Clinton educates a misinformed voter; crowd applauds

Their exchanged grew heated as he insisted the bill would authorize combat. Clinton snapped back, her voice rising, "I'm sorry, sir, it does not."

"I know what we voted for, and I know what we intended to do with it," she said. She said it gives the authority to impose penalties.

Many in the crowd applauded her in an effort to cut off the exchange.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/07/AR2007100700798_2.html

If it did, isn't that what the dispute is over? Whether it could be used as a backdoor entrance by Cheney and Bush and the rest of the thugs in the White House?

Hillary was correct -voter incorrect -text below



TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED:

SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq''.

(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state''.

(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM , since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.

(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, states that ``he Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. ..... It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.

(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian border''.

(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``e know that it goes as high as Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force. ..... We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country''.

(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence in Iraq, that ``he political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.

(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, that ``he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability''.

(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, that ``e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy commander, and others, and it's in black and white. ..... We interrogated these individuals. We have on tape. ..... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of course not. ..... So they told us about the amounts of money that they have received. They told us about the training that they received. They told us about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that that they received''.

(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, that ``hat we have got is evidence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we captured, documents and so forth. ..... In one case, a 22-page document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in January''.

(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289, states that ``here has been no decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians..... Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest impediments to progress on reconciliation''.

(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in Iraq, that ``ost of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force..... For the period of June through the end of August, events are projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of March through May''.

(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than actually doing serious business ..... Right now, I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.

(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, stating that ``e have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.

(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--

(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions and structures its military presence in Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of the global economy;

(2) that it is a vital national interest of the United States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;

(3) that it should be the policy of the United States to combat, contain, and roll back the violent activities and destabilizing influence inside Iraq of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its foreign facilitators such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and its indigenous Iraqi proxies;

(4) to support the prudent and calibrated use of all instruments of United States national power in Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military instruments, in support of the policy described in paragraph (3) with respect to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies;

(5) that the United States should designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and

(6) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March 24, 2007, respectively.

"(5) that the United States should designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and..."

Designating part of another country's army as terrorist organization is no way to further diplomatic exchanges as she claims.

KYL-LIEBERMAN MODIFIED AMENDMENT NO. 2011 SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq''.
(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state''.
(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM , since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, states that ``he Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian border''.
(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``e know that it goes as high as Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force . . . We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country''.
(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence in Iraq, that ``he political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, that ``he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability''.
(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, that ``e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy commander, and others, and it's in black and white . . . We interrogated these individuals. We have on tape ..... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of course not . . . So they told us about the amounts of money that they have received. They told us about the training that they received. They told us about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that that they received''.
(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, that ``hat we have got is evidence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we captured, documents and so forth . . . In one case, a 22-page document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in January''.
(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289, states that ``here has been no decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians . . . Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in Iraq, that ``ost of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force . . . For the period of June through the end of August, events are projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of March through May''.
(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than actually doing serious business . . . Right now, I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.
(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, stating that ``e have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions and structures its military presence in Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of the global economy;
(2) that it is a critical national interest of the United States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
(3) that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
(4) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March 24, 2007, respectively.
Insert prior to section (6) the following:
(16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that ``I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not going to talk anymore . . . I do believe it's important to keep the option for further discussion on the table.''
(17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September 16, 2007 that ``I think that the administration believes at this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the one we are using . . . we always say all options are on the table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is the one that we are pursuing.''

The more bellicose language, using the word "combat" was removed and other wording changed. The argument still is that calling a segment of the Iranian army a terrorist organization is a bad precedent and the amendment is a move toward justifying military action against Iran.

Hillary voted for it; Biden and Dodd did not. There were reasons they didn't, so, if the amendment is supposed to be so harmless, why didn't HRC's Democratic allies (Biden and Dodd) vote along with her?

when he was just an undecided voter. Iowa has many of those.

She'd been asked the same question three times, which was suspicious. And she apolgized afterward. The guy should have had his facts straight.

and he seems to be committed Dem who write a lot of letters to the editor to his local paper. So far, no indication of him being a plant or someone sent there to make Hillary look bad.

Check the flopjunkie thread- there are some posts about the guy.

She apologized. It's understandable she was suspicious, given she had apparently been getting the same question based on the same false premise at several venues.

Although, he probably never would have voted for her anyway since he was hung up on a misrepresentation of what she voted for. In other words, he seemed out to get her. Probably he was a lost cause.

I like the way Clinton stands up for herself when attacked. She doesn't back down, and that gives me confidence in her ability to fight and win.

I am.

TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED:

SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq''.

(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state''.

(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM , since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.

(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, states that ``he Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. ..... It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.

(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian border''.

(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``e know that it goes as high as Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force. ..... We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country''.

