i've been thinking about biden's idea of partitioning iraq and

have come to my own conclusion that this is a bad idea.

Look at india and pakistan, syria and lebanon, palestine and israel.

It doesn't seem to work, and always turns out bad.

Also, I don't support him because he talks tough but gives in in the end.

But until today, I supported his idea of partitioning, and after Bhutto's death it got me to thinking about the partitioning in a different light.

Maybe you should take a closer look at the plan first.

IT'S NOT PARTIONING!

duh:crazy:

Why am I still having to explain this????

say in what happens in Iraq? Haven't we had enough of this?

Keep your fingers crossed!

You really don't think it's our obligation to leave Iraq with some form of structure and stability?

perhaps we should have had france design our government for us once it was clear the articles of confederation weren't working :rofl:

You forgot to cite your butt as the source of that little factoid. :rofl:

http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=Iraq&article=167

The senator should be more honest about these problems and should follow in the footsteps of his fellow pro-partitionist Michael O'Hanlon, who openly asserts that only a minority of Iraqis support any idea of soft partitioning or federalism based on ethnic groups.

That objection has less force than it might otherwise.

Participation is effectively ocurring now, wrought by young men with guns who will not suffer central rule they do not themselves direct....

& Santa was last week, the Easter Bunny is just a few months away.

I think it's cutting off the flow of blood to your brain.....

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:rofl:


OMG! the moran brigade is out in force today


-da U, S ofa da A --mussa bee a partitionizer cause we gotta da 50 states, que no?

partitionizering into 50 piece, oh my godda, it's a miracolo

Whatever does eventuate will be forced against the will of somebody or other....

If they are going to be pissed, it might as well be because of some half ass plan that biden cooked up.

That's like saying that white english politicians should have a say in what happens in how indian reservations are run since we're the ones that displaced them in the first place.

Just a guess...

the details of Iraq's future, don't you think?

Since there are so many different ideologies that exist within Iraq's borders, the Biden plan allows for different areas to govern themselves enabling them to choose whatever approach is best suited for that particular group, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach using a strong central government.

Not to mention that it is NOT "partitioning". Read the plan.

This is so misunderstood.



A Five Point Plan for Iraq

1. Establish One Iraq, with Three Regions

Federalize Iraq in accordance with its constitution by establishing three largely autonomous regions - Shiite, Sunni and Kurd -- with a strong but limited central government in Baghdad
Put the central government in charge of truly common interests: border defense, foreign policy, oil production and revenues
Form regional governments -- Kurd, Sunni and Shiite -- responsible for administering their own regions
2. Share Oil Revenues

Gain agreement for the federal solution from the Sunni Arabs by guaranteeing them 20 percent of all present and future oil revenues -- an amount roughly proportional to their size -- which would make their region economically viable
Empower the central government to set national oil policy and distribute the revenues, which would attract needed foreign investment and reinforce each community's interest in keeping Iraq intact and protecting the oil infrastructure

3. Convene International Conference, Enforce Regional Non-Aggression Pact

Convene with the U.N. a regional security conference where Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, pledge to support Iraq's power sharing agreement and respect Iraq's borders
Engage Iraq's neighbors directly to overcome their suspicions and focus their efforts on stabilizing Iraq, not undermining it
Create a standing Contact Group, to include the major powers, that would engage Iraq's neighbors and enforce their commitments

4. Responsibly Drawdown US Troops

Direct U.S. military commanders to develop a plan to withdraw and re-deploy almost all U.S. forces from Iraq by the summer of 2008
Maintain in or near Iraq a small residual force -- perhaps 20,000 troops -- to strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq's neighbors honest and train its security forces

5. Increase Reconstruction Assistance and Create a Jobs Program

Provide more reconstruction assistance, conditioned on the protection of minority and women's rights and the establishment of a jobs program to give Iraqi youth an alternative to the militia and criminal gangs
Insist that other countries take the lead in funding reconstruction by making good on old commitments and providing new ones -- especially the oil-rich Arab Gulf countries

Plan for Iraq: What It Is - and What It Is Not

Some commentators have either misunderstood the Plan, or mischaracterized it. Here is what the plan is - and what it is not:

1. The Plan is not partition.

In fact, it may be the only way to prevent a violent partition - which has already started -- and preserve a unified Iraq. We call for a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities for truly common interests like foreign policy and the distribution of oil revenues. Indeed, the Plan provides an agenda for that government, whose mere existence will not end sectarian violence.

2. The Plan is not a foreign imposition.

To the contrary, it is consistent with Iraq's constitution, which already provides for Iraq's 18 provinces to join together in regions, with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. On October 11, Iraq's parliament approved legislation to implement the constitution's articles on federalism. Prior to the British colonial period and Saddam's military dictatorship, what is now Iraq functioned as three largely autonomous regions.

