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NYT: Lessons in Victory - How J.F.K.'s approach to Vietnam is a model for President Obama.

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Pirate Smile Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Oct-17-09 06:38 PM
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NYT: Lessons in Victory - How J.F.K.'s approach to Vietnam is a model for President Obama.
Edited on Sat Oct-17-09 06:45 PM by Pirate Smile
Written by Gordon M. Goldstein is the author of “Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam.”

Lessons in Victory
How J.F.K.'s approach to Vietnam is a model for President Obama.


PRESIDENT OBAMA recently told Congressional leaders something many of them did not want to hear. It was time to “dispense with the straw man argument that this is about either doubling down or leaving Afghanistan,” he is said to have declared, frustrating those on both sides of the aisle who have sought to portray the choices in Afghanistan as just such a simplistic dichotomy.
The emerging picture is of a commander in chief trying to chart a middle way
through one of the most complex challenges of his young presidency. If so, instructive lessons can be found in the contrasting ways two of his predecessors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, navigated a perilous way ahead in Vietnam.

Kennedy’s Vietnam strategy was informed by a pair of harrowing foreign policy crises in 1961 that sobered him to his responsibilities as commander in chief. The botched Bay of Pigs invasion was a humiliation that Kennedy believed would have driven him from office if he had been a British prime minister. He vowed never again to be “overawed by professional military advice.”
That same year, Kennedy was shocked by the half-baked recommendation of his generals to use tactical nuclear weapons against the Communist Pathet Lao movement in Laos, a proposal he decisively dismissed.

In this context, Kennedy was deeply skeptical when his most senior advisers argued in the fall of 1961 that only substantial numbers of American forces could prevent the government of South Vietnam from collapsing. Kennedy nonetheless rejected the deployment of combat troops. But he also rejected the notion of abandoning Saigon. Instead, he chose to chart a middle course.

Kennedy favored a strategy of arming and reinforcing the South Vietnamese Army, and of teaching them new counterinsurgency tactics. He increased the number of military advisers assigned to Saigon but maintained a ceiling of about 16,000 men.
By October 1963, operations were deemed sufficiently successful for the White House to announce the withdrawal of 1,000 advisers and its expectation that the advisory mission would be concluded by the end of 1965. At the time of Kennedy’s assassination the following month, the Pentagon had recorded only 108 American military personnel killed.

-snip-
There are four lessons from these presidential decisions that remain relevant to Afghanistan today:



Counselors advise but presidents decide: Kennedy’s ability to execute a middle way in Vietnam led him to reject military strategies he did not find plausible or persuasive. It is the president as commander in chief who must rigorously evaluate and define strategy, not the commander in the field.



Politics is the enemy of strategy: In a polarized political environment, some constituencies will necessarily be left dissatisfied. Kennedy chose to antagonize the hawks in his administration. Johnson chose to antagonize the doves. Presidents should pick the loser in the debate on strategic grounds, disallowing politics from clouding military decisions.



Command the generals: A president does not benefit from public disagreements with the military, but his position may be worse if he backs down. Kennedy’s generals in 1961 tried, and failed, to box him in by publicly leaking their proposals to the press. Johnson, in contrast, was so fixated with avoiding a public rift with Westmoreland that he subverted the deliberative process. Dissent should be encouraged in debates about strategy but articulated privately.



Never deploy military means in pursuit of indeterminate ends: Westmoreland advocated a strategy of coercion in Vietnam in which American forces would inflict such disproportionate costs on the Communist insurgency that its leadership would eventually capitulate. That outcome never came close to occurring. Military force is the wrong instrument for achieving imprecise objectives based on unrealistic goals.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/opinion/18goldstein.html


It is amazing to consider how much damage one bullet can do to a country and the world. If JFK wasn't killed... If Lincoln wasn't killed... how different would Reconstruction have been and how that could have changed what followed.

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Kurt_and_Hunter Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Oct-17-09 07:39 PM
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1. If Kennedy wasn't killed he would have lived to see set-backs...
Edited on Sat Oct-17-09 07:59 PM by Kurt_and_Hunter
and may well have ended up mired in Vietnam much like LBJ. I think Bobby Kennedy's anti-LBJ, anti-war stance has colored our thinking about the JFK presidency of five years earlier. (For one thing, JFK was a lot more hawkish than Eisenhower--a singularly non-interventionist President.)

"By October 1963, operations were deemed sufficiently successful for the White House to announce the withdrawal of 1,000 advisers and its expectation that the advisory mission would be concluded by the end of 1965."

There is no reason to take the "expectation that the advisory mission would be concluded by the end of 1965" seriously. It was an expectation at one point in time, and probably a very flawed expectation. All of our other expectations about Vietnam were wrong.

We know from history that we didn't have a clue what the real dynamics were in Vietnam. South Vietnam was vastly more vulnerable than we thought in 1963. Had Johnson been President at the same time he would probably have also expected that our military advisers had stabilized the situation in SV enough that the government could survive on its own.

And he would have been wrong.

The question is whether Kennedy would have allowed SV to be taken over by communists. In 1963 it looked like that could be prevented by small steps and Kennedy's thinking seems saner in retrospect. We know that he was thinking about letting the chips (or dominoes) fall where they may and maybe he would have. We know that Lincoln thought about sending the slaves back to Africa... people, smart presidents especially, think a lot of different things in looking for solutions.

And if Kennedy thought it acceptable to let SV fall in 1963 that doesn't mean he would have continued to find it acceptable as the reality of the thing unfolded. We know that Kennedy was comfortable with SV governments falling and probably had a tough-love approach, assuming that SV might get its act together better if we didn't prop up corrupt regimes. But did anyone in 1963 think North Vietnam could, with Russian arms, almost casually defeat the South without our help?

Kennedy was no dove. And he was going to face a Republican challenger in 1964 who would have been jumping all over the idea of allowing the reds to take SV.

I grant that JFK was skeptical of the military, and with excellent reason. But MacNamara was Kennedy's boy... would Mac have given completely different advice to JFK than he gave to LBJ?

There may have been no Tonkin resolution under JFK... or perhaps there would have been.

Lots of factors in play and we will never know.

I am not saying that JFK would have done X, Y or Z. I don't know. But it is unreliable to take what JFK thought in October 1963 and extrapolate that he would have continued to think the same thing in the face of changing circumstances.
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Pirate Smile Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Oct-17-09 09:33 PM
Response to Reply #1
2. I don't disagree with you. Kennedy's skepticism regarding the Generals is what makes
it seem like more of a question re whether or how much he would escalate.

He knew they could and potentially would screw up in a huge way. That questioning of the brass is what makes it harder to guess which way he would go.
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