(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence in Iraq, that ``he political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.

(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, that ``he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability''.

(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, that ``e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy commander, and others, and it's in black and white. ..... We interrogated these individuals. We have on tape. ..... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of course not. ..... So they told us about the amounts of money that they have received. They told us about the training that they received. They told us about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that that they received''.

(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, that ``hat we have got is evidence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we captured, documents and so forth. ..... In one case, a 22-page document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in January''.

(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289, states that ``here has been no decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians..... Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest impediments to progress on reconciliation''.

(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in Iraq, that ``ost of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force..... For the period of June through the end of August, events are projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of March through May''.

(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than actually doing serious business ..... Right now, I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.

(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, stating that ``e have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.

(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--

(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions and structures its military presence in Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of the global economy;

(2) that it is a vital national interest of the United States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;

(3) that it should be the policy of the United States to combat, contain, and roll back the violent activities and destabilizing influence inside Iraq of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its foreign facilitators such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and its indigenous Iraqi proxies;

(4) to support the prudent and calibrated use of all instruments of United States national power in Iraq, including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military instruments, in support of the policy described in paragraph (3) with respect to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies;

(5) that the United States should designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and

(6) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March 24, 2007, respectively.

Well I sure see the "military instruments" part still there, I still see the urging of declaring the Revolutionary Guards to be a terrorist group, and the words "combat, contain and roll back" Iran's violent behavior inside of Iraq and that of its facilitators.

No, it doesn't say, "Oh and we'd like you to invade Iran too," but that wasn't the point at all.

n/t

I don't find this funny at all.

Fine whatever. You, Hillary etc, seem to think that because it's a non-binding resolution, it has no cost and cheerleading for heightened tensions with Iran can be done safely with all the blame for anything that happens to squarely fall on the shoulders of the Bush administration. I don't find the march to war with Iran to be funny at all. But for those who think it's a big joke, ha. ha. ha.

text that passed is below

KYL-LIEBERMAN MODIFIED AMENDMENT NO. 2011 SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq''.
(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state''.
(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM , since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, states that ``he Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian border''.
(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``e know that it goes as high as Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force . . . We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country''.
(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence in Iraq, that ``he political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, that ``he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability''.
(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, that ``e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy commander, and others, and it's in black and white . . . We interrogated these individuals. We have on tape ..... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of course not . . . So they told us about the amounts of money that they have received. They told us about the training that they received. They told us about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that that they received''.
(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, that ``hat we have got is evidence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we captured, documents and so forth . . . In one case, a 22-page document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in January''.
(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289, states that ``here has been no decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians . . . Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in Iraq, that ``ost of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force . . . For the period of June through the end of August, events are projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of March through May''.
(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than actually doing serious business . . . Right now, I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.
(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, stating that ``e have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions and structures its military presence in Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of the global economy;
(2) that it is a critical national interest of the United States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
(3) that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
(4) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March 24, 2007, respectively.
Insert prior to section (6) the following:
(16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that ``I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not going to talk anymore . . . I do believe it's important to keep the option for further discussion on the table.''
(17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September 16, 2007 that ``I think that the administration believes at this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the one we are using . . . we always say all options are on the table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is the one that we are pursuing.''

The only substantive change is the "combat and contain" line which the later "military instruments" part refers to. (Since that language was removed, the reference to it was also removed.)

I'd characterize the resolution as saying, "Iran is very, very bad, and WE TRUST that the Bush administration will properly put a halt to all of Iran's evil deeds inside and affecting Iraq. Oh and you should still declare the Revolutionary Guards to be terrorists, pretty please?"

But that would be accusing Hillary Clinton of spin and well, we can't have that.

KYL-LIEBERMAN MODIFIED AMENDMENT NO. 2011 SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq''.
(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state''.
(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM , since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, states that ``he Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of extreme severity and have the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and maim our soldiers are coming from across the Iranian border''.
(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``e know that it goes as high as Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force . . . We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country''.
(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence in Iraq, that ``he political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, that ``he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability''.
(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, that ``e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy commander, and others, and it's in black and white . . . We interrogated these individuals. We have on tape ..... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of course not . . . So they told us about the amounts of money that they have received. They told us about the training that they received. They told us about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that that they received''.
(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, that ``hat we have got is evidence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we captured, documents and so forth . . . In one case, a 22-page document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in January''.
(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289, states that ``here has been no decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians . . . Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in Iraq, that ``ost of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force . . . For the period of June through the end of August, events are projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of March through May''.
(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than actually doing serious business . . . Right now, I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.
(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, stating that ``e have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions and structures its military presence in Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of the global economy;
(2) that it is a critical national interest of the United States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
(3) that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
(4) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March 24, 2007, respectively.
Insert prior to section (6) the following:
(16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that ``I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not going to talk anymore . . . I do believe it's important to keep the option for further discussion on the table.''
(17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September 16, 2007 that ``I think that the administration believes at this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the one we are using . . . we always say all options are on the table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is the one that we are pursuing.''

""SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military Force'.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

(b) War Powers Resolution Requirements-

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.""

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/sjres23_eb.htm

Therefore * has the power, granted by Congress unconstitutionally in this AUMF to unilaterally proceed with military action outside of Congressional oversight and specific authorization; the "he (President Bush, or any subsequent President I suppose) determines" language is therefore unconstitutionally granted this power which can also violate the War Powers Resolution, since the WPA of '73

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm

requires "clear" "circumstances" and "situations", something sorely amiss in the WMD fiasco and even now we're finding in the original War on Terror pretext of 9-11 according to the 9-11 Truth Movement folks who are pointing out much information about the 9-11 attacks that make many scratch their heads.

In any event, the war in Iraq, Oct 2002 AUMF, is now obsolete since the war's pretexts are all in a muck; in fact even Sen Warner has considered a 'revisit' of this AUMF since the war is now clearly an occupation having no resemblance to the original rationales given for the uses of military force:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html

a quote where she's suggesting he was sent by someone to ask the question. Do you have a link? Thanks.

It seems the gentleman was incorrect about the resolution.

Thanks for this thread, as you said, sometimes a reality check is badly needed.

She is absolutely UNFLAPPABLE!

She knows the issues, and she knows where she stands on those issues. And that is what she presents to the voters.

Well done, Sen. Clinton!

And what can I say, brilliant!

but refuses to be bullied. No one will be suggesting now she can't take care of herself and push back when appropriate.

Sometimes a bully on a mis-informed mission just needs a good head thump.

I just love a good strong woman. Go Hill.

The bottom line is that this nimrod in office will use any half-baked excuse to pursue an agenda he wants to follow whether or not some same individual can claim that a certain ruling in congress did NOT give him authorization to go to war.

Many would argue that he violated the Iraq "authorization" when he went to war then. What's stopping Bush from misinterpretting this bill again and doing the exact same thing in Iran again! Apparently a weak kneed congress, press, and other entities that you'd normally expect to hold him accountable when he breaks laws, which he routinely does in ways that noone holds him accountable for.

If Hillary thinks any "wording" traps in this bill protects them from having Bush using it to attack Iran, she's got another thing coming. She might have had an excuse that she and her congressional peers didn't know that Bush wasn't going to follow the true allowances of the Iraq bill when he went ahead with using that bill to go into Iran, but she should know better than to have anything even CLOSE to the bill that they had for Iraq passed for Iran this time around. If she thinks the language of that bill is going to give her political cover if Bush violates it again to go to war, she's got another thing coming this time around.

This person who argued with her was RIGHT ON in his comments saying essentially that.

The better approach of couse, would be to recognize that this government is dysfunctional now and that there's no way to pass "nuanced" bills like this to allow for prudent use of force and witthold authorization from blatantly wrong efforts to going to war like happened with Iraq. And that the only way to fix this dysfunctional government is to impeach those responsible for this lawless behavior and put someone in place where you CAN trust them to do the right thing if a very difficult choice comes up with someone like Iran and not having them itching to pull the trigger.

Oh don't forget, it's "non-binding!"

LOL, Like Bush Inc cares if it's non-binding or not! :rofl:

We know she will not relinquish any of the additional power bush gave the office. Invading Iran is just annother place for the "Military industerial complex"to make more money. HRC is for that.

capable of handling herself.

One of the things I love about her, is that she doesn't wait to respond, when baselessly attacked. It's one of the things she taught President Clinton.

I remember reading in a book on Hillary Clinton, that during the Arkansas days, Bill Clinton didn't feel the need to respond when lies were told about him. He figured that the people of Arkansas were smart enough to know when lies were being told about him.

And Hillary taught him that he still had to respond. That if he did not respond, poeple would assume what was being said about him was true.

If she wins the nomination next year, this is exactly how she will need to handle the general election, and I feel very confident she will do so.

Nothing close.

The REALITY is that the bill Hillary voted FOR escalates hostility toward Iran and moves us one step closer to WAR!

You may parse it any way you like, but you cannot deny the above REAL WORLD results.

has the authority to go after them. remember he said we will hunt terrorist where ever they are.So when Hillary and the other senators voted yes to call the republican guard a terrorist group that sealed the deal.

Typical waste of time on their part

vitriolic posts.

That would have been the next question.

If anyone can spin what she would have answered to that, please post.

:popcorn: