from which Greewald selects excerpts..
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
Defendant
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ATTACHMENT
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On two prior occasions the United States Government contacted Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) in connection with legal proceedings initiated by former Guantanamo Bay detainee Binyam Ahmed Mohamed. On both occasions, we iterated the high esteem in which we hold the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. In maintaining our remarkably open sharing of information, we indicated our strong objection to the public disclosure of certain classified information. We are most appreciative of HMG’s efforts in preventing the public disclosure of the highly sensitive information.
It has come to the United States Government’s attention that on 22 April 2009 your High Court heard argument on a motion of Mr. Mohamed for reconsideration of the Court’s decision to withhold seven paragraphs from its open decision of 21 August 2008. The Court withheld those seven paragraphs at the request of your Foreign Secretary, based on a Public Interest Immunity Certificate that explained the damage to the United Kingdom’s intelligence relationship with the United States--and as a consequence the United Kingdom’s own national security--if the paragraphs were disclosed. Mr. Mohamed argued during the 22 April hearing that given the change in administration in the United States, HMG should be ordered to ask the Obama administration for its views on the disclosure of the information contained in the seven paragraphs.
Days prior to the 22 April hearing, the Obama administration released four memoranda issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC of the U.S. Department of Justice that describe interrogation techniques that the CIA employed during interrogations of certain high-value detainees. I understand that during the hearing, the High Court placed great import on President Obama’s decision to release the OLC memoranda as an indication that the United States Government would not object to disclosure of the seven paragraphs. The Court made clear, nevertheless, that it would entertain further clarification of the United States Government’s position, and the potential damage to the U.K.-U.S. intelligence sharing relationship that would be caused by public disclosure of the seven paragraphs.
The seven paragraphs at issue are based upon classified information shared between our countries. Public disclosure of this information, reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the United Kingdom’s national security. Specifically, disclosure of this information may result in a constriction of the U.S.-U.K. relationship, as well as U.K. relationships with other countries. Among the most critical sources and methods in
the collection of foreign intelligence are the relationships the United Kingdom maintains with foreign countries. Through these relationships, the United Kingdom’s intelligence and security services are able to provide national security and foreign policy officials with information that is critical to informed decision making; information that the United Kingdom cannot obtain through other means. Without the assistance of these foreign governments, it is almost certain that the United Kingdom’s ability to identify and arrest suspected terrorists and to disrupt terrorist plots would be severely hampered. Quite clearly, the information that the United Kingdom obtains from the United States and other foreign governments is a critical component of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorist efforts.
The cooperation and sharing of intelligence between the United Kingdom and United States, as well as with other foreign governments, exists under strict conditions of secrecy. Public disclosure by the United Kingdom of information garnered from such relationships would suggest that the United Kingdom is unwilling or unable to protect information or assistance provided by its allies. As a consequence, if foreign partners learn that information it has provided is publicly disclosed, these foreign partners could take steps to withhold from the United Kingdom sensitive information that could be important to its safety and security. Any decreased cooperation from those foreign partners would adversely impact counterterrorism missions and other endeavors.
Quite distinct from the significant harm to the U.S.–U.K. partnership if the seven paragraphs--or underlying documents--are released, is the impact of President Obama’s declassification of the OLC memoranda. The memoranda focused solely on intelligence-gathering methods previously utilized by the CIA. In releasing the memoranda, President Obama made clear his administration’s intention that the enhanced interrogation techniques discussed therein would no longer be utilized by the United States Government. Neither in the memoranda, nor in any statements of the administration accompanying their release, was reference made to the identity of any foreign governments that might have assisted the United States. Given the declassification of the highly sensitive information contained in the memoranda, the fact that the President refrained from providing any information about foreign governments is indicative that the United States continues to preserve the secrecy of such information as critical to our national security.
Public disclosure of the information contained in the seven paragraphs withheld from the High Court’s open decision, as well as the documents from which the information was drawn, could likely result in serious damage to U.K. and U.S. national security. If it is determined that HMG is unable to protect information we provide to it, even if that inability is caused by your judicial system, we will necessarily have to review with the greatest care the sensitivity of information we can provide in future