AP: Analyst warns against partitioning Iraq

Political instability could ensue and Iraq's economic development could be crippled, said Cordesman, a former director of intelligence assessment at the Pentagon.

Iran and others would try to exploit Iraq's weakness and divisions, he wrote in a report released Wednesday. He added that Iraq is divided along sectarian and ethnic lines in many areas by the force of extremists. The Kurds are the only faction that shows major popular support for any formal effort at partition.

(snip)

Deriding the description "soft partition" as a cruel oxymoron, he said "virtually every aspect of sectarian and ethnic struggle to date has been brutal, and come at a high economic cost to those affected."

"The reality is that partitioning must be described as 'hard' by any practical political, economic and humanitarian standard," Cordesman said.

And, he said, "the U.S. is in a poor position to encourage partitioning or federalism when Iraqi public opinion polls show that most Iraqis do not want such divisions to take place."

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A debate has developed over whether the US should try to legislate Iraqi federalism and
encourage some form of “soft partitioning.” It is time to take a much harder look at the
facts in Iraq, at just how “hard” partitioning has already been, and at the dangers any
form of federalism or partitioning can have unless they are achieved as the result of some
form of Iraqi accommodation that can minimize the years of turbulence and instability
that could follow any form of sectarian and ethnic division.

Some formal political division of Iraq’s population may take place as a result of force,
intimidation, and other factors causes by the insurgency and Iraq’s civil conflicts, but
planning and managing it in any orderly way will be incredibly difficult for Iraq’s leaders
and the Iraqi government, and is not something the US should overtly encourage.
No one can deny that Iraq is already dividing along sectarian and ethnic lines in many
areas. This process, however, has been forced upon Iraq’s population by its violent
extremists rather than by popular will, and Iraq’s Kurds are the only faction in Iraq that
show major popular support any formal effort at partitioning. The term “Soft
Partitioning” has also been shown to be a cruel oxymoron. Virtually every aspect of
sectarian and ethnic struggle to date has been brutal, and come at a high economic cost to
those affected. The reality is that partitioning must be described as “hard” by any
practical political, economic, and humanitarian standard.

If such divisions continue and reach the level of partitioning or federalism that effectively
divide Iraq on sectarian and ethnic lines the consequences are likely to be much grimmer.
It is far from clear that such developments will lead to a large-scale blood bath --
although this is at least possible. However, isolated cases of large-scale violence and
local atrocities seem all too likely. Major new displacements of population are almost
certain, and will come at great economic cost to those involved.

Any such developments that occur without some form of broad national political
accommodation, and without a central government that retains significant strength, is
virtually certain to lead to ongoing local and regional power struggles. The result will be
continuing insecurity, and a level of political instability that easily could play out over a
decade or more. It might well cripple much of Iraq’s economic development. It also could
lead to political or military intervention by Iraq’s neighbors as they take sides, and some -
- like Iran – will seek to exploit Iraq’s weakness and divisions.

Even if Iraqis can agree on some form of accommodation that create sectarian and ethnic
zones in much of the country – “federalism” by at least partial consensus -- the results are
still likely to be continued tension and instability, albeit at a lower level. Efforts to pay
compensation and actually manage such separation in peaceful ways are almost certainly
likely to fail in many cases because of sectarian and ethnic divisions over how to pay the
money, the specific details of any given set of shifts, and the inability to create housing
and jobs in ways that match population migration. Efforts to create military and police
forces and a justice system that is not divided along sectarian and ethnic lines are almost
certain to fail. Preserving and improving Iraq’s infrastructure -- petroleum, water, utilities
and transport – will at best present massive challenges.

As for the US, there is a good case for quiet efforts to help Iraq’s leaders find solutions
that reflect the grim realities of the last four years, that do create “federal areas” that
empower Arab Shi’ites, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds without breaking up the country, and
develop more legitimate local and provincial governments and ensure a sharing of the
nation’s oil wealth.

This is very different, however, from trying to openly intervene in shaping the division or
partitioning of Iraq. First, it is far from clear that the US has the competence to offer such
plans and advice. Second, it is unclear that any overt US effort can do anything other than
alienate Iraqi factions and much of the Iraqi public. The US is in a poor position to
encouraged partitioning or federalism when Iraqi public opinion polls show that most
Iraqis do not want such divisions to take place. Further, any overt action to divide Iraq by
the US would almost certainly raise the already high level of Iraqi anger and hostility to
the US presence in Iraq, and lead one or more sides to see the US as an enemy almost
regardless of the nature of the US effort.

Third, US security efforts may not be popular among Iraqis, but they are almost certainly
doing more to reduce the cost of hard partitioning, and to make some form of gradual
Iraqi political accommodation possible, than any US effort to encourage partitioning or
federalism could possibly accomplish. If the US attempts to intervene in federalism, it
will confront major new security problems in every divided area. It will almost inevitably
see its efforts to create national -- rather than sectarian and ethnic – security forces fail.
Leaders and officials in the central government will question US motives and be
encouraged to support given factions even more than they do today. The US might also
end in compromising any ability to act as a buffer between Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic
factions or take humanitarian action to halt new outbreaks of open fighting between them.