70% of the U.S. public concludes that the President's proposal to escalate the conflict will only make the disaster worse, and is for that reason a terrible mistake. Over two-thirds of each House of Congress -- supermajorities that include numerous members of the President's own party -- are willing to vote to forbid him from taking such a fateful step.
link Congress Can Forbid the President from Escalating the Iraq War without Renewed AuthorizationEven if the President does not submit his plan for congressional approval, Congress is constitutionally empowered to require him to do so.
As Commander in Chief, the President’s role is to prosecute the war that Congress has authorized. The President may not go beyond this authorization.
This understanding of the President’s power as Commander in Chief is plain enough from the text of the Constitution itself. It has also been the consistent interpretation of the Courts. Chief Justice John Marshall set forth this interpretation in a series of cases arising from the naval war with France. Most notably, in Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice Marshall held that the President’s war powers are defined by statute and may not exceed statutory limits.
In the naval war with France, Congress had authorized the U.S. navy to intercept vessels bound to, but not from, French ports. In Little a U.S. navy ship, acting pursuant to a presidential order to intercept ships bound to or from French ports, intercepted a commercial vessel suspected of coming from a French port. The Supreme Court ruled the action illegal because it went beyond the military force authorized by statute.
The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this view of the war power. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the famous Steel Seizure case), the Supreme Court struck down President Truman’s order that the nation’s steel mills continue operating in order to keep the troops in the Korean War armed. Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion (which the Supreme Court has since held to set forth the proper view of presidential power) emphasized that the Constitution does not set forth exclusive power, but overlapping or shared power. Where Congress and the President share power, as in the area of war power, the President is bound to comply with the statutes that Congress enacts.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has applied Justice Jackson’s framework to resolve challenges to President Bush’s assertions of commander-in-chief power. In both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the Supreme Court rejected the President’s assertion of unilateral authority to conduct military operations (in those cases dealing specifically with the detention and treatment of enemy combatants), holding instead that the President must comply with applicable statutory limits as well as applicable international law.
The Supreme Court has been clear and unambiguous. When Congress, acting in the vast areas of overlapping power, tells the President “no,” the President must comply. Thus, Congress may limit the scope of the present Iraq War by either of two mechanisms. First, it may directly define limits on the scope of that war—and forbid the President from exceeding these limits—such as by imposing a ceiling on the number of troops assigned to that conflict. Second, it may achieve the same objective by enacting appropriations riders that limit the use of appropriated funds. Indeed, the reason that the Constitution limits military appropriations to two years is to prevent Congress from abdicating its responsibility to oversee ongoing military engagements.
link War Powers ResolutionCongress needs to
set a deadline for withdrawal and cut funding to end the war More on Congress limiting and cutting funds for war