But federalism alone is not enough. To ensure Sunni support, it is imperative that Iraqis also agree to an oil revenue sharing formula that guarantees the Sunni region economic viability. The United States should strongly promote such an agreement. The final decisions will be up to Iraqis, but if we do not help them arrange the necessary compromises, nothing will get done. At key junctures in the past, we have used our influence to shape political outcomes in Iraq, notably by convincing the Shiites and Kurds to accept a provision allowing for the constitution to be amended following its adoption, which was necessary to secure Sunni participation in the referendum. Using our influence is not the same as imposing our will. With 140,000 Americans at risk, we have a right and an obligation to make known our views.

3. The Plan is not an invitation to sectarian cleansing.

Tragically, that invitation has been sent, received and acted upon. Since the Samarra mosque bombing in February, one quarter of a million Iraqis have fled their homes for fear of sectarian violence, at a rate now approaching 10,000 people a week. That does not include hundreds of thousands of Iraqis - many from the professional class - who have left Iraq since the war. Only a political settlement, as proposed in the Plan, has a chance to stop this downward spiral.

4. The Plan is the only idea on the table for dealing with the sectarian militia.

It offers a realistic albeit interim solution. Realistic, because none of the major groups will give up their militia voluntarily in the absence of trust and confidence and neither we or the Iraqi government has the means to force them to do so. Once federalism is implemented, the militias are likely to retreat to their respective regions to protect their own and vie for power, instead of killing the members of other groups. But it is only an interim solution, because no nation can sustain itself peacefully with private armies. Over time, if a political settlement endures, the militia would be incorporated into regional and national forces, as is happening in Bosnia.

5. The Plan is an answer to the problem of mixed cities.

Large cities with mixed populations present a challenge under any plan now being considered. The essence of the Plan is that mixed populations can only live together peacefully if their leadership is truly satisfied with the overall arrangement. If so, that leadership will help keep the peace in the cities. At the same time, we would make Baghdad a federal city, and buttress the protection of minorities there and in the other mixed cities with an international peacekeeping force. Right now, the prospect for raising such a force is small. But following a political settlement, an international conference and the establishment of a Contact Group, others are more likely to participate, including countries like Saudi Arabia which have offered peacekeepers in the past.

6. The Plan is in the self-interest of Iran.

Iran likes it exactly as it is in Iraq - with the United States bogged down and bleeding. But the prospect of a civil war in Iraq is not in Tehran's interest: it could easily spill over Iraq's borders and turn into a regional war with neighbors intervening on opposing sides and exacerbating the Sunni-Shiite divide at a time Shiite Iran is trying to exert leadership in the Islamic world. Iran also would receive large refugee flows as Iraqis flee the fighting. Iran, like all of Iraq's neighbors, has an interest in Iraq remaining unified and not splitting into independent states. Iran does not want to see an independent Kurdistan emerge and serve as an example for its own restive 5 million Kurds. That's why Iran - and all of Iraq's neighbors -- can and should be engaged to support a political settlement in Iraq.

7. The Plan is in the self-interest of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

The Sunnis increasingly understand they will not regain power in Iraq. Faced with the choice of being a permanent minority player in a central government dominated by Shiites or having the freedom to control their day-to-day lives in a Sunni region, they are likely to choose the latter provided they are guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues to make their region viable. The Shiites know they can dominate Iraq politically, but not defeat a Sunni insurgency, which can bleed Iraq for years. The Kurds may dream of independence, but fear the reaction of Turkey and Iran - their interest is to achieve as much autonomy as possible while keeping Iraq together. Why would Shiites and Kurds give up some oil revenues to the Sunnis? Because that is the price of peace and the only way to attract the massive foreign investment needed to maximize Iraqi oil production. The result will be to give Shiites and Kurds a smaller piece of a much larger oil pie and give all three groups an incentive to protect the oil infrastructure.




Thanks for your uninformed opinion though.....

will read later on!

:kick:

at the end of WWI by the Europeans without regard to ethnic makeup or ancient ongoing feuds. EXACTLY the same situation as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. These were fantasy countries with borders that placed blood-feuds that existed for centuries within. They cannot, and did not survive. Iraq remains and it too will wind up as Kurd-Sunni-shia whether dipwads on blogs in the US want it or not, it will wind up divided whether the fucking WORLD wants it or not, these cultures cannot co-exist, not at this time and not in the forseeable future. Now go see a good lawyer about suing your school, you were cheated!

that for themselves. They shouldn't be forced to maintain a strong central government if that's not what they want. However, there simply isn't much we can do to "make" them set up a 3-state federation, either. I didn't agree with the Biden Resolution, but I don't think it did much harm, being non-binding and all.

what their constitution CALLS FOR. So, apparently, they did agree to it.

Just disagree with the necessity or wisdom of the "American Stamp of Official Approval" of this plan via Senate legislation, that's all. Imagine another nation passing a law on what type of government WE should have--not since we belonged to the English, right? Would seem arrogant, and insult our national pride, no matter how effed-up our country was. And as the OP says, not sure that this plan would be any more stable or peaceful than a central government in the long term, even if it was what they had way back before the English messed with them. More heavyhanded Western-Father-Knows-Best imperialist thinking, IMO. They don't need our suggestions on how to organize themselves--they need us to leave them largely alone while they struggle to become a functional, cohesive country again, without a foreign occupying force of hundreds of thousands.

(from Joe Biden's floor statement)

The example of Bosnia is illustrative. Ten years ago, Bosnia was being torn apart by ethnic cleansing. The United States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords to keep the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations. We even allowed Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of U.S. troops and others, Bosnians have lived a decade in peace. Now, they are strengthening their central government, and disbanding their separate armies. The Bush administration continues to hope that Iraqis will rally behind a strong central government that keeps the country together and protects the rights of all citizens equally. But that vision has been engulfed by the flames of sectarian hatred. There is no trust within the central government, no trust of the government by the people, no capacity by the government to deliver security and services - and no evidence that we can build that trust and capacity any time soon. There are two other ways to govern Iraq from the center: a foreign occupation that the United States cannot sustain or the return of a dictator like Saddam Hussein, who is no on the horizon.

That leaves federalism as Iraq's best possible future. But unless we help make it work for all Iraqis, it won't stop the violence. We should start with a major diplomatic offensive to convince the major powers and Iraq's neighbors that a federal Iraq is the best possible outcome for them, too. Then, together, we should convene a Dayton-like conference to move all the Iraqi parties from civil war to the negotiating table. Through a combination of pressure and reassurance, we would persuade the Sunnis to accept federalism and press the Shiites and Kurds to give the Sunnis a bigger piece of the pie.

The course we're on leads to a terrible civil war and possibly a regional war. This plan is designed to head that off. It offers the possibility - not the guarantee - of producing a soft landing for Iraq. I believe it is the best way to bring our troops home, protect our fundamental security interests, and preserve Iraq as a unified country.

The question I have for those who reject this plan is simple: what is your alternative?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

About the Dayton Peace Accords;

Overview
On Nov. 21, 1995, after 21 days of intensive negotiations at an anything-but-luxurious American Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, the three Bosnian leaders initialed a peace agreement and 11 annexes, known as the Dayton accords, to try to bring an end to nearly four years of terror and killing in the former Yugoslavia. About 250,000 people died and another 2.7 million were turned into refugees.

The accords went into effect when the leaders -- Alijia Izetbegovic of Bosnia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia -- formally signed the pact in Paris on Dec. 14. NATO troops known as the Implementation Force, or IFOR, took over from United Nations troops in Bosnia on Dec. 20, known as "D-day," starting the clock on a series of deadlines running for a year and bringing some 60,000 NATO troops, nearly 20,000 of them American, to keep the peace in Bosnia.

Already, under pressure from civilian authorities trying against great difficulties construct a single, multiethnic state in Bosnia, NATO has agreed to keep all those troops in Bosnia through Dec. 14, through elections that are supposed to take place by Sept. 14.

American officials say it is almost sure that a new, smaller force of NATO troops, including some Americans, will be deployed after Dec. 14 with a new mandate, to insure that Bosnia does not return to open warfare.

But big doubts remain that Bosnia will be reintegrated; that substantial numbers of refugees will be able to return to their homes; that the elections will be sufficiently free and fair despite American pressure to hold them on time; that the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian nationalist parties that prosecuted the war will lose elections; or that more than a few, low-ranking officials will be turned over to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

Here is a look at the major points and deadlines in the Dayton accords, and where they stand today. (June 10, 1996)


The Division of Land

The Bosnian Serbs received 49 percent of the original Bosnia-Herzogovina, while a Federation of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats received 51 percent. The division -- and the American-forced creation of the Federation -- allowed contiguous areas, without divisions, as well as access to the sea for both entities.

Territorial issues nearly derailed the talks, but the Bosnian Muslims finally gained control of a corridor five miles (eight kilometers) wide, known as the Posavina corridor, to link Sarajevo and Gorazde, while Bosnian Serbs kept Zepa and Srebrenica. Rebel Serbs in Croatia agreed to return the region of Eastern Slavonia to the Croatian Government.

The status of Brcko, a town on the northern edge of the Posavina corridor that is traditionally Muslim but Serb-occupied, was not settled at Dayton but sent to negotiations, and then if necessary, to arbitration, which is supposed to be finished by Dec. 14. The Americans are pressing to get the matter resolved sooner. Both Serbs and Muslims claim the town.

The pact also establishes Sarajevo as a united city under the control of the new central Government, requiring Bosnian Serbs to give up control of neighborhoods and suburbs from which Serb forces had bombarded the city. That transfer of control produced ugly scenes. (See photo essay.)


War Criminals

People indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, sitting in The Hague, cannot run in elections scheduled to be held between June 14 and Sept. 14 and thus cannot hold office afterward. The three Bosnian Governments pledged to cooperate with the tribunal, but are not explicitly required to arrest indicted people. Fewer than 60 people have been indicted so far, the majority of them Serbs.

Only one person, a young Croat, Drazen Erdemovic, 24, has been convicted after a tearful confession of massacring Muslims in Srebrenica in July 1995. One Bosnian Serb, Gen. Djordje Djukic, fatally ill with cancer, finally turned himself in under international pressure but died a few weeks later.

The most prominent of those indicted for war crimes, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the military commander Ratko Mladic, remain at large and move relatively freely through the Bosnian Serb areas. NATO forces have been reluctant to move to arrest them, in part because they are surrounded by bodyguards, but mostly because they fear the Serbs will take hostages among the Western aid and political workers there. NATO's reluctance has been widely criticized.

Dr. Karadzic has openly challenged the implementation of the accords, and the Americans and Europeans have stepped up pressure on Mr. Milosevic to get Dr. Karadzic out of a position to influence events -- in particular, the coming elections. But there is little evidence that Dr. Karadzic does not remain in control of many matters, though now working through proxies.



-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dayton Accords Working In Balkans

By R. Bruce Hitchner, for the Dayton Daily News, February 10, 1998

U.S. troops' presence guarantees progress

The Dayton Peace Accords are beginning to take hold in Bosnia. Indeed, for the first time since the accords were signed more than two years ago at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, diplomats and experts are in general agreement that Bosnia has a real chance to emerge as a unified multiethnic state.

---------------------------------

Dayton Peace Accords Site;


http://www.daytonproject.org/index.php

oil, and immediate neighbors like Iran and Turkey, for starters. A state of Iraqi Shia might just eventually side with, or want to merge with, Iran--there is already a heavy influence of Iran in Iraq, especially in the south. Would the Kurds in their own northern state have to fight Turkey on their own, or would they get help from a decentralized government? They're not getting much love now, it seems. Would Syria and Saudi Arabia align with the Sunni state and cause trouble? Would there just be an even bigger eventual fight for territory and oil, causing us to have to stay there even longer, to help hold the country together and prevent neighbor interference on three fronts? I don't know much about the history of Bosnia, or how it compares to Iraq's situation, population, or economy--but my general principle is, if Iraqis want to partition themselves, fine--let it go to a national referendum, or whatever. They don't NEED us to partition them (yet) as with Bosnia. Iraqis have to lead the way.

let it GO. You do NOT know everything. You have been given GOOD information which YOU choose to IGNORE.

I wonder who's brain is bigger, yours, or your DOGS.

but they often manage to outwit me and steal my sandwiches off my plate. Plus, I follow behind them and scoop their poo. Hmmm....

That has always been the problem, and it would still be the problem.

Sharing the oil revenues sounds pretty Pollyanna-ish. There is more at stake.

up the Ottoman government after WWI. This artificial imposition of Western ideas about how the Middle Eastern map should be drawn was a bad idea a century ago and it's not a better idea now.

Moreover, an independent Kurdistan in what is now northern Iraq would invite an ethnic war of cessation in southern (ethnically Kurdish) Turkey. Creating a Shiite state in Southern Iraq would essentially create an Iranian client state on Saudi Arabia's border and remove any buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia (an invitation to regional Sunni versus Shia and Arab versus Persian conflict).

Besides, imagine if a foreign occupying power had intervened in the US Civil War and (1) decided that we were better off with a division rather than a civil war and (2) chose where the North-South border should be drawn. That might give the illusion of a solution that might promote stability, but it would not hold and it would earn the occupying force much enmity.

Saddam was a bad man, but he was a bad man who used brutality to keep the factions in place (I'm not saying this was a good thing; I'm just discussing cause and effect). We removed him. Now there is no one who can keep the factions from each others' throats (this is true both in Iraq and in the broader Middle Eastern division between Sunni and Shia). We couldn't keep them apart even if it was a good idea to impose ourselves into their civil war.

The relative sectarian "peace" in Iraq under Saddam was a false "peace" because it was artificially imposed by a vicious dictator. That false "peace" is now over and if it were possible to restore that false "peace" - if that were a good thing, which is debatable - it would have to be restored with equal brutality by a dictator comparable to Saddam.

an imperialist idea now.

It was a fairly simple conversation to follow actually. Sorry you didn't understand it.

I think the most important thing to remember that in the end it's up to the Iraqis, not